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8/28/07

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

VOLUME I

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION

&

FUNCTIONS

PREPARED BY:

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

STAFF

## INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS

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## CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Control and direction of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort is exercised by the President and his National Security Council. Authorities for intelligence activities and for the various organizational entities of the Intelligence Community are set forth in statutes such as the National Security Act of 1947 and the CIA Act of 1949; in Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," 18 February 1976, in directives recently issued by President Carter and in National Security Council Intelligence Directives.

The chart at the left, "National Intelligence Community Structure," depicts the Executive Branch officials and organizations involved in control, supervision, oversight, coordination and conduct of the activities of the Intelligence Community. More detailed information on the entities identified on the chart is provided at other tabs in this briefing book.

The Director of Central Intelligence leads, coordinates and guides the Intelligence Community, but he does not "manage" it. His management and direction right applies only to the Central Intelligence Agency.

The Intelligence Oversight Board is provided quarterly reports by Inspectors General and General Counsels of intelligence organizations and reports to the President and the Attorney General concerning the legality and propriety of intelligence activities.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board reviews intelligence activities on behalf of the President and submits its recommendations directly to him.

The NSC Special Coordinating Committee reviews and makes recommendations to the President concerning sensitive activities such as proposed covert actions and reconnaissance operations over or near potentially hostile territory.

The NSC Policy Review Committee controls budget development and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program and establishes policy guidance on management, collection and production of national intelligence.

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There are twelve Director of Central Intelligence Committees including representation from all elements of the Community dealing with specialized areas of intelligence collection, production and support activities.

The National Foreign Intelligence Board, composed of the heads of all Intelligence Community organizations, is advisory to the DCI, primarily with regard to national intelligence products (such as National Intelligence Estimates) and the establishment of requirements and priorities.

The National Intelligence Officers are individual representatives of the DCI responsible for the identification of user needs and for assuring that responses are timely and of high quality.

The Intelligence Community Staff supports the DCI in execution of his Community responsibilities and provides staff support to the NSC Policy Review Committee.

The ten organizations listed at the two bottom rows of the chart are the component elements of the Intelligence Community.

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## **THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY**

- **Central Intelligence Agency**
- **National Security Agency**
- **Defense Intelligence Agency**
- **Special offices in DoD for specialized intelligence collection through reconnaissance**
- **Intelligence elements of Army, Navy, Air Force**
- **Intelligence element of the FBI**
- **Intelligence element of State Department**
- **Intelligence element of Treasury Department**
- **Intelligence element of ERDA**

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## COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Executive Order 11905 defines the component elements of the Intelligence Community as listed in the chart at the left.

The "national programs" which account for about four-fifths of the resources in the budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program are:

- The Central Intelligence Agency;
- The National Security Agency and those elements of the Army, Navy and Air Force cryptologic services subject to NSA tasking and control;

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The other organizational elements listed on the chart are "departmental programs." They provide inputs to national intelligence, but exist primarily for departmental purposes.

The listed organizations vary markedly in size. The National Security Agency and its associated components of the service cryptologic agencies  25X1  
total personnel strength of the Intelligence Community. The intelligence elements of the Treasury Department and ERDA include only a handful of people.

Departmental intelligence programs included in the National Foreign Intelligence Program are:

- Those Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence elements which are in the Defense Department's Program Three, "Intelligence and Communications;"
- The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State;
- The Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
- The Treasury Department's Special Assistant to the Secretary for National Security and his staff;
- The Deputy Assistant Administrator for National Security and his staff in the Energy Research and Development Administration.

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## **ROLE OF THE DCI**

- Chairman, Policy Review Committee (Budget & Resources)
- Executive head of the CIA and Intelligence Community Staff (ICS)
- Primary advisor to the President on foreign intelligence
- Principal spokesman to the Congress for the Intelligence Community



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## THE ROLE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The Director of Central Intelligence is both the operating head of the Central Intelligence Agency (a large and complex organization), and the titular head and leader of the Intelligence Community--a diverse collection of organizations engaged in collection, processing and producing foreign intelligence. While the Community is linked together by shared objectives and tasks, it is not a hierarchical entity in any sense.

The responsibilities of the DCI are spelled out in statute, in Executive Order 11905, in Presidential and in National Security Council Intelligence Directives. Even so, his actual role is difficult to describe since it depends on a variety of factors, of which the responsibilities actually assigned to him in documents are only one.

Other important factors include:

- a. The world situation and the types of problems which are most critical to the United States at any particular time.
- b. The expectations of the President and how the President approaches his decisionmaking.
- c. The personal relationship of the DCI with the President.
- d. The personal standing of the DCI with oversight elements of the Congress.
- e. The personality and character of the DCI himself.

In essence, however, the DCI role can be seen as involving three basic ingredients.

First, he must assure that high quality intelligence is provided to the President and to policy and decisionmaking levels of the Government.

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This involves a variety of tasks.

a. The DCI must seek to assure that the Intelligence Community has adequate resources to collect, process and produce the intelligence needed.

b. He must assure there are mechanisms for liaison with consumers to determine what is needed and that sound analysis is applied to the development of estimates.

(1) To this end, the DCI puts great reliance on his National Intelligence Officers, and on the National Foreign Intelligence Board, membership of which includes the directors of all major organizations of the Intelligence Community.

(2) He also uses his Intelligence Community Staff to review and evaluate the performance of the Community, particularly in crisis situations.

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c. The DCI must provide guidance to the Intelligence Community both as to current needs and as the basis for planning. To accomplish this the DCI issues a number of guidance documents developed for him by his Intelligence Community Staff and his National Intelligence Officers. These documents include:

(1) Key Intelligence Questions which are published annually to identify substantive matters of particular importance. Collection and production strategies are developed for the KIQs, and an evaluation is made of the manner in which organizations of the Community respond to the KIQs.

(2) The DCI's Goals and Objectives for the current fiscal year are issued annually.

(3) Guidance for the coming five years is provided annually in the DCI's Perspectives for Intelligence.

(4) Supplementing the Perspectives, is an annually prepared directive

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This guidance is applicable for planning purposes over the next five years.

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(5) The DCI's annual report on the Intelligence Community to the President and the Congress in support of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

The second major DCI function is often referred to as "management" of the Intelligence Community, but can more aptly be called leadership of the Community.

The leadership role of the DCI depends in large measure on the guidance which he issues and his use of the coordination mechanisms which are available to him, such as his Intelligence Community Staff and the National Foreign Intelligence Board. The DCI's leadership role was enhanced by his chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence. Presidential Directive NSC-2 of 20 January 1977, while abolishing the CFI, provides for a continuation of this role by designating the DCI to serve as Chairman of the NSC Policy Review Committee when it deals with Community budget and resource matters.

The DCI's role in providing guidance and ensuring coordination of Community activities is stressed because he has no authority actually to manage any elements of the Community except the CIA and the two Community elements which directly support him--the Intelligence Community Staff and the National Intelligence Officers.

In an overall sense, the DCI is the leader of the Intelligence Community, its spokesman and its primary coordinator, but not its manager.

The third major responsibility of the DCI stems from his position as operating head of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Because of competing demands on his time, particularly Community matters and the requirement that he serve as spokesman for the Community and advisor to the President and the National Security Council, the DCI leaves the detailed management of the CIA largely to his Deputy Director.

In recent years, the DCI role in managing CIA has stressed the issuance of formal directives and utilization of a system of management by objective to measure accomplishments and to assess the responsiveness of the Agency to its responsibilities.

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## THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

One of the most important responsibilities of the DCI is the annual development of the National Foreign Intelligence Program and the budget which supports this program.

All the resources of the organizations identified as part of the Intelligence Community are included in the NFIP.

From 1947 until the mid-1960s the DCI had no responsibility for the program and budget of any intelligence organization other than the CIA.

As the United States entered the space age and the potentialities of collecting intelligence from space began to emerge, the CIA and the Air Force were in strenuous competition in the development of capabilities in space.

To improve management of the overall effort, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the DCI signed a Memorandum of Understanding in August 1965, one result of which was establishment of an Executive Committee with responsibility for decisions on the program and budget of U.S. intelligence activities in space.

Members of the EXCOM originally were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Chairman, the DCI and the President's Science Advisor.

Following abolishment of the Science Advisor post, and appointment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, the EXCOM became a two-man organization, with the DCI as Chairman and the Assistant Secretary working with him.

The next step toward expanding the DCI role with regard to Community resources and budgets came in the President's memorandum of 5 November 1971 on "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community," which was reflected in the February 1972 revision of NSCID No. 1.

The President's 1972 directive markedly expanded the DCI's responsibilities, but did nothing to increase his actual authority.

The DCI was charged in this directive, among other things, to develop an annual National Foreign Intelligence Program/Budget for the entire Intelligence Community and submit it to the President through the Office of Management and Budget.

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The President established an Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, which the DCI chaired, and which advised him on budget and program matters.

During the discussions in late 1975 and early 1976 which led to issuance of Executive Order 11905 in February 1976, considerable attention was paid to the role of the DCI and the problem of developing a budget and program for the entire Intelligence Community.

The result, in this field, was the provision in the Executive Order for establishment of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence as an element of the National Security Council structure.

The DCI was chairman of the CFI and other members were the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Among the responsibilities assigned to the CFI was that it, "shall control budget preparation and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program" and "shall review and amend as it deems appropriate" the budget for the NFIP before it is submitted to the Office of Management and Budget.

The Order made the DCI responsible to "ensure the development and submission of a budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program to the CFI" and assigned the Intelligence Community Staff responsibility to provide staff support for the CFI.

The CFI devoted primary attention to the NFIP budget for FY 1978, although it also provided a Community reclama to the Senate and House conference on the FY 1977 budget and accomplished a number of other tasks such as revision of the National Security Council Intelligence Directives to bring them into consonance with the Executive Order 11905.

The first budget cycle involving the CFI was completed in November when the first consolidated budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program was submitted to the President through OMB (covering FY 1978).

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As adjusted by the President, this budget is currently being defended by the DCI before responsible oversight Committees of the Congress.

#### MECHANISMS AND CHANNELS AVAILABLE TO THE DCI FOR EXECUTION OF HIS COMMUNITY RESPONSIBILITIES

In addition to the DCI's role in the development of the NFIB, the DCI has a wide variety of arrangements under which he responds to his responsibilities as leader of the Intelligence Community.

Within his own office he has an Intelligence Community Staff headed by the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community.

For the production of national intelligence he looks to his own National Intelligence Officers, headed by the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence, and to the production elements of the Central Intelligence Agency.

The National Foreign Intelligence Board, which the DCI chairs, provides a means for obtaining inputs to national intelligence from elements of the Community with production capabilities and a means for reviewing the national intelligence products.

A dozen DCI Committees, including representation from all elements of the Community, work on problems of collection, production and support within their specialized areas of interest.

His provision of intelligence to the senior levels of the Government is markedly enhanced by the fact that the DCI attends National Security Council meetings and is a member of (and chairs when it meets on intelligence) the NSC Policy Review Committee. The DCI is also a member of the NSC Special Coordination Committee which considers and makes recommendations to the President on all proposed covert action programs and special operations.

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He meets regularly with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

His role as spokesman to the Congress on intelligence matters, while time consuming, keeps him in continuing contact with all of the Congressional committees which have a role in intelligence oversight and in budget matters.

#### OPTIONS FOR CHANGE

Recognition of the anomalies in the role of the DCI has been reflected in recent examination at senior levels of the Government of various organizational options applicable to definition of the role of the senior U.S. foreign intelligence officer, whether or not he is termed the DCI.

The four options to which particular attention has been given, and the PROs and CONs applicable to each are outlined in the following paragraphs.

#### THE FIRST OPTION

The senior foreign intelligence officer would be a member both of the White House Staff and of the National Security Council. He would have supervisory and direct management authority over the major national intelligence organizations-- CIA, NSA and NRO. The CIA would have a separate director. The NSA and NRO would each become a statutory executive agency. The senior intelligence officer would have responsibility for production of national estimates and for the warning function, and would have a staff for these purposes. Departmental and agency intelligence would be a responsibility of the departments and the CIA. Community coordination mechanisms would be as desired by the senior intelligence officer.

##### a. PROs

(1) The President and the Congress would have one man upon whom to charge responsibility for effectiveness of the U.S. national intelligence effort--and that man would have the tools to carry out the job.

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(2) The national intelligence effort would be highly centralized through direct management controls from the top, embracing CIA, NSA and special reconnaissance activities.

(3) Responsibility for substantive national intelligence of direct interest to the President and the NSC would be located in the White House Staff.

(4) The Intelligence Community would have a senior spokesman with greater access to the President than the DCI now has.

(5) Separation of the senior intelligence officer from CIA would eliminate any charge of favoritism from other agencies.

(6) Clear delineation of organizational functions and responsibilities would be enhanced.

b. CONs

(1) Such extreme concentration of intelligence authority in a single person would pose serious problems if that person is politically motivated and more interested in responding to policymaker desires than in concentrating on unbiased intelligence.

(2) The Department of Defense could be expected to object strenuously to separate executive agency status for NSA and special reconnaissance activities, which are now within Defense.

(3) Major legislative actions would be required.

(4) The necessary bureaucratic changes would have a major, if only temporary, unsettling impact within the Intelligence Community.

(5) Unless adequate coordination machinery is provided, conflict could arise among the departmental secretaries and the senior intelligence officer over estimates prepared in the White House Staff and over what is national and what is departmental intelligence.

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(6) The senior intelligence officer would require a sizeable separate staff.

(7) The national intelligence and warning production staff would be handicapped by lack of direct access to the analytic base.

## THE SECOND OPTION

The senior intelligence officer would be attached to the Office of the President and serve as advisor to the NSC. The CIA would have a separate director. The senior intelligence officer would have responsibility for production of national estimates and for the warning function. Budgets of the CIA, NSA and special reconnaissance activities would require approval of the senior intelligence officer, but he would have no direct management authority over these organizations. NSA and conduct of special reconnaissance activities would remain, as now, within the Department of Defense structure. The senior intelligence officer would serve as Inspector General of the Community for the President.

### a. PROs

(1) Some of the PROs for this option are the same as those for Option One:

(a) Increased access to the President by an intelligence spokesman.

(b) Separation of the senior intelligence officer from CIA to reduce any charges of favoritism.

(c) Responsibility for production of national estimates would still be in the White House Staff though the resources for producing them would be elsewhere.

(2) Other PROs directly applicable to the second option are these:

(a) The senior intelligence officer would not be burdened with administrative management chores since he would not have management responsibility for CIA, NSA and special reconnaissance activities, but he still would hold a strong hand through his budget approval authority.

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(b) Little legislative action would be required.

(c) Defense Department objectives might be less strong than in the case of Option One.

b. CONs

(1) The CONs for this option also include some of those applicable to Option One.

(a) Location of the senior intelligence officer within the White House Staff would increase the risk of politicization of the intelligence effort.

(b) There would be a major, even if only temporary, unsettling effect within the Intelligence Community.

(c) The senior intelligence officer's staff for production of substantive intelligence would be handicapped by lack of direct access to the analytic base.

(d) Unless coordination mechanisms were particularly effective there would be risk of conflicts with departmental secretaries over the content of estimates produced by the senior intelligence officer and over determination as to what are national and what departmental intelligence activities.

(2) Other CONs directly applicable to Option Two are these:

(a) The line of authority of the senior intelligence officer would be limited to budgetary control.

(b) Budget controls might not be sufficient to eliminate "end runs" by agency heads.

(c) Detailed control by the senior intelligence officer of sensitive clandestine (CIA) activities would be weakened by bureaucratic barriers.

## THE THIRD OPTION

The senior foreign intelligence officer would be, as now, the operating head of the CIA. The CIA would retain its present function, and existing Community coordination organs would continue. The DCI would chair Executive Committees--or EXCOMs--for the NSA as well as for the special reconnaissance activities. These EXCOMs would have approval authority for programs and budgets, but the organizations would remain within the Department of Defense. Departmental intelligence activities, including tactical intelligence, would be solely departmental responsibilities. The DCI would have two deputies, with appropriate staffs, one for Community management and one for direct management of CIA.

a. PROs

(1) The present Community structure would be maintained and somewhat strengthened.

(2) The DCI would have more responsibility than now for the three major national programs encompassing the major collection activities (SIGINT, imagery and human source).

(3) The concept of a national intelligence Community independent of departmental or White House pressures would be continued.

(4) Conflicts between the DCI and departmental heads concerning departmental intelligence activities would be minimized.

(5) The DCI would continue to serve as spokesman before Congress for all national intelligence activities.

(6) Bureaucratic changes would be few, so turbulence would be minimal.

(7) No legislative action would be needed for organizational changes.

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b. CONS

(1) The senior foreign intelligence officer would continue to be separated from the White House and would still be clearly subordinate to the Secretaries of State and Defense in the NSC structure.

(2) The DCI would have only partial authority for non-CIA budgets and programs.

(3) Problems of DCI and CIA access to sensitive departmental activities and communications would continue.

(4) Some ambiguities would continue concerning differentiation between national and departmental or tactical intelligence activities.

(5) Adoption of this "partial" option would mean missing an opportunity for a major reshuffling within the Intelligence Community which would markedly enhance the authority of the senior foreign intelligence officer and erase the bad image which the CIA has recently acquired.

THE FOURTH OPTION

The Intelligence Community concept would be abandoned. The DCI would have no operating responsibilities other than as head of the CIA. No consolidated Intelligence Community budget recommendations would be prepared. State, Defense and CIA would separately support intelligence needs of policy levels of the Government. Some agency and departmental functions could be redistributed. (An example would be transfer of CIA responsibilities for collection and analysis of technical intelligence to the Defense Department.)

a. PROs

(1) Visibility of CIA would be reduced, which could assist continuation of clandestine activities.

(2) Renaming of CIA and reduction in the scope of its responsibilities could enhance a "fresh start."

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(3) The CIA service and support structure could be reduced somewhat.

(4) Specialized activities, such as technical intelligence, could be concentrated in a single department.

(5) Reduction in the analytical role of CIA could facilitate creation of an intelligence analytic staff in the NSC structure to produce national intelligence.

b. CONs

(1) Resource constraints and increasing dependence on technology in intelligence activities emphasize the need for greater centralization of intelligence management, not abandonment of a Community concept.

(2) The DCI would not be able to provide service to the Congress commensurate with what he now does.

(3) Coordination of national intelligence estimates and other national intelligence activities would be much more difficult.

(4) Independence of intelligence advice and assessments to the President and the NSC would be much reduced. Parochial views could well replace a broad interdisciplinary approach especially in the technical and scientific arena.

(5) The CIA would lose much of its present flexibility in support to the Government as a whole.

(6) Bureaucratic upheaval costs would be high.

(7) CIA would experience a major loss of cohesion and lowering of morale.

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President Ford's decision, as reflected in Executive Order 11905, was to reject all of the options for major change, leave the position of the Director of Central Intelligence as it was, but clarify the statement of his responsibilities, and reorganize arrangements for Executive Branch oversight of the Intelligence Community.

President Carter's intention to order a major review of the Intelligence Community is contained in NSC/PRM-11 which was sent to the Mr. Knoche in draft for comment.

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## **Control and Direction**

# **POLICY DEVELOPMENT**

**National Security Council**

• **President**

• **Vice President**

• **Secretary  
of  
State**

• **Secretary  
of  
Defense**

### • **Conduct semi-annual reviews**

- **needs of policy-makers and responsiveness to those needs**

- **scope and timeliness of product**

- **use of resources in collection of information**

- **appropriateness of covert and sensitive collection operations**



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SEMI-ANNUAL REVIEW

The relatively inactive National Security Council Intelligence Committee established in 1971 by Presidential memorandum was disestablished by issuance of Executive Order 11905, and the National Security Council itself was charged (1) to provide guidance and direction to the development and formulation of national intelligence activities, and (2) to conduct a semiannual review of intelligence policies and ongoing special activities.

The first of these semiannual reviews was completed in January of this year.

The DCI's Intelligence Community Staff prepared a major input to this semiannual review in the form of a study in which a large number of interviews of senior-level Government officials was used to review the intelligence needs of policy-makers and the responsiveness of the Intelligence Community to those needs, particularly in terms of the scope and timeliness of national intelligence products.

Two other inputs to the semiannual review were reports from the Committee on Foreign Intelligence and from the Operations Advisory Group on their activities.



**Control and Direction**

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**COVERT ACTION and SPECIAL OPERATIONS**

**NSC  
SPECIAL COORDINATION  
COMMITTEE**

**Chairman:** Asst. to Pres. for Nat'l Security Affairs

**Members:** Statutory members of the NSC or their reps.

Other senior officials, as appropriate

( • DCI • Attorney General  
• Chairman, JCS • Director OMB )

- ◆ *Consider & make recommendations to President on all proposals for special missions*
- ◆ *Submit periodic review to N S C on ongoing missions*
- ◆ *Meet formally to carry out its responsibility to make recommendations to the President.*

## COVERT ACTION AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

The Congressional investigations of covert actions in 1975 and early 1976 disclosed that the 40 Committee--the National Security Council organization responsible for review and approval of such activities--had handled matters very informally at times.

Executive Order 11905 established the Operations Advisory Group and charged it to consider and make recommendations to the President on all proposals for special missions--which meant all proposed covert action programs and sensitive reconnaissance missions proposed by the Department of Defense. The OAG was required to meet formally and make its recommendations to the President in writing. It was also charged to review ongoing sensitive activities periodically and submit a report to the National Security Council, as an input to the NSC's semiannual review of intelligence.


Under Presidential Directive/NSC-2 the full functions and responsibilities of the OAG are assumed by the NSC Special Coordination Committee. When the SCC meets on intelligence business of this nature, it is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and includes the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as full members. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget attend as observers.



## Control and Direction

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# OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES



- Consider reports of Community IG's & General Counsels concerning questionable activities
- Review procedures of IG's & General Counsels
- Report to President & Atty General on questionable activities
- Staff Support from non-intelligence community personnel

## OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

The Intelligence Oversight Board is a "watchdog" organization established by Executive Order 11905 as a direct Executive Branch response to criticisms surfaced during the Congressional investigations of intelligence activities concerning alleged illegal actions and improprieties on the part of intelligence personnel.

The IOB has three members: Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, a long-time top-level State Department official prior to his retirement, as Chairman; Mr. Leo Cherne, an economist who also is Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and Mr. Stephen Ailes, a lawyer who once was Secretary of the Army.

The Board is receiving reports at least quarterly from the Inspectors General and General Counsels of the various elements of the Intelligence Community concerning activities which raise questions of legality or propriety.

Working from these reports and its own reviews of the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsels and its review of the adequacy of internal guidelines within Intelligence Community organizations, the IOB reports its findings at least quarterly to the President and to the Attorney General.

In addition to submission of its periodic reports, the IOB also is charged to report to the President on a timely basis concerning any intelligence activities which the Board considers raise serious questions about propriety, and to both the President and the Attorney General on any activities that raise serious questions about legality.

The primary focus of IOB attention are the "Restrictions on Intelligence Activities" set forth in Section 5 of Executive Order 11905.

The various organizations of the Intelligence Community have individually issued internal directives to implement Section 5 of the Executive Order.





**Control and Direction.**

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**MANAGEMENT and RESOURCES CONTROL**

NSC POLICY REVIEW COMMITTEE (PRC)

- |                             |                     |   |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|---|
| ● Deputy Secretary, Defense | ● DCI<br>(Chairman) | ● Dep. Asst. to President<br>for Nat'l Sec. Affairs |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|---|

Staff Support by Intelligence Community Staff

- *Control Budget preparation and resource allocation for NFIP  
(excl. Tactical)*
- *Establish management policies for the NIP*
- *Implement policy decisions of NSC  
(Collection and Production of National Intelligence)*

## MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES CONTROL

The President's memorandum of 5 November 1971, "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community," charged the DCI to develop an annual budget for the entire Intelligence Community, including tactical intelligence, and to submit it to the President through the Office of Management and Budget.

Using his Intelligence Community Staff, the DCI prepared such budgets for Fiscal Years 1973 through 1977.

Numerous problems arose, however, primarily because about four-fifths of the Intelligence Community resources are spent by organizations within the Department of Defense and because of difficulties involved in definition of the components and costs of tactical-intelligence activities.

The Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) established by Executive Order 11905 represented a second effort by the Executive Branch to create a single National Foreign Intelligence Program budget covering all resources of the Intelligence Community.

The Committee on Foreign Intelligence, with the DCI as Chairman and including the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs as members, was charged to "control budget preparation and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program" and to "review and amend as it deems appropriate" the budget for the NFIP before it is submitted to the Office of Management and Budget. Budgeting for tactical intelligence activities was specifically removed from CFI purview.

One of the initial tasks of the CFI was the revision of all National Security Council Intelligence Directives to bring them into consonance with E.O. 11905.

In addition to its responsibilities for budget preparation and resource allocation in the NFIP, the CFI also was to:

- a. Establish policy priorities for management of the NFIP.

b. Establish policy priorities for the collection and production of national intelligence. ?

c. Provide guidance on the relationship between national and tactical intelligence. ?

d. Provide continuing guidance to the Intelligence Community to assure compliance with policy directions of the National Security Council.

E.O. 11905 directed that staff support to the CFI be provided by the DCI's Intelligence Community Staff.

Most of the 20 meetings the CFI held during its existence were devoted to review of the proposed national and departmental intelligence programs for FY 1978, to study of budget issues raised by these programs, and to reaching decisions on resources to be requested for Intelligence Community organizations in the FY 1978 Presidential Budget.

<sup>1/20/77</sup>  
Presidential Directive/NSC-2 entitled "The National Security Council System" assigns the full functions and responsibilities of the CFI to the NSC Policy Review Committee. When the PRC meets on intelligence business of this nature, it will be chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and include the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and a senior representative of the Secretary of State as members. The DCI's Intelligence Community Staff will act as the PRC staff in these instances.

The PRC held its first meeting under the new ground rules on 9 February, with the Acting DCI in the chair.

*Minutes of mtg?*



SUBCOMMITTEES  
OF THE  
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
AND THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS

SENATOR BAYH, <i>Chairman</i>	SENATOR GARN, <i>Vice Chairman</i>
SENATOR HATHAWAY	SENATOR CASE
SENATOR BIDEN	SENATOR STAFFORD
SENATOR MORGAN	

SUBCOMMITTEE ON BUDGET AUTHORIZATION

SENATOR HATHAWAY, <i>Chairman</i>	SENATOR GOLDWATER, <i>Vice Chairman</i>
SENATOR HUDDLESTON	SENATOR HATFIELD
SENATOR HART, (Colo.)	

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COLLECTION, PRODUCTION AND QUALITY

SENATOR STEVENSON, <i>Chairman</i>	SENATOR CASE, <i>Vice Chairman</i>
SENATOR MORGAN	SENATOR GOLDWATER
SENATOR HART, (Colo.)	

AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON CHARTERS AND GUIDELINES

SENATOR HUDDLESTON, <i>Chairman</i>	SENATOR HATFIELD, <i>Vice Chairman</i>
SENATOR BAYH	SENATOR THURMOND
SENATOR STEVENSON	SENATOR GARN
SENATOR BIDEN	

*Ex Officio*  
ON ALL SUBCOMMITTEES

SENATOR INOUE, <i>Committee Chairman</i>	SENATOR MATHIAS <i>Committee Vice Chairman</i>
SENATOR BYRD <i>Majority Leader</i>	SENATOR BAKER <i>Minority Leader</i>

## SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

The Senate Select Committee has a broad mandate under Senate Resolution 400\* to oversee the activities of United States foreign intelligence agencies. It has jurisdiction over all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence activities of all other departments and agencies. The Committee also has jurisdiction over authorizations for appropriations for the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency and other Intelligence Community agencies. The Committee is authorized to make investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction; to hold hearings; to require, by subpoena, the production of documents; and to take depositions and other testimony. The Senate has expressed its sense that all agency heads should keep the Select Committee fully and currently informed with respect to intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated activities, and that they furnish the Committee any information or document in their possession, custody, or control whenever requested by the Select Committee.

Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D., Hawaii) was named Chairman, and Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., (R., Tennessee) was named Vice Chairman.\*\*

• The 15-member committee includes two members (one Democrat and one Republican) from each of four other committees--Appropriations; Armed Services, Foreign Relations and Judiciary--and seven appointed from the Senate at large (four Democrats and three Republicans).

The committee has organized itself into four subcommittees constituted as shown in the chart at the left.

• A staff of more than 40 personnel has been assembled, with William G. Miller as Staff Director. Mr. Miller had been Staff Director of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities which Senator Church headed and which conducted the widely publicized 1975-1976 Senate investigation. A high proportion of the professional staff members working for Senator Inouye's committee also were members of Senator Church's committee staff.

\*Test of S. Res. 400 is at Annex D.

\*\*Since replaced by Senator Mathias.

The primary activity to date of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and the Rights of Americans involved consideration of proposed legislation on electronic surveillance on which the Senate did not complete action during the 94th Congress.

Staff members of the Subcommittee on Collection Production and Quality are engaged in the preparation of background papers for the committee on various intelligence collection and production programs.

The Subcommittee on Budget Authorization has begun hearings on the Intelligence Community authorization figure for the FY 1978 budget.

The Subcommittee on Charters and Guidelines is expected to become the focal point for the drafting of legislation, but no specific proposals have as yet surfaced.





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#### OTHER OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES

Prior to establishment of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community was exercised by the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House. This included oversight of CIA since, as sponsoring committees of the National Security Act of 1947, the Armed Services Committees assumed jurisdiction over agencies created by the Act.

In addition to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community is exercised by:

- a. Intelligence Subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees;
- b. The Intelligence Operations Subcommittee of the Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations;
- c. The Defense Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations;
- d. On matters relating to covert actions, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate and the International Relations Committee of the House.

As sponsoring committees of the National Security Act of 1947, the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House assumed jurisdiction over agencies created by the Act, which included CIA. In the House of Representatives the Armed Services Committee continues to have oversight of CIA, but in the Senate exclusive jurisdiction for CIA oversight has been transferred to the Select Committee on Intelligence, which has "sequential" jurisdiction with Armed Services and other oversight committees, over intelligence activities of the Defense Department and other Federal organizations.

Briefings on substantive intelligence assessments within their jurisdictions are given upon request to other committees of the Senate and House, either by the DCI or by CIA representatives. Intelligence officers of the Defense Department also provide briefings on request.

During his first nine months as DCI, Director Bush not only appeared personally several times before each of the oversight committees and had a number of conferences with Congressmen, either individually or in groups, but he also presented briefings or testified before seven other committees as follows:

Joint -	Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Joint Economic Committee
Senate -	Budget Rules and Administration Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee)
House -	Government Operations Select Committee on Drug Abuse and Narcotics Control



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# **NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD (NFIB)**

## **CHAIRMAN:**

**Director of Central Intelligence**

## **VICE CHAIRMAN:**

**D/DCI/IC**

## **MEMBERS:**

**CIA DIA NSA STATE TREASURY FBI ERDA**

## **OBSERVERS:**

**Intelligence Chiefs of Military Services**

## THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD

The National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB) was established by the DCI in May 1976 as a replacement for the United States Intelligence Board which was abolished by Executive Order 11905 issued by President Ford in February 1976.

The mission of the NFIB is to advise and assist the DCI with respect to:

- a. The review and coordination of national intelligence products;
- b. The maintenance of effective interface between intelligence producers and consumers and the development of procedures for continuing identification of consumer needs for intelligence;
- c. The establishment of appropriate objectives, requirements, and priorities for substantive intelligence;
- d. The review of requirements coordination and operational guidance for intelligence collection systems;
- e. The protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods and of sensitive intelligence information;
- f. The development, as appropriate, of policies regarding arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters; and
- g. Such other matters as the DCI may refer to the Board for advice.

The membership of the NFIB is shown on the chart at the left.

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The NFIB is the only Intelligence Community body in which the heads of every organization in the Community assemble as a group and jointly participate in consideration of intelligence problems.

As indicated in the chart at the left, more than half of the activities of the NFIB involve the review of national intelligence estimative papers leading to a Board recommendation that the DCI approve and disseminate the document.

About one-fourth of the NFIB activities relate to actions which come to the Board from one of the DCI Committees, functions of which are discussed at the next Tab.

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## **D C I COMMITTEES**

### **COLLECTION**

**Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX)**

**SIGINT Committee**

**Human Sources Committee (HRC)**

25X1

### **PRODUCTION**

**Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC)**

**Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC)**

**Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC)**

**Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC)**

### **SUPPORT**

**Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC)**

**Committee on Exchanges (COMEX)**

**Security Committee**

**Intelligence Information Planning Committee (IHC)**

## DCI COMMITTEES

The titles of the 12 DCI Committees, as listed on the chart at the left, are roughly descriptive of the functions and areas of responsibility of each committee.

The present set of DCI Committees is the product of an evolutionary process which has become an institutionalized part of the Intelligence Community. Joint committees of one kind or another have been a part of intelligence activities in Washington since World War II. New committees have been formed as needs are identified, old committees have been disbanded when their usefulness ended.

Until issuance of Executive Order 11905 the existing committees were titled USIB Committees. With the disestablishment of USIB and the formation of the National Foreign Intelligence Board as its replacement, the DCI Committee title was adopted to emphasize that the committees could be utilized as needed and would support the DCI and the Committee on Foreign Intelligence as well as the NFIB.

The DCI appoints each committee chairman and meets periodically with the chairmen as a group to discuss problems with which the committees are currently concerned. Oversight of the DCI Committees on behalf of the Director is exercised by his Deputy for the Intelligence Community.

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Members of the committees and of the subcommittees and working groups which support them normally are trained personnel with experience in the field for which the committee has responsibility.

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Wide differences in the continuity of action and the scope of activities of the individual DCI Committees is reflected in the number of personnel and the number of organizations participating in the program of each committee and its substructure, as depicted in the chart at the left.

25X1 The Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) provides staff support to and acts for the DCI and the NFIB in the development and implementation of national-level guidance for imagery collection and exploitation. Much of the committee activity is highly detailed and requires the participation of [ ] Another [ ] personnel participate 25X1 in meetings and work with the committee on a part-time basis.

25X1 At the other end of the scale, the Critical Collection Problems Committee (CCPC), which is a study group responsive to specific tasking laid on it by the DCI, involves only the part-time participation of [ ] persons.

25X1 Each of the [ ] principals who takes part in NFIB activities is accorded representation on any DCI Committee which deals with a subject in which his organization has an interest.

As the chart at the left indicates, less than half of the DCI Committees include representatives of all of the USIB principals, and five committees include in their activities representation from organizations which are not a part of the Intelligence Community.

25X1 The program of the Economic Intelligence Committee (EIC) includes representatives of [ ] separate organizations, cutting across the Executive Branch spectrum of the departments, agencies, and special offices interested in foreign economic information. The part-time participation of [ ] personnel in EIC activities 25X1 makes it second only to the COMIREX in size.

25X1 Of the [ ] full-time personnel on the staffs of the six DCI Committees which have such, [ ] are assigned to the DCI's Intelligence Community Staff (ICS). 25X1

The chairmen of five committees--COMIREX, SIGINT, Security, Human Resources, and Information Handling--are members of the Intelligence Community Staff, and all but the Security Committee Chairman serve as division chiefs in ICS.

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One of the functions of the DCI Committees is educational since the committee activities enable representatives of the various organizations of the Intelligence Community to keep abreast of what is going on within the specialized areas with which each committee deals and to contribute their individual expertise.

As the statistics on the chart at the left indicate, the various organizations participating in NFIB activities consider it worthwhile to have sizeable numbers of their personnel take part in activities of the committees and their subcommittees and working groups.

Nearly 10 percent of the participants are from organizations that are not a part of the Intelligence Community. Most of these personnel are involved in work to which an input of foreign economic intelligence is important.

Even those organizations that have relatively few professional personnel engaged in foreign intelligence matters--INR/State, ERDA, Treasury and the FBI--are active participants in the committee program. ERDA, which has  intelligence personnel, manages to take part in thirty committees and subcommittees.

25X1

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## **THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF**

**Supports the Director of Central Intelligence in four areas:**

- **RESOURCES MANAGEMENT**
- **COLLECTION ASSESSMENT**
- **PRODUCT IMPROVEMENT**
- **COORDINATION AND PLANNING**



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## INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

The Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) is the staff arm of the Director of Central Intelligence for the execution of his Community responsibilities. Presently located at CIA Headquarters, it is organizationally separate from the CIA and is scheduled to move soon [REDACTED]

25X1

The ICS has a separate line authorization of [REDACTED]

As indicated at the chart on the left, the ICS supports the DCI in four primary areas--resource management, collection assessment, product improvement, and coordination and planning.

A detailed description of functions of the staff is at Annex F, IC Staff Directive No. 8, "Intelligence Community Staff Organization and Management," 8 October 1976.

The ICS had its inception in 1963 when DCI John McCone established the National Intelligence Programs Evaluation Staff to assist him with Community matters. The NIPE was enlarged and retitled the Intelligence Community Staff by DCI Richard Helms in early 1972 in response to the added Community responsibilities assigned to the DCI in the President's memorandum of 5 November 1971 on "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community."

The NIPE Staff and the original Intelligence Community Staff were manned entirely by CIA officers and a few contract personnel until Dr. James Schlesinger became DCI in 1973. He decided the ICS should be headed by an active duty military officer and have a manning more representative of the Community as a whole. Lieutenant General Lew Allen, USAF, later to be Director of the National Security Agency, became the first military officer to serve as Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community. Active duty officers were detailed to the ICS from the four military services and civilian personnel were detailed from the State Department, Defense Intelligence Agency, and National Security Agency as well as from CIA.

25X1


25X1

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Subsequent D/DCI/ICs were Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, USA, who left to be Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, USA, currently the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. The current D/DCI/IC [redacted] is the first four-star military officer to have an intelligence assignment since the early 1960s.

25X1

The role and responsibilities of the ICS were enlarged when Executive Order 11905 created the Committee on Foreign Intelligence and charged the ICS to provide staff support to the Committee.



The organization of the Intelligence Community Staff, depicted on the chart at the left, is designed to facilitate ICS action to (1) assist the DCI in his supervision and guidance of the Community, (2) serve as the Committee on Foreign Intelligence staff, and (3) develop requirements system for and assess the performance of national intelligence collection and production.

The DCI-approved Table of Organization for the ICS

Office of the Community Deputy (OCD)	25X1
Office of Policy and Planning (OPP)	
Office of Program and Budget Development (OPBD)	
Office of Performance, Evaluation and Improvement (OPEI)	

TOTAL:

This Table of Organization includes ☐ full-time staff members of five DCI Committees as follows: 25X1

- OPP: Information Handling Committee (in the Information Handling Division)  
Security Committee
- OPEI: SIGINT Committee (in the SIGINT Division)  
COMIREX (in the Imagery Division)  
Human Resources Committee (in the Human Resources Division)

Mission and functions of the various elements of the ICS are described in detail in the ICS Staff Directive No. 8 at Annex F.

In essence, the primary functions of the three ICS offices are to:

- OPP : Draft the DCI guidance and planning documents and the annual report of the DCI on the Intelligence Community
- OPBD: Prepare the National Foreign Intelligence Program documents and support the CFI in its annual program review and budget cycle
- OPEI: Support the DCI, CFI and NFIB in evaluating and improving the performance of national intelligence collection and production activities, systems and programs and in validation of imagery and SIGINT collection requirements.

A listing of key ICS personnel and a description of current ICS publications follow.

## ICS INVOLVEMENT IN CFI RESPONSIBILITIES

CFI Tasks from E.O. 11905	Supporting ICS Office
Control NFIP budget preparation and resource allocation .....	OPBD
Establish policy priorities for national intelligence collection and production .....	All
Establish policy for management of intelligence .	OPP, OPEI & ES
Provide guidance on national/tactical intelligence relationship .....	All
Ensure Community compliance with NSC policy direction .....	All
Designate activities to be included in NFIP .....	OPBD

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As indicated in the chart at the left, offices of the Intelligence Community Staff are involved in providing support to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence on all six of the tasks assigned to the CFI in Executive Order 11905.

The ICS Office of Program and Budget Development is specifically organized and manned to prepare the necessary documents and staff CFI actions in execution of the responsibility to which the CFI has thus far devoted its primary attention--control of budget preparation and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

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## ICS INVOLVEMENT IN NFIB ACTIVITIES

### NFIB Advisory Responsibilities (DCID 1/8)

### Supporting ICS Office

Review national products .....	OPEI
Coordinate national products .....	---
Maintain consumer/producer interface .....	---
Develop procedures to identify consumer needs .	OPEI
Establish objectives/requirements/priorities .....	OPEI & OPP
Protect sensitive sources, methods and information ..	OPP & OPEI
Develop policies for arrangements with foreign Governments .....	ES & OPEI
Such other matters as the DCI assigns .....	All

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The Intelligence Community Staff provides staff support to the National Foreign Intelligence Board with respect to six of the eight responsibilities assigned to the NFIB in DCID 1/8.

The ICS is not involved in the actual production of substantive intelligence, so it has no role in assisting the NFIB as regards coordination of national products or maintaining a consumer/producer interface.

The Office of Performance, Evaluation and Improvement has a division (Production, Assessment and Improvement) specifically devoted to two NFIB responsibilities--review of national products, and the development of procedures to identify consumer needs.

The Office of Program and Budget Development is the only ICS staff element not directly involved in support of the NFIB. This is because the NFIB has no budget or resource allocation responsibilities.

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF INVOLVEMENT IN  
RESPONSIBILITIES ASSIGNED TO THE DCI IN E.O. 11905

<u>DCI Responsibilities from E.O. 11905</u>	<u>ICS Office Involve- ment</u>	<u>DCI Responsibilities from E.O. 11905</u>	<u>ICS Office Involve- ment</u>
Chair the CFI	A11	Protect intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures	OPP
Head CIA and ICS	A11	Downgrade and declassify foreign intelligence information	OPP
Develop and submit NFIP budget to CFI	OPBD	Ensure strong Inspector General capability	----
Be President's primary foreign intelligence advisor	A11	Establish common security standards	OPP
Provide Executive Branch officials with foreign intelligence	----	Spokesman to the Congress	A11
Develop national intelligence requirements and priorities	OPP	Promote development/maintenance by CIA of services of common concern	----
Supervise production and dissemination of national intelligence	----	Establish criteria for CRITIC intelligence and guidance on communications requirements	OPEI
Ensure implementation of special activities in support of foreign policy objectives	----	Establish committees of collectors/producers/users of intelligence	OPEI
Ensure propriety of White House staff requests to Intelligence Community	ES	Consult with users to ensure relevance, timeliness and quality of intelligence	OPEI

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The scope of the Community responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence and the role which the ICS has in support of the DCI's execution of these responsibilities are illustrated by the chart at the left.


The ICS is directly involved in supporting the DCI in 13 of the 18 responsibilities assigned to him in Executive Order 11905.

Those DCI responsibilities to which ICS activities do not relate concern the actual production and dissemination of national intelligence, the CIA covert action programs, Inspector General activities, and the provision by CIA of services of common concern to the entire Community.

As the chart indicates, all elements of the ICS are involved in supporting the DCI in four of his responsibilities, the Office of Planning and Programming is the primary staff element for four other responsibilities, the Office of Performance, Evaluation and Improvement for an additional three, and the Office of Program and Budget Development for the one to which its title applies.

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## Flow of Intelligence Community Activities



DCI'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

Office of Community Deputy

Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC)

25X1

Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community  
(AD/DCI/IC)

Mr. John N. McMahon

Executive Officer (EO/IC)

Mr. Richard J. Kerr

Executive Staff

Special Assistant to the D/DCI/IC (SA-D/DCI/IC)

25X1

Special Assistant to the D/DCI/IC (SA-D/DCI/IC)

25X1

CFI/NFIB Executive Secretariat

Executive Secretary CFI/NFIB

Mr. Walter Elder

Office of Policy and Planning

Director, Office of Policy and Planning (O/PP)

25X1

Policy and Plans Division (OPP/PPD)

25X1

Information Handling Division (OPP/IHD)

25X1

Security Committee (OPP/SC)

25X1

Office of Program and Budget Development

25X1 Director, Office of Program and Budget Development (O/PBD)

25X1 Data Support Group (OPBD/DSG)

25X1 Program and Budget Development Division (OPBD/PBDD)

25X1 Program Analysis Division (OPBD/PAD)

Office of Performance, Evaluation and Improvement

25X1 Director, Office of Performance, Evaluation and Improvement (O/PEI)

25X1 Integration Staff (OPEI/IS)

25X1 SIGINT Division (OPEI/SD)

25X1 Imagery Division (OPEI/ID)

25X1 Human Resources Division (OPEI/HRD)

25X1 Production Assessment and Improvement Division (OPEI/PAID)

## CURRENT PUBLICATIONS

TITLE	PURPOSE	CONTENT	TARGET AUDIENCE
<u>PLANNING DOCUMENTS</u> Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1977	KIQS are designed to improve intelligence production and collection management by providing a highly selective list of current, critical questions for a period of special operational attention. General criteria for selection are that the items are not sufficiently highlighted under other directives and that they are achievable within the year. The KIQs are followed up with individual strategy reports aimed at developing special collection and analytical strategies to enhance the information gain and improve the analyses in each KIQ area of concern.	In FY 1977, the KIQ list currently contains thirteen (13) specific areas of concern and related questions.	All collection and production managers and appropriate DCI Committee Chairmen.
DCI Goals and Objectives for FY 1977	Provides senior Intelligence Community managers with DCI views on the major direction toward which the Community should strive in the coming fiscal year. Also fulfills a Presidential and OMB request for such data.	Statement of the purpose which National Intelligence serves, plus Community Goals related to specific DCI responsibilities found in EO 11905. FY 1977 Objectives are listed under pertinent goals.	Program managers, OMB, and possibly the Congressional committees.
DCI Perspectives for Planning and Programming (FY 1979-83)	The Perspectives provide a substantive framework within which CFI annual program guidance may be developed and in which program managers may find guidance for their individual planning and programming problems.	Part I, The Changing World Environment, Part II, The Role of Intelligence and Part III, Implications for Intelligence Planning and Resource Management.	CFI program guidance developers and program managers and planning staffs.

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CURRENT APPLICATIONS

TITLE	PURPOSE	CONTENT	TARGET AUDIENCE
National Foreign Intelligence Requirements and Priorities for Planning and Programming (FY 1979-83) (NFIRP)	The NFIRP is designed to reflect the DCI Perspectives in an explicit statement of prioritized global national foreign intelligence requirements for planning and programming. Currently developed, using the DCID 1/2 attachment, the NFIRP is a Community level input to the planning and programming process.	Specific prioritized requirements on a global basis stated in geo-topical terms Vol I: Priorities 1-3; Vol II: Priorities 4-7.	CFI program guidance developers, program managers and staff, and appropriate DCI Committees.
<u>OTHER DOCUMENTS</u> DCI Annual Report	A consolidated annual report by the DCI prepared for presentation to the leaders of the Executive and Legislative Branches which covers the Community's performance, budget, and plans for the future.	Covers the entire gamut of intelligence activities, costs, and future plans.	The President and his councils, Legislative leaders and staffs.
Overview of Imagery Satellite Issues, Activities and Planning	This document presents a series of policy issues which are critical to the future course of U.S. satellite imagery activities. It is designed to inform and stimulate further action at the NSC and CFI level on these issues. (The effort was originally organized to present a National Imagery Plan.)	Issues requiring national level and CFI level decisions, as well as a consolidated overview of Imagery Requirements, collection, exploitation, and dissemination activities, including major planning milestones and fiscal implications.	The NSA Space Policy Committee, CFI members and Community managers.

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CURRENT PUBLICATIONS

TITLE	PURPOSE	CONTENT	TARGET AUDIENCE
NSC Intelligence Review	Responds to the E.O. 11905 requirement that the NSC conduct a semiannual review of intelligence policies, the needs of users of intelligence, the timeliness and quality of intelligence products, and the continued appropriateness of special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives.	A wide spectrum of political, economic, military, and scientific/technical concerns; strengths and weaknesses of the IC; analysis of performance in specific regions and topics; systemic problems of intelligence management and performance.	The NSC and the users and producers (who are themselves prime users) of intelligence.

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## INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

The Intelligence Research and Development Council (IR&DC), originally formed in 1973 as a subcommittee of the since-abolished Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee, is now a standing subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence. \*

The IR&DC is chaired by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering and membership includes the senior R&D officers of Intelligence Community organizations, the Assistant Secretaries for R&D of the three military departments, and the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.

The scope of IR&DC activities is illustrated by the chart at the left.

The Council meets monthly to review proposed and ongoing R&D projects, to assess how well programmed R&D will respond to identified needs of the Intelligence Community, and to identify "intelligence gaps" which could benefit from additional research and development efforts.

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The IR&DC has played a significant role in resource allocation deliberations within the Community.

The Council's annual report to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence is scheduled for publication in January 1977.

\* PD/NSC-2 did not address the IR&D Council, but it is expected it will continue as a functioning organization reporting to the chairman of the PRC(Intelligence)

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# INTELLIGENCE RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL

## CHAIRMAN:

Director, Defense Research & Engineering

## MEMBERS:

OSD

DIA

CIA

NSA

ARPA

ARMY

NAVY

AIR FORCE



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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## PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) was established by President Eisenhower in 1956 as the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. Reconstituted and renamed by President Kennedy, the Board has been continued by each succeeding President.

As a non-partisan group of distinguished private citizens, the Board is responsible for advising the President on the overall national intelligence effort and for recommending to him appropriate measures to increase the effectiveness of the U.S. Intelligence Community.

In recent years, the PFIAB has reported its findings and recommendations to the President concerning U.S. human source intelligence; effectiveness of the Intelligence Community's response to the needs of the economic policymakers; and the quality of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), especially those dealing with the strategic capabilities of the USSR. A direct consequence of the Board's review of NIEs is an ongoing experiment in competitive analysis being undertaken in connection with production of this year's estimate on "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict: NIE 11-3/8-76."

In March of 1976, President Ford appointed Leo Cherne Chairman of the PFIAB. Mr. Cherne, a member of the Board since 1973, is an economist, political scientist, lawyer and sculptor and for many years has been Executive Director of the Research Institute of America. President Ford also expanded the PFIAB from 10 to 17 members, noting, "By strengthening the Board as I have done today and by giving the Board my full personal support, I fully anticipate that the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board will continue its indispensable role in advising me on the effectiveness of our foreign intelligence efforts."

Traditionally, the Board meets on the first Thursday and Friday of the even months of the year, and a regular feature of these sessions is a briefing by the DCI. Some of the topics discussed are in response to requests from the Board, but the DCI also uses these meetings to draw the Board's attention to activities of particular significance and to seek the members' views and/or assistance on intelligence matters where appropriate.

Attachment:

List of Members

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Appointment Dates

Chairman

Mr. Leo Cherne, Executive Director, Research Institute of America, Inc., New York, New York	June 1973 to Board, 11 March 1976 to Chairman
--	---

Members

Mr. Stephen Ailes, of Maryland, President and Chief Executive Officer, Association of American Railroads, Washington, D. C.	11 March 1976
Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr., USN (Ret.), Washington, D. C.	March 1969 (Chairman from 1 May 1970 to 11 March 1976
Mr. Leslie C. Arends, of Melvin, Illinois, retired Member of Congress	11 March 1976
Dr. William O. Baker, President, Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., Murray Hill, New Jersey	December 1959
Mr. William J. Casey, of Washington, D. C., counsel to the law firm of Rogers and Wells, Washington, D. C.	11 March 1976
Mr. John B. Connally, of Houston, Texas, partner, law firm of Vinson, Elkins, Searls, Connally and Smith, Houston, Texas	December 1970 - January 1971; August 1972 - January 1975; 11 March 1976
Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., Vice President for Energy Research and Development, TRW, Inc., Palos Verdes Estates, California	June 1973

Members (continued)

Appointment Dates

Mr. Robert W. Galvin, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Motorola, Inc., Chicago, Illinois	June 1973
Mr. Gordon Gray, broadcast executive and former Government official, Washington, D. C.	May 1961
Dr. Edwin H. Land, Chairman of the Board, Polaroid Corporation, Cambridge, Massachusetts	May 1961
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Ret.), Washington, D. C.	11 March 1976
Mrs. Clare Boothe Luce, novelist; playwright; writer; and lecturer, Honolulu, Hawaii	June 1973
Mr. Robert D. Murphy, of Washington, D. C., honorary chairman, Corning International Corporation, New York, New York	May 1961 - June 1975 11 March 1976
Mr. Edward Teller, of Berkeley, California, director at large, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, University of California, Livermore, California	July 1971
Mr. Edward Bennett Williams, senior partner, Williams, Connolly and Califano, Washington, D. C.	11 March 1976

Executive Secretary


Mr. Wheaton B. Byers, The White House, Room 340, Old Executive Office Building, Washington, D. C.	July 1973 (served as Special Assistant to Executive Secretary from 1970)
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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8/28/07

January 27, 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Presidential Directive NSC-2


In Presidential Directive NSC-2 the Director of Central Intelligence will be appointed Chairman of those Policy Review Committee meetings convened to address National Foreign Intelligence Program and Budget matters.

The President has directed that you continue to carry out your responsibilities and functions previously assigned to you as the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence in Executive Order 11905. For the time being you are expected to continue the same working arrangements as established in the past year.

The President desires that membership from the Defense and State Departments be included in these deliberations. The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will be my representative. You will inform the Assistant for National Security Affairs when you judge that a meeting is necessary to carry out your responsibilities.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

cc: The Secretary of Defense  
The Secretary of State



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

January 26, 1977

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8/28/07

MEMORANDUM FOR

SECRETARY OF STATE  
SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
ATTORNEY GENERAL  
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF  
MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
ADMINISTRATOR, ENERGY RESEARCH  
AND DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: Executive Order 11905 and PD/NSC-2

Several interpretive questions have been raised concerning PD/NSC-2 and its relationship to Executive Order 11905. With the following exceptions, the Executive Order remains in full effect:

- The full functions and responsibilities of the CFI shall be assumed by the NSC Policy Review Committee (PRC). When the PRC meets on intelligence business of this nature it shall be chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and include the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and a senior representative of the Secretary of State as members. The DCI's Intelligence Community Staff shall act as the PRC staff in these instances.
- The full functions and responsibilities of the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) shall be assumed by the NSC Special Coordination Committee (SCC). When the SCC meets on intelligence business of this nature, it shall be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and include the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense,


Classified by Zbigniew  
Brzezinski; XGDS of  
E. O. 11652 by Category  
5.B(2).

SECRET/XGDS

SECRET

Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as full members. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall be invited to attend as observers. The NSC Staff will provide staff support.

The Department of Justice is requested to submit a proposed amendment to E. O. 11905 to implement the above mentioned changes.



Zbigniew Brzezinski

SECRET/XGDS2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

22-0226

CONFIDENTIAL GDS

January 20, 1977

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8/28/07

Presidential Directive/NSC-2

TO:           The Vice President  
              The Secretary of State  
              The Secretary of Defense

ALSO:   The Secretary of the Treasury  
          The Attorney General  
          The United States Representative to the  
              United Nations  
          The Director, Office of Management and Budget  
          The Assistant to the President for National  
              Security Affairs  
          The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers  
          The Administrator, Agency for International  
              Development  
          The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament  
              Agency  
          The Director, United States Information Agency  
          The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
          The Director of Central Intelligence  
          The Administrator, Energy Research and  
              Development Administration

SUBJECT:    The National Security Council System

To assist me in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs, I hereby direct the reorganization of the National Security Council system. The reorganization is intended to place more responsibility in the departments and agencies while insuring that the NSC, with my Assistant for National Security Affairs, continues to integrate and facilitate foreign and defense policy decisions.

CONFIDENTIAL GDS

a. The National Security Council (NSC)

The functions, membership, and responsibilities of the National Security Council shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. In addition, other senior officials, including the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the United States Representative to the United Nations, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration, shall attend appropriate NSC meetings.

The National Security Council shall be the principal forum for international security issues requiring Presidential consideration. The NSC shall assist me in analyzing, integrating and facilitating foreign, defense, and intelligence policy decisions. International economic and other interdependence issues which are pertinent to national security shall also be considered by the NSC.

The Council shall meet regularly. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, at my direction and in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense and, when appropriate, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers, shall be responsible for determining the agenda and insuring that the necessary papers are prepared. Other members of the NSC may propose items for inclusion on the agenda. The Assistant to the President shall be assisted by a National Security Council staff, as provided by law.

b. NSC Policy Review Committee

An NSC Policy Review Committee is hereby established to develop national security policy for Presidential decision in those cases where the basic responsibilities fall primarily within a given department but where the subject also has important implications for other departments and agencies. This Committee shall deal with such matters as:

-- foreign policy issues that contain significant military or other interagency aspects;

-- defense policy issues having international implications and the coordination of the annual Defense budget with foreign policy objectives;

CONFIDENTIAL GDS

-- the preparation of a consolidated national intelligence budget and resource allocation for the Intelligence Community (thus assuming under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence the functions and responsibilities of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence); and

-- those international economic issues pertinent to U. S. foreign policy and security, with staffing of the underlying economic issues through the Economic Policy Group.

I shall designate for each meeting the appropriate Chairman of the Policy Review Committee and attendance, depending on the subject matter being considered. Membership, in addition to the statutory members of the NSC and the Assistant for National Security Affairs, shall include, as appropriate, other senior officials.

c. The NSC Special Coordination Committee

A second NSC Committee, the Special Coordination Committee, is hereby established to deal with specific cross-cutting issues requiring coordination in the development of options and the implementation of Presidential decisions. The Committee shall deal with such matters as: the oversight of sensitive intelligence activities, such as covert operations, which are undertaken on Presidential authority; arms control evaluation; and it will assist me in crisis management.


The Special Coordination Committee shall be chaired by the Assistant for National Security Affairs. Membership shall include the statutory members of the NSC, or their representatives, and other senior officials, as appropriate.

d. NSC Interdepartmental Groups

Existing NSC Interdepartmental Groups, chaired by a designated senior departmental official, are to continue as needed under the direction of the NSC Policy Review Committee.

The membership of the Interdepartmental Groups shall include the agencies represented on the NSC Policy Review Committee. Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Policy Review Committee.

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


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e. National Security Council Ad Hoc Groups

When appropriate, I intend to appoint NSC Ad Hoc Groups to deal with particular problems, including those which transcend departmental boundaries.



Jimmy Carter

CONFIDENTIAL GDS


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**federal register**

**THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 19, 1976**

Approved For Release 2007/11/30 : CIA-RDP84M00713R000100030001-0



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**PART III:**

## **THE PRESIDENT**

### **UNITED STATES FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES**

**Executive Order 11905**

NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION. 8/28/07

## Title 3—The President

Executive Order 11905

February 18, 1976

### United States Foreign Intelligence Activities

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

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Section 1. Purpose. The purpose of this Order is to establish policies to improve the quality of intelligence needed for national security, to clarify the authority and responsibilities of the intelligence departments and agencies, and to establish effective oversight to assure compliance with law in the management and direction of intelligence agencies and departments of the national government.

Sec. 2. Definitions. For the purpose of this Order, unless otherwise indicated, the following terms shall have these meanings:

(a) Intelligence means:

(1) Foreign intelligence which means information, other than foreign counterintelligence, on the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or their agents; and

(2) Foreign counterintelligence which means activities conducted to protect the United States and United States citizens from foreign espionage, sabotage, subversion, assassination or terrorism.

(b) Intelligence Community refers to the following organizations:

- (1) Central Intelligence Agency;
- (2) National Security Agency;
- (3) Defense Intelligence Agency;

- (4) Special offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
- (5) Intelligence elements of the military services;
- (6) Intelligence element of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
- (7) Intelligence element of the Department of State;
- (8) Intelligence element of the Department of the Treasury; and
- (9) Intelligence element of the Energy Research and Development Administration.

(c) Special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives means activities, other than the collection and production of intelligence and related support functions, designed to further official United States programs and policies abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or publicly acknowledged.

(d) National Foreign Intelligence Program means the programs of the Central Intelligence Agency and the special offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, and those elements of the General Defense Intelligence Program and other programs of the departments and agencies, not including tactical intelligence, designated by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence as part of the Program.

Sec. 3. Control and Direction of National  
Intelligence Organizations.

(a) National Security Council.

(1) The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security. Statutory members of the National Security Council are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Among its responsibilities, the National Security Council shall provide guidance and direction to the development and formulation of national intelligence activities.

(3) The National Security Council shall conduct a semi-annual review of intelligence policies and of ongoing special activities in support of national Foreign policy objectives. These reviews shall consider the needs of users of intelligence and the timeliness and quality of intelligence products and the continued appropriateness of special activities in support of national Foreign policy objectives. The National Security Council shall consult with the Secretary of the Treasury and such other users of intelligence as designated by the President as part of these reviews.

(b) Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

(1) There is established the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the CFI), which shall be composed of the Director of Central Intelligence, hereinafter referred to as the DCI, who shall be the Chairman; the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The CFI shall report directly to the National Security Council.

(2) The CFI shall (i) control budget preparation and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

(A) The CFI shall, prior to submission to the Office of Management and Budget, review, and amend as it deems appropriate, the budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

(B) The CFI shall also adopt rules governing the reprogramming of funds within this budget. Such rules may require that reprogrammings of certain types or amounts be given prior approval by the CFI.

(ii) Establish policy priorities for the collection and production of national intelligence.

(iii) Establish policy for the management of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

(iv) Provide guidance on the relationship between tactical and national intelligence; however, neither the DCI nor the CFI shall have responsibility for tactical intelligence.

(v) Provide continuing guidance to the Intelligence Community in order to ensure compliance with policy directions of the NSC.

(3) The CFI shall be supported by the Intelligence Community staff headed by the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community.

(4) The CFI shall establish such subcommittees as it deems appropriate to ensure consultation with members of the Intelligence Community on policies and guidance issued by the CFI.

(5) Decisions of the CFI may be reviewed by the National Security Council upon appeal by the Director of Central Intelligence or any member of the National Security Council.

(c) The Operations Advisory Group.

(1) There is established the Operations Advisory Group (hereinafter referred to as the Operations Group), which shall be composed of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Chairman shall be designated by the President. The Attorney General and the Director

of the Office of Management and Budget or their representatives, and others who may be designated by the President, shall attend all meetings as observers.

(2) The Operations Group shall (i) consider and develop a policy recommendation, including any dissents, for the President prior to his decision on each special activity in support of national foreign policy objectives.

(ii) Conduct periodic reviews of programs previously considered by the Operations Group.

(iii) Give approval for specific sensitive intelligence collection operations as designated by the Operations Group.

(iv) Conduct periodic reviews of ongoing sensitive intelligence collection operations.

(3) The Operations Group shall discharge the responsibilities assigned by subparagraphs (c) (2) (i) and (c) (2) (iii) of this section only after consideration in a formal meeting attended by all members and observers; or, in unusual circumstances when any member or observer is unavailable, when a designated representative of the member or observer attends.

(4) The staff of the National Security Council shall provide support to the Operations Group.

(d) Director of Central Intelligence.

(1) The Director of Central Intelligence,



pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, shall be responsible directly to the National Security Council and the President. He shall:

- (i) Chair the CFI.
- (ii) Act as executive head of the CIA and Intelligence Community staff.
- (iii) Ensure the development and submission of a budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program to the CFI.
- (iv) Act as the President's primary adviser on foreign intelligence and provide him and other officials in the Executive branch with foreign intelligence, including National Intelligence Estimates; develop national intelligence requirements and priorities; and supervise production and dissemination of national intelligence.
- (v) Ensure appropriate implementation of special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives.
- (vi) Establish procedures to ensure the propriety of requests, and responses thereto, from the White House Staff or other Executive departments and agencies to the Intelligence Community.
- (vii) Ensure that appropriate programs are developed which properly protect intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures. His responsibility within the United States shall be limited to:

(A) Protection by lawful means against disclosure by present or former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency or persons, or employees of persons or organizations, presently or formerly under contract with the Agency;

(B) providing leadership, guidance and technical assistance to other government departments and agencies performing foreign intelligence activities; and

(C) in cases involving serious or continuing security violations, recommending to the Attorney General that the case be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further investigation.

(viii) Establish a vigorous program to downgrade and declassify foreign intelligence information as appropriate and consistent with Executive Order No. 11652.

(ix) Ensure the existence of strong Inspector General capabilities in all elements of the Intelligence Community and that each Inspector General submits quarterly to the Intelligence Oversight Board a report which sets forth any questionable activities in which that intelligence organization has engaged or is engaged.

(x) Ensure the establishment, by the Intelligence Community, of common security standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence systems, information and products, and for granting access thereto.

(xi) Act as the principal spokesman to the Congress for the Intelligence Community and facilitate the use of foreign intelligence products by Congress.

(xii) Promote the development and maintenance by the Central Intelligence Agency of services of common concern to the Intelligence Community organizations, including multi-discipline analysis, national level intelligence products, and a national level current intelligence publication.

(xiii) Establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection, and designation of relative priorities for the transmission of critical intelligence, and provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing guidance as to the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such intelligence.

(xiv) Establish such committees of collectors, producers and users of intelligence to assist in his conduct of his responsibilities as he deems appropriate.

(xv) Consult with users and producers of intelligence, including the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and the Council of Economic Advisors, to ensure the timeliness, relevancy and quality of the intelligence product.

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(2) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the supervision and direction of the Intelligence Community, the position of Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community is hereby established (Committee on Foreign Intelligence).

(3) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the supervision and direction of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Director of Central Intelligence shall, to the extent consistent with his statutory responsibilities, delegate the day-to-day operation of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (50 U.S.C. 403(a)).

(4) To assist the DCI in the fulfillment of his responsibilities, the heads of all departments and agencies shall give him access to all information relevant to the foreign intelligence needs of the United States. Relevant information requested by the DCI shall be provided, and the DCI shall take appropriate steps to maintain its confidentiality.

Sec. 4. Responsibilities and Duties of the Intelligence Community. Purpose. The rules of operation prescribed by this section of the Order relate to the activities of our foreign intelligence agencies. In some instances, detailed implementation of this Executive order will be contained in classified documents because of the sensitivity of the information and its relation

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to national security. All such classified instructions will be consistent with this Order. Unless otherwise specified within this section, its provisions apply to activities both inside and outside the United States, and all references to law are to applicable laws of the United States. Nothing in this section of this Order shall be construed to interfere with any law-enforcement responsibility of any department or agency.

(a) Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community.

The senior officials of the CIA, Departments of State, Treasury and Defense, ERDA and the FBI shall ensure that, in discharging the duties and responsibilities enumerated for their organizations which relate to foreign intelligence, they are responsive to the needs of the President, the National Security Council and other elements of the Government. In carrying out their duties and responsibilities, senior officials shall ensure that all policies and directives relating to intelligence activities are carried out in accordance with law and this Order, including Section 5, and shall:

(1) Make appropriate use of the capabilities of the other elements of the Intelligence Community in order to achieve maximum efficiency.

(2) Contribute in areas of his responsibility to the national intelligence products produced under auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(3) Establish internal policies and guidelines governing employee conduct and ensuring that such are made known to, and acknowledged by, each employee.

(4) Provide for a strong and independent organization for identification and inspection of, and reporting on, unauthorized activity.

(5) Report to the Attorney General that information which relates to detection or prevention of possible violations of law by any person, including an employee of the senior official's department or agency.

(6) Furnish to the Director of Central Intelligence, the CFI, the Operations Group, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Intelligence Oversight Board all of the information required for the performance of their respective duties.

(7) Participate, as appropriate, in the provision of services of common concern as directed by the Director of Central Intelligence and provide other departments and agencies with such mutual assistance as may be within his capabilities and as may be required in the interests of the Intelligence Community for reasons of economy, effectiveness, or operational necessity.

(8) Protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods within his department or agency, consistent with policies and guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(9) Conduct a continuing review of all classified material originating within his organization and promptly declassifying such material consistent with Executive Order No. 11652, as amended.

(10) Provide administrative and support functions required by his department or agency.

(b) The Central Intelligence Agency. All duties and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be related to the foreign intelligence functions outlined below. As authorized by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the CIA Act of 1949, as amended, and other laws, regulations, and directives, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:

(1) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, sociological, and geographic intelligence, to meet the needs of the President, the National Security Council, and other elements of the United States Government.

(2) Develop and conduct programs to collect political, economic, scientific, technical, military, geographic, and sociological information, not otherwise

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obtainable, relating to foreign intelligence, in accordance with directives of the National Security Council.

(3) Collect and produce intelligence on foreign aspects of international terrorist activities and traffic in narcotics.

(4) Conduct foreign counterintelligence activities outside the United States and when in the United States in coordination with the FBI subject to the approval of the Attorney General.

(5) Carry out such other special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives as may be directed by the President or the National Security Council and which are within the limits of applicable law.

(6) Conduct, for the Intelligence Community, services of common concern as directed by the National Security Council, such as monitoring of foreign public radio and television broadcasts and foreign press services, collection of foreign intelligence information from cooperating sources in the United States, acquisition and translation of foreign publications and photographic interpretation.

(7) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized in this subsection.

(8) Protect the security of its installations, activities, information and personnel. In order to maintain this security, the CIA shall conduct such investigations of applicants, employees, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA as are necessary.

(9) Conduct administrative, technical and support activities in the United States or abroad as may be necessary to perform the functions described in paragraphs (1) through (8) above, including procurement, maintenance and transport; communications and data processing; recruitment and training; the provision of personnel, financial and medical services; development of essential cover and proprietary arrangements; entering into contracts and arrangements with appropriate private companies and institutions to provide classified or unclassified research, analytical and developmental services and specialized expertise; and entering into similar arrangements with academic institutions, provided CIA sponsorship is known to the appropriate senior officials of the academic institutions and to senior project officials.

(c) The Department of State. The Secretary of State shall:

(1) Collect, overtly, foreign political, political-military, sociological, economic, scientific, technical and associated biographic information.

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(2) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States foreign policy as required for the execution of his responsibilities and in support of policy-makers involved in foreign relations within the United States Government.

(3) Disseminate within the United States Government, as appropriate, reports received from United States diplomatic missions abroad.

(4) Coordinate with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that United States intelligence activities and programs are useful for and consistent with United States foreign policy.

(5) Transmit reporting requirements of the Intelligence Community to our Chiefs of Missions abroad and provide guidance for their collection effort.

(6) Contribute to the Intelligence Community guidance for its collection of intelligence based on the needs of those responsible for foreign policy decisions.

(7) Support Chiefs of Missions in discharging their responsibilities to direct and coordinate the activities of all elements of their missions.

(d) The Department of the Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury shall:

(1) Collect, overtly, foreign financial and monetary information.

(2) Participate with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign economic information.

(3) Produce that intelligence required for the execution of the Secretary's interdepartmental responsibilities and the mission of the Department of the Treasury.

(4) Contribute intelligence and guidance required for the development of national intelligence.

(5) Disseminate within the United States Government, as appropriate, foreign intelligence information acquired.

(e) Department of Defense.

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall:

(i) Collect foreign military intelligence information as well as military-related foreign intelligence information, including scientific, technical, political and economic information as required for the execution of his responsibilities.

(ii) Produce and disseminate, as appropriate, intelligence emphasizing foreign military capabilities and intentions and scientific, technical and economic developments pertinent to his responsibilities.

(iii) Conduct such programs and missions necessary to fulfill national intelligence requirements as determined by the CFI.

(iv) Direct, fund and operate the National Security Agency, and national, defense and military intelligence and reconnaissance entities as required.

(v) Conduct, as the executive agent of the United States Government, signals intelligence activities and communications security, except as otherwise approved by the CFI.

(vi) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government.

(2) In carrying out these assigned responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to utilize the following:

(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency (whose functions, authorities and responsibilities are currently publicly assigned by Department of Defense Directive No. 5105.21) to:

(A) Produce or provide military intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies.

(B) Coordinate all Department of Defense intelligence collection requirements and manage the Defense Attache system.

(C) Establish substantive intelligence priority goals and objectives for the Department of Defense and provide guidance on substantive intelligence matters to all major Defense intelligence activities.

(D) Review and maintain cognizance over all plans, policies and procedures for noncryptologic intelligence functions of the Department of Defense.

(E) Provide intelligence staff support as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(ii) The National Security Agency, whose functions, authorities and responsibilities shall include:

(A) Establishment and operation of an effective unified organization for the signals intelligence activities of the United States Government, except for certain operations which are normally exercised through appropriate elements of the military command structure, or by the CIA.

(B) Exercise control over signals intelligence collection and processing activities of the Government, delegating to an appropriate agent specified resources for such periods and tasks as required for the direct support of military commanders.

(C) Collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence in accordance with objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(D) Dissemination of signals intelligence to all authorized elements of the Government, including the Armed Services, as requested.

(E) Serving under the Secretary of Defense as the central communications security authority of the United States Government.

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(F) Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United States for signals intelligence and communications security.

(iii) Special offices for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs, whose functions, authorities, and responsibilities shall include:

(A) Carrying out consolidated programs for reconnaissance.

(B) Assigning responsibility to the various departments and agencies of the Government, according to their capabilities, for the research, development, procurement, operations and control of designated means of collection.

(iv) Such other offices within the Department of Defense as shall be deemed appropriate for conduct of the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense.

(f) Energy Research and Development Administration.  
The Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration shall:

(1) Produce intelligence required for the execution of his responsibilities and the mission of the Energy Research and Development Administration, hereinafter referred to as ERDA, including the area of nuclear and atomic energy.

(2) Disseminate such intelligence and provide technical and analytical expertise to other Intelligence Community organizations and be responsive to the guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

(3) Participate with other Intelligence Community agencies and departments in formulating collection requirements where its special technical expertise can contribute to such collection requirements.

(g) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of the FBI shall:

(1) Detect and prevent espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other unlawful activities by or on behalf of foreign powers through such lawful counterintelligence operations within the United States, including electronic surveillance, as are necessary or useful for such purposes.

(2) Conduct within the United States and its territories, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, those lawful activities, including electronic surveillance, authorized by the President and specifically approved by the Attorney General, to be undertaken in support of foreign intelligence collection requirements of other intelligence agencies.



(3) Collect foreign intelligence by lawful means within the United States and its territories when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President to make such requests.

(4) Disseminate, as appropriate, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information which it acquires to appropriate Federal agencies, State and local law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments.

(5) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.

Sec. 5. Restrictions on Intelligence Activities.

Information about the capabilities, intentions and activities of other governments is essential to informed decision-making in the field of national defense and foreign relations. The measures employed to acquire such information should be responsive to the legitimate needs of our Government and must be conducted in a manner which preserves and respects our established concepts of privacy and our civil liberties.

Recent events have clearly indicated the desirability of government-wide direction which will ensure a proper balancing of these interests. This section of this Order does not authorize any activity not previously authorized

and does not provide exemption from any restrictions otherwise applicable. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions of this section apply to activities both inside and outside the United States. References to law are to applicable laws of the United States.

(a) Definitions. As used in this section of this Order, the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed to them below:

(1) "Collection" means any one or more of the gathering, analysis, dissemination or storage of non-publicly available information without the informed express consent of the subject of the information.

(2) "Counterintelligence" means information concerning the protection of foreign intelligence or of national security information and its collection from detection or disclosure.

(3) "Electronic surveillance" means acquisition of a non-public communication by electronic means, without the consent of a person who is a party to, or, in the case of a non-electronic communication, visibly present at, the communication.

(4) "Employee" means a person employed by, assigned or detailed to, or acting for a United States foreign intelligence agency.

(5) "Foreign intelligence" means information concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of any foreign power, or of any non-United States person, whether within or outside the United States, or concerning areas outside the United States.

(6) "Foreign intelligence agency" means the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency; and further includes any other department or agency of the United States Government or component thereof while it is engaged in the collection of foreign intelligence or counter-intelligence, but shall not include any such department, agency or component thereof to the extent that it is engaged in its authorized civil or criminal law enforcement functions; nor shall it include in any case the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(7) "National security information" has the meaning ascribed to it in Executive Order No. 11652, as amended.

(8) "Physical surveillance" means continuing visual observation by any means; or acquisition of a non-public communication by a person not a party thereto or visibly present thereat through any means which does not involve electronic surveillance.

(9) "United States person" means United States citizens, aliens admitted to the United States for permanent residence and corporations or other organizations incorporated or organized in the United States.

(b) Restrictions on Collection. Foreign intelligence agencies shall not engage in any of the following activities:

(1) Physical surveillance directed against a United States person, unless it is a lawful surveillance conducted pursuant to procedures approved by the head of the foreign intelligence agency and directed against any of the following:

(i) A present or former employee of such agency, its present or former contractors or their present or former employees, for the purpose of protecting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods or national security information from unauthorized disclosure; or

(ii) a United States person, who is in contact with either such a present or former contractor or employee or with a non-United States person who is the subject of a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence inquiry, but only to the extent necessary to identify such United States person; or

(iii) a United States person outside the United States who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf

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of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities or activities threatening the national security.

(2) Electronic surveillance to intercept a communication which is made from, or is intended by the sender to be received in, the United States, or directed against United States persons abroad, except lawful electronic surveillance under procedures approved by the Attorney General; provided, that the Central Intelligence Agency shall not perform electronic surveillance within the United States, except for the purpose of testing equipment under procedures approved by the Attorney General consistent with law.

(3) Unconsented physical searches within the United States; or unconsented physical searches directed against United States persons abroad, except lawful searches under procedures approved by the Attorney General.

(4) Opening of mail or examination of envelopes of mail in United States postal channels except in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.

(5) Examination of Federal tax returns or tax information except in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.

(6) Infiltration or undisclosed participation within the United States in any organization for the purpose of reporting on or influencing its activities

or members; except such infiltration or participation with respect to an organization composed primarily of non-United States persons which is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.

(7) Collection of information, however acquired, concerning the domestic activities of United States persons except:

(i) Information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations which constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.

(ii) Information concerning present or former employees, present or former contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting, necessary to protect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods or national security information from unauthorized disclosure; and the identity of persons in contact with the foregoing or with a non-United States person who is the subject of a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence inquiry.

(iii) Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts, but only for the purpose of determining the suitability or credibility of such persons.

(iv) Foreign intelligence or counterintelligence gathered abroad or from electronic surveillance conducted in compliance with Section 5(b)(2); or foreign intelligence acquired from cooperating sources in the United States.

(v) Information about a United States person who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities.

(vi) Information concerning persons or activities that pose a clear threat to foreign intelligence agency facilities or personnel, provided, that such information is retained only by the foreign intelligence agency threatened and that proper coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is accomplished.

(c) Dissemination and Storage. Nothing in this section of this Order shall prohibit:

(1) Lawful dissemination to the appropriate law enforcement agencies of incidentally gathered information indicating involvement in activities which may be in violation of law.

(2) Storage of information required by law to be retained.

(3) Dissemination to foreign intelligence agencies of information of the subject matter types listed in Section 5(b)(7).

(d) Restrictions on Experimentation. Foreign intelligence agencies shall not engage in experimentation with drugs on human subjects, except with the informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinterested third party, of each such human subject and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects for Biomedical and Behavioral Research.

(e) Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities.

(1) No foreign intelligence agency shall, except as expressly authorized by law (i) provide services, equipment, personnel or facilities to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration or to State or local police organizations of the United States or (ii) participate in or fund any law enforcement activity within the United States.

(2) These prohibitions shall not, however, preclude: (i) cooperation between a foreign intelligence agency and appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the personnel and facilities of the foreign intelligence agency or preventing espionage or other criminal activity related to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or (ii) provision of specialized equipment or technical knowledge for use by any other Federal department or agency.



(f) Assignment of Personnel. An employee of a foreign intelligence agency detailed elsewhere within the Federal Government shall be responsible to the host agency and shall not report to such employee's parent agency on the affairs of the host agency, except as may be directed by the latter. The head of the host agency, and any successor, shall be informed of the detailee's association with the parent agency.

(g) Prohibition of Assassination. No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.

(h) Implementation.

(1) This section of this Order shall be effective on March 1, 1976. Each department and agency affected by this section of this Order shall promptly issue internal directives to implement this section with respect to its foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.

(2) The Attorney General shall, within ninety days of the effective date of this section of this Order, issue guidelines relating to activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the areas of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

Sec. 6. Oversight of Intelligence Organizations.

(a) There is hereby established an Intelligence Oversight Board, hereinafter referred to as the Oversight Board.

(1) The Oversight Board shall have three members who shall be appointed by the President and who shall be from outside the Government and be qualified on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of background and experience. The members of the Oversight Board may also serve on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Executive Order No. 11460 of March 20, 1969). No member of the Oversight Board shall have any personal contractual relationship with any agency or department of the Intelligence Community.

(2) One member of the Oversight Board shall be designated by the President as its Chairman.

(3) The Oversight Board shall:

(i) Receive and consider reports by Inspectors General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Community concerning activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(ii) Review periodically the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Community designed to discover and report to the Oversight Board activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(iii) Review periodically with each member of the Intelligence Community their internal guidelines to ensure their adequacy.

(iv) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the Attorney General and the President on its findings.

(v) Report in a timely manner to the Attorney General and to the President any activities that raise serious questions about legality.

(vi) Report in a timely manner to the President any activities that raise serious questions about propriety.

(b) Inspectors General and General Counsels within the Intelligence Community shall:

(1) Transmit to the Oversight Board reports of any activities that come to their attention that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the Oversight Board on its findings concerning questionable activities, if any.

(3) Provide to the Oversight Board all information requested about activities within their respective departments or agencies.

(4) Report to the Oversight Board any occasion on which they were directed not to report any activity to the Oversight Board by their agency or department heads.

(5) Formulate practices and procedures designed to discover and report to the Oversight Board activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(c) Heads of intelligence agencies or departments shall:

(1) Report periodically to the Oversight Board on any activities of their organizations that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(2) Instruct their employees to cooperate fully with the Oversight Board.

(3) Ensure that Inspectors General and General Counsels of their agencies have access to any information necessary to perform their duties assigned by paragraph (4) of this section.

(d) The Attorney General shall:

(1) Receive and consider reports from the Oversight Board.

(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the President with respect to activities of the Intelligence Community, if any, which raise questions of legality.

(e) The Oversight Board shall receive staff support. No person who serves on the staff of the Oversight Board shall have any contractual or employment relationship with any department or agency in the Intelligence Community.

(f) The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board established by Executive Order No. 11460 of March 20, 1969, remains in effect.

Sec. 7. Secrecy Protection.

(a) In order to improve the protection of sources

and methods of intelligence, all members of the Executive branch and its contractors given access to information containing sources or methods of intelligence shall, as a condition of obtaining access, sign an agreement that they will not disclose that information to persons not authorized to receive it.

(b) In the event of any unauthorized disclosure of information concerning sources or methods of intelligence, the names of any persons found to have made unauthorized disclosure shall be forwarded (1) to the head of applicable departments or agencies for appropriate disciplinary action; and (2) to the Attorney General for appropriate legal action.

(c) In the event of any threatened unauthorized disclosure of information concerning sources or methods of intelligence by a person who has agreed not to make such disclosure, the details of the threatened disclosure shall be transmitted to the Attorney General for appropriate legal action, including the seeking of a judicial order to prevent such disclosure.

(d) In further pursuit of the need to provide protection for other significant areas of intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to expand the scope of agreements secured from those persons who, as an aspect of their relationship with the United States Government, have access to classified intelligence material.

Sec. 8. Enabling Data.

(a) The Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the Director of Central Intelligence shall provide for detailed implementation of this Order by issuing appropriate directives.

(b) All existing National Security Council and Director of Central Intelligence directives shall be amended to be consistent with this Order within ninety days of its effective date.

(c) This Order shall supersede the Presidential Memorandum of November 5, 1971, on the "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community."

(d) Heads of departments and agencies within the Intelligence Community shall issue supplementary directives to their organizations consistent with this Order within ninety days of its effective date.

(e) This Order will be implemented within current manning authorizations of the Intelligence Community. To this end, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget will facilitate the required realignment of personnel positions. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget will also assist in the allocation of appropriate facilities.

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
February 18, 1976.

*Gerard R. Ford*

[FR Doc.76-5010 Filed 2-18-76;12:36 pm]

EDITORIAL NOTE: For the President's remarks at his news conference of February 17, 1976, announcing a reorganization of the intelligence community, see the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 12, no. 17).

Approved For Release 2007/11/30 : CIA-RDP84M00713R000100030001-0

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Approved For Release 2007/11/30 : CIA-RDP84M00713R000100030001-0

76-6896/3

March 10, 1976

NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.  
8/28/07

MEMORANDUM FOR WORKING MEMBERS OF ICG  
FROM: JACK MARSH *Jack*  
SUBJECT: EXECUTIVE ORDER ANNOTATIONS

Attached are annotations of the President's Executive Order on the Intelligence Community. These represent the consensus of the working group which worked on the Executive Order and, in some cases, the position the President took where there was a split among the agencies and departments.

I hope that these annotations will be of assistance to you as you implement the provisions of the Executive Order.

Attachment

Distribution:

✓ George Bush, CIA  
Robert Ellsworth, Defense  
Harold Saunders, State  
Nino Scalia and Rex Lee, Justice  
Bill Hyland, NSC  
Don Ogilvie, OMB  
Phil Buchen  
Mike Duval



Annotations (p. 3)

2 (b) (5) - (9) The "intelligence elements" referred to here do not include organizations whose primary job is law enforcement, such as the Internal Revenue Service, even though they may collect intelligence for a law enforcement purpose. This term refers to those organizations which carry out the intelligence functions enumerated in Section 4.

2 (c) Special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives means covert action.

2 (d) This subsection allows the CFI to determine whether a certain program (other than those relating solely to tactical intelligence) should be considered a part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. This flexibility is necessary since current budget classifications may be changed over the years.

Annotations (p. 5)

(b)(1) The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence is the Deputy Secretary of Defense who is responsible for intelligence matters.

(b)(2)(ii) In establishing these policy priorities, the CFI will generally be implementing the findings of the NSC in its semi-annual review of intelligence policies and the CFI's resource decisions. These policy priorities should not interfere with the DCI's responsibility for the substantive production of intelligence national, as detailed in Section 3(d)(iv). The CFI is given no responsibilities for substantive intelligence judgments; those responsibilities are the DCI's alone. A simple example may help demonstrate the distinction between the CFI's policy priority responsibilities and the DCI's substantive intelligence responsibilities: The CFI might issue a policy that more intelligence resources (both in collection and production) shall be allocated to obtaining information on the oil policies of Middle Eastern nations. The DCI alone however would be responsible for the actual intelligence estimates of those Middle Eastern policies.

Annotations (p. 7)

2(c)(2)(iii) Approval of sensitive intelligence collection operations is required only when such operations have been designated by the Operations Group. No change from past approval procedures for certain types of overhead reconnaissance was necessarily intended, but the Operations Group was given authority to expand the scope of sensitive intelligence collection operations over which it would have approval authority.

2(c)(3) This provision requires that the Operations Group meet formally to consider proposals for new covert actions and sensitive collection operations.

Annotations (p. 8)

d(1)(ii) The DCI is executive head of the CIA under the terms of the National Security Act; he is head of the Intelligence Community staff as a responsibility assigned by this Executive Order (See also Sections 3(b)(3) and 3 (d) (2).)

d (1) (vii) The primary rationale for the limitations on the DCI's responsibilities in protecting sources and methods in the United States was to rule out CIA investigations of unauthorized disclosures other than disclosures from the CIA itself. This limitation was recommended by the Rockefeller Commission. CIA investigations will be limited by the restrictions contained in Section 5 of the Executive Order.

Annotations (p. 10)

4(d) (xiii) This DCI responsibility should be read in conjunction with the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense (in Section 4(e) (1) (vi)) to provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence.

4(d) (xiv) This provision empowers the DCI to establish committees of producers and consumers of intelligence. He may choose to reconstitute the United States Intelligence Board or a similar organization to assist him in producing national intelligence.

Annotations (p. 11)

4 (d) (2) The reference to Committee on Foreign Intelligence in this paragraph was meant as a cross reference to Section 3 (b) (3) and was not intended to imply that all activities of the Deputy to the Director of Central for the Intelligence Community will be related to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

4 (d) (4) This provision is designed to ensure that the DCI receives all relevant foreign intelligence information coming into the possession of the departments and agencies of our Government.

Sec. 4 In describing the responsibilities and duties of the Intelligence Community, the intention was to write in unclassified form those responsibilities as they already existed in classified form. Other than those changes necessary to take account of the new control and direction organizations established in Section 3, the restrictions in Section 5, and the new oversight in Section 6, no changes in the responsibilities and duties of the Intelligence Community, as previously assigned, were intended in Section 4.

Annotations (p. 13)

4(a)(5) This provision requires that agency heads report to the Attorney General any information they may obtain which relates to the commission of federal crimes. It is not intended to authorize any new collection activities but is intended to allow appropriate dissemination of incidentally collected information which relates to crimes. See Section 5 (c) (1).

Annotations (p. 14)

4(b) - This subsection makes it clear that all activities of the CIA must relate to foreign intelligence.



Annotations (p. 15)

4(b) (3) This assignment must be read in light of the prohibition in the National Security Act of 1947 against the CIA's performing any law enforcement role. This provision, therefore, is intended to task the CIA to collect and produce "strategic" intelligence relating to international narcotics traffic and terrorism. This would include subjects such as: identity of major source countries for narcotics, predominant international routes for narcotics transportation, etc. It would not include collection of information intended for use as evidence in a criminal prosecution.

Annotations (p. 16)

4(b)(8) All activities conducted by the CIA, including those designed to fulfill this responsibility, are subject to the restrictions contained in Section 5 of this order.

4(b)(9) The proviso at the end of this paragraph requires that the head of a university with which the CIA enters a contract must be informed of the agency's sponsorship, as well as those officials actually heading the project in question, such as the head of a laboratory conducting the research contracted for.

Approved For Release 2007/11/30 : CIA-RDP84M00713R000100030001-0

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Annotations (p. 19)

4(e)(1)(v) The proviso "except as otherwise approved by the CFI", and the proviso in Section 4 (e)(2)(ii)(A) "or by the CIA," were included to recognize that NSCID #6, allows certain signals intelligence activities to be conducted by the CIA. No change from existing classified directives was intended. (NOTE: The phrase "except as otherwise approved by the CFI" was erroneously included in 4(e)(1)(vi) in the copy of the Executive Order in the original White House package. The phrase was transferred to 4 (e)(1)(v) before the order appeared in the Federal Register.)

4(e)(2) The intent of this paragraph is to specify the functions currently performed by DIA and NSA. It is not intended to deprive the Secretary of Defense of whatever authority he may have to reassign these functions to other elements of his department.

(e) (2) (iv) This provision recognizes the existence of offices in the Department of Defense other than DIA, NSA and special offices for reconnaissance programs, which the Secretary of Defense utilizes to fulfill the responsibilities assigned in Section 4 (e) (1). These include the intelligence offices in each of the military services.

4 (g)(1) The reference to lawful counterintelligence operations was intended to refer to foreign counterintelligence operations.

4 (g) (2) This provision is intended to deal with activities by the FBI in support of foreign intelligence collection requirements of other intelligence agencies. It is not intended to deal with collection of intelligence through human sources.

Annotations (p. 23)

4(g)(3) This provision is intended to relate primarily to the collection of foreign intelligence by non-technical means.

4(g)(4) The reference to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information was intended to refer to foreign intelligence and foreign counterintelligence information.

Sec. 5 In stating that "This section of this Order does not authorize any activity not previously authorized, "it is meant that Section 5 of the Order should not be read to authorize any activity directly or indirectly, but rather to establish restrictions on already authorized activity. In stating that this section of the Order "does not provide exemption from any restrictions otherwise applicable," it was meant that if any statutes, other executive orders or internal department or agency regulations placed stricter regulations on foreign intelligence agencies, Section 5 of this Order did not relax those restrictions.

Annotations (p. 24)

(a)(3) The monitoring of a telephone conversation with the consent of one party does not constitute electronic surveillance under this definition. This is consistent with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Also, the recording of an ordinary oral conversation by someone who can be seen by both parties to it (and therefore can reasonably be expected to overhear it) does not constitute electronic surveillance.



Annotations (p. 25)

(a) (6) For the purposes of this order, the CIA, NSA, and DIA are considered "foreign intelligence agencies" (and therefore subject to these restrictions) with respect to all of their activities. (NSA, for example, has responsibilities for communications security, which does not constitute a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence activity.) Other agencies (not including the FBI) are deemed "foreign intelligence agencies" whenever they are engaged in activities related to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.

(a) (8) The definition of physical surveillance refers primarily to systematic observation of an individual designed to determine all of his regular daily activities. It also refers to the acquisition of an oral communication by a person not otherwise a party thereto or visibly present thereat through any means which does not involve electronic surveillance. This second half of the definition refers primarily to a situation where a person hides in a room to overhear what persons in the room are saying.

(b)(1) Foreign intelligence agencies may engage in physical surveillance of U.S. persons only under very limited circumstances. Within the U.S., only two types of U.S. subjects may be physically surveilled:

(a) Present and former employees of the agency or its contractors may be surveilled only for the purpose of preventing unauthorized disclosure of classified information obtained as a result of their employment.

(b) Persons who are observed in contact with employees described above during a surveillance of such employees, but only long enough to identify such persons. This exception is necessary to allow leads to be followed up by the FBI, if appropriate; it does not allow any surveillance for purposes other than establishing identity.

Physical surveillance abroad by foreign intelligence agencies of U.S. persons is limited to those who are reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities or other activities threatening the U.S. These few U.S. persons who may be surveilled abroad are in a class that represents serious dangers to the U.S. In many foreign countries, only foreign intelligence agencies can perform this task.

Annotations (p. 27)

(b) (2) No electronic surveillance performed by foreign intelligence agencies is allowed of communications made from or received in the United States or directed against United States persons abroad unless the procedures for such surveillance are approved by the Attorney General. The Attorney General will establish such procedures, and in many cases, his approval will be required for each individual surveillance. Further, the CIA is prohibited from performing any electronic surveillance within the United States except for the purpose of testing equipment under lawful procedures approved by the Attorney General. If the CIA has any legitimate need for electronic surveillance, it is allowed to ask other agencies to perform such surveillance; the CIA may give technical assistance for such surveillance.

(b) (3) Foreign intelligence agencies are prohibited from searching persons, homes or offices in the United States. Lawful physical searches abroad directed against U.S. persons are allowed only under procedures approved by the Attorney General.

(b) (6) This subsection bars infiltration of groups within the U.S. for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. It does not prohibit placement by a foreign intelligence agency of an individual in a group for the limited purpose of developing associations and credentials to be utilized in collecting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence outside of the United States. This provision contains an exception for organizations composed primarily of foreigners and reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power. Information on such groups would constitute legitimate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

Annotations (p. 28)

(b) (7) This subsection, with certain exceptions, prohibits a foreign intelligence agency from gathering, analyzing, disseminating, or storing non-publicly available information on the domestic activities of U.S. persons.

(b) (7) (i) Much information on even the domestic activities of corporations organized in the United States is of relevance to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. For example, commercial organizations owned or controlled by foreign governments are often incorporated here; many of their activities shed light on the capabilities and intentions of the governments which control them. Even many truly American corporations (especially multinational corporations) are so engaged in international commerce that information on their domestic activities is essential to understand significant trends in foreign economic affairs. For example, a U.S. wheat seller's plans to sell to the Soviet Union are domestic activities highly relevant to foreign intelligence. Therefore this provision allows foreign intelligence agencies to have information on U.S. corporations, but only to the extent that it constitutes legitimate foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.

(b) (7) (ii) This exception recognizes several appropriate activities of foreign intelligence agencies. In order to protect classified information, intelligence agencies must run security checks on applicants for employment and employees. Like any Government agency, these agencies must also check out employee backgrounds to ascertain their job suitability. Even after a person has left an intelligence agency, it has a legitimate need to maintain its records on that person should a security breach stemming from his employment occur. Similarly, each intelligence agency has an interest in the suitability and security worthiness of persons who contract with it or are employees of its contractors working on its projects and requiring access to classified information. Each intelligence agency must also maintain records on persons who, without necessarily being employed by it, are given access to its classified information. Such persons would include employees of other Government agencies who require access to its classified information and private citizens who voluntarily agree to be cleared to receive classified information in order to aid in their voluntary reporting of foreign intelligence information to the agency.

Annotations (p. 28) Continued

(b) (7) (iii) Each intelligence agency will on occasion consider contacting a U.S. person because he may be a potential source or contact who will aid the agency. Before making such contacts, however, the agency will want to be assured that the person would be suitable for such assistance. This exception therefore allows collection of information on such persons, but only for the purpose of determining their suitability or credibility. Furthermore, such a person must reasonably be considered to be a potential source or contact.

Annotations (p. 29)

(b) (7) (iv) This provision recognizes that information on the domestic activities of U.S. individuals can constitute legitimate foreign intelligence or counterintelligence. For example, the fact that a U.S. citizen is recruiting mercenaries within the U.S. to fight in a foreign war constitutes foreign intelligence. Although counterintelligence normally involves either employees of a foreign intelligence agency or persons acting on behalf of a foreign power, sometimes a U.S. person may be seeking to disclose national defense information. Therefore, foreign intelligence agencies are permitted to have such information. However, such information is not permitted to be collected by spying on Americans within this country. Such information may only be gathered abroad, or from electronic surveillance conducted through procedures approved by the Attorney General, or from cooperating sources in the United States.

(b) (7) (v) Foreign intelligence agencies or other foreign groups use many resources seeking to penetrate (i.e., obtain information from) United States intelligence agencies. The United States agencies need to protect themselves from such activities. Such activities may involve domestic activities of United States persons. Because United States intelligence agencies have a need to understand the operating modes of foreign intelligence agencies, there is a legitimate need for it to collect and use such information. Also, because of the unique contacts of our foreign intelligence agencies with information sources abroad and foreign sources within the United States, these agencies are also permitted to collect information on United States persons reasonably believed to be involved in international terrorist or narcotics activities.

(b) (7) (vi) This provision allows a foreign intelligence agency to collect information about persons that pose a clear threat to the facilities or personnel of the agency involved. However, such information may be retained only by the agency threatened and this agency must coordinate the matter with the FBI. This authority is necessary to allow agencies to take appropriate precautions in cases such as bomb threats or threats to kill agency personnel.

Annotations (p. 29) Continued

(c) (1) This provision allows intelligence agencies to transmit to law-enforcement agencies information indicating involvement in activities which may be in violation of law which it happens to obtain incidentally to its proper foreign intelligence activities. All citizens and Government agencies have an obligation to turn information related to criminal activity over to appropriate authorities.

(c) (2) This allows storage of information required by law to be maintained. For example, should an intelligence agency ever conduct an illegal electronic surveillance, the law requires it to keep records to such an incident for possible court action. Such information, although it may be stored, cannot be used by the agency.

(c) (3) This provision allows agencies to disseminate information of the subject matter types listed as exceptions to the general prohibition of collection of information about the domestic activities of U.S. persons. These represent the limited categories of information on the domestic activities of Americans which foreign intelligence agencies may appropriately have.

With respect to information covered by Section 5 (b)(7)(iv) which is allowed to be collected or retained only if it came from certain sources (i.e., from abroad, electronic surveillance, or cooperating sources in the U.S.), these conditions based on sources are also applicable to Section 7(c)(3) allowing dissemination. That is, if the information specified in Section 5(b)(7)(iv) was not collected from the specified allowed sources, it may not be disseminated pursuant to Section 7 (c) (3).

Annotations (p. 30)

(e) This section recognizes that the FBI and LEAA are the appropriate federal agencies to give assistance to state and local law enforcement agencies.

It also recognizes the 1973 amendment to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (the Holtzmann Amendment), which prohibits CIA assistance to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and evidences congressional disapproval of direct CIA assistance to state and local police departments in general.



Annotation (p. 31)

5 (h) (2) Attorney General guidelines on the FBI, as called for in this paragraph, may be classified.

Annotations (p. 32)

6 (a) (3) The Oversight Board has jurisdiction over the Intelligence Community, as defined in Section 2 (b). Note that the element of the FBI which performs the functions assigned by Section 4 (g) of this order is under the jurisdiction of the Oversight Board.

Annotations (p. 33)

6 (a) (3) (v) and (vi) Activities raising questions as to legality are required to be reported to the President and the Attorney General. Such activities would include possible criminal infractions and activities, which, although not criminal, are not authorized by the charter of the agency involved. Activities raising mere questions of propriety are required to be reported to the President. These would include activities which, although consistent with U.S. law, may be of questionable morality or judgment.

6 (b) (4) This provision is designed to ensure that an Inspector General cannot be "muzzled" by his agency head. Note, however, that this subsection does not grant Inspectors General the authority to report an activity to the Oversight Board without informing his agency head, in cases where the IG is required by agency practice to notify his superior.

Annotations (p. 34)

6(c)(3) The reference to paragraph (4) of this section should be to paragraph (b) of this section.

6 (e) This provision prohibits detailees from intelligence agencies from serving as staff to the Oversight Board. It is not intended to prohibit detailees from other government agencies except those listed as comprising the Intelligence Community in Section 2 (b). Thus, an employee of a State Department office other than INR would not be covered.

6 (f) This order does not affect the role of PFIAB. It continues to exist and perform the same functions.

Annotations (p. 36)

8 (d) Although the affected departments and agencies are given ninety days to issue supplementary directives, this order became effective when signed by the President, with the exception of Section 5, whose restrictions took effect on March 1, 1976.

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15 October 1976

Approved by DCI 10/27

NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION: 8/28/07

OPERATIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 11905  
(Proposed as a DCI presentation to the Senate Select  
Committee on Intelligence)

INTRODUCTION

My comments today on operations of the Intelligence Community under Executive Order 11905 are provided as a follow-on to the discussions which Senator Inouye and Senator Huddleston had on 1 September with John O. Marsh, Counsellor to the President; my Deputy for the Intelligence Community, [ ] and Mr. George Cary.

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The briefing will deal with:

- The functioning of the management and oversight structure which the Executive Order created;
- The DCI's follow-on program, and
- The manner in which restrictions set forth in E.O. 11905 have affected the operations of intelligence organizations.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTION

The Executive Order charged the National Security Council with providing guidance and direction to the development and formulation of national intelligence activities.

In carrying out this responsibility, the NSC will conduct semi-annual reviews, geared to the new fiscal year to help ensure the maximum impact on program planning, budget decisions and management policies.

The first review will be conducted this fall.

Matters to be reviewed include:

- Intelligence policies
- The needs of users of intelligence
- The timeliness and quality of intelligence products, and
- The continued appropriateness of special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives.

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Three separate inputs are being prepared.

The first is a written report from the Committee on Foreign Intelligence. This report will:

- Summarize CFI activities since its creation in February, and
- Identify the major program and budget issues thus far encountered and those anticipated within the next six months.

The second report will be provided by the Operations Advisory Group.

The third element, being prepared by my Intelligence Community Staff in consultation with the NSC Staff will assess:

- Requirements of the major users of intelligence products, and
- The timeliness and quality of intelligence reporting.

An ad hoc group representing major organizations of the Intelligence Community has been working on this report for the past several months.

- Over one hundred important consumers of intelligence have been interviewed;
- Based on these interviews and ongoing analyses of intelligence products by the IC Staff, an overall assessment is being prepared.

I am in no position to prejudge what will result from this initial NSC review of intelligence activities, but we are anticipating guidance which will be of direct use in our efforts to improve our responsiveness to user needs.

#### OPERATIONS ADVISORY GROUP

The need for better control of sensitive intelligence activities was stressed in the recent investigations, and the newly established OPERATIONS ADVISORY GROUP is intended to accomplish this.

As you are aware, the OAG includes as its members the

- Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
- Secretary of State;
- Secretary of Defense;

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- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- with the Attorney General and Director of OMB  
as observers

The Operations Advisory Group has four functions:

- To consider and develop a policy recommendation for the President prior to his decision on each special activity in support of national foreign policy objectives;
- To conduct periodic reviews of programs previously considered by the Operations Group;
- To give approval for specific sensitive intelligence collection operations as designated by the Operations Group, and
- To conduct periodic reviews of ongoing sensitive intelligence collection operations.

The OAG is the successor to the National Security Council 40 Committee, and was created to review proposed covert actions and sensitive reconnaissance activities.

As you are aware from my actions in keeping your committee advised as to special activities within the province of the OAG, the Operations Group is performing its assigned functions.

You also are aware that we are engaged in covert actions only to a very limited degree.

- The situation is a far cry from the 1950s when more than half of the CIA budget was being devoted to covert actions and related operations.
- In recent years this figure has dropped to less than 5 percent of the Agency budget and it is even less today.

I am convinced, however, it is important that our Government maintain a capability to conduct covert actions when the international situation calls for such.

In the Operations Advisory Group I consider we have an effective mechanism for review and recommendations concerning such activities.

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## INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

In the interest of assuring that intelligence activities are conducted within the law and with full regard to the Constitutional rights of American citizens, the President created an INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD composed of three prominent private citizens.

The members are:

- Ambassador Robert D. Murphy, who had a distinguished State Department career
- Mr. Leo Cherne, an economist, who also is Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and
- Mr. Stephen Ailes, a lawyer and former Secretary of the Army

Executive Order 11905 gives this Board responsibility to:

- Receive and consider reports by agency heads, Inspector General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Community organizations concerning activities that raise questions of legality or propriety;
- Review periodically the practices and procedures which the IGs and General Counsels use to discover and report on activities that might raise questions of legality or propriety;
- Review with each member of the Intelligence Community the internal guidelines which have been issued and ensure their adequacy;
- Report at least quarterly to the President and to the Attorney General on the Board's findings;
- Report in a timely manner to the President and to the Attorney General any activities that raise serious questions about legality, and
- Report to the President any activities that raise serious questions about propriety.

\* I personally contacted all of the department and agency heads concerning the adequacy of their inspector general capabilities to respond to the Oversight Board requirements, and was in every case assured that such a capability existed.

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On April 19, by memorandum to all CIA employees, I called upon them to cooperate fully with the Intelligence Oversight Board.

Director of Central Intelligence Directives and CIA Headquarters Regulations were updated to reflect the restrictions on intelligence activities set forth in Executive Order 11905.

The organizations of the Intelligence Community submitted their first quarterly reports to the Oversight Board between 15 June and 15 July according to a schedule set by the Board.

Reports to the IOB by intelligence elements other than CIA are not made available to me, although we have been informally advised of some activities reported by other organizations.

The content of these reports and any follow-on actions are matters between the Oversight Board and the reporting organization, plus--if serious illegalities are involved--the President and the Attorney General.

At the very minimum the Board is focusing our attention on the requirement that we must continuously pay heed to the legality and propriety of our intelligence activities.

#### COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

Of the new organizations established by E.O. 11905, the one to which I have devoted the most personal time is the COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE.

--I chair this committee, and its other members are Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth, and William Hyland, who is Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

The CFI has a number of key functions relating to the management of our foreign intelligence effort/WCWD/11/8

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It is charged to:

- Control budget preparation and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program;
- Designate the intelligence activities and organizations which are to be included in this Program;
- Review and amend as appropriate the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget before it is submitted to OMB;
- Adopt rules governing the reprogramming of funds within the NFIP budget;
- Establish policy priorities for the collection and production of national intelligence;
- Establish policy for the management of the National Foreign Intelligence Program;
- Provide guidance on the relationship between national and tactical intelligence, and
- Provide continuing guidance to the Intelligence Community in order to ensure compliance with policy directions of the National Security Council.

This is a large order, I can assure you, but the CFI has proved to be an active organization.

- The Committee has met 16 times, and the workload it has undertaken has required the commitment of a sizeable part of my Intelligence Community Staff.
- The CFI also has established that the Intelligence Research and Development Council serve as a permanent subcommittee to the CFI.
- Malcolm Currie, Director of Defense Research and Engineering is chairman of the IR&D Council.

Most of the CFI's attention has been devoted thus far to its responsibilities for budget preparation and resource allocation for the FY 1978 budget.

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This has not been without some difficulty.

- Differing interpretations within the Community of CFI responsibilities under E.O. 11905, in contrast to statutes and regulations which govern, for example, the Defense Department budget authority, have raised questions regarding the extent of DCI and CFI authority. Since 80% of NFIP costs reside in Defense-managed programs, differences within the CFI were unavoidable.
- Nonetheless, as Chairman, I have held to the view that, with strong staff support provided by my Deputy for the Intelligence Community, the CFI can and will:
  - play a decisive role in the development, review, and approval of the NFIP and its budget;
  - meet the expectations of the President for better management of intelligence resources and activities; and
  - at the same time, accommodate to existing authorities governing resource and budget control of Departmental Secretaries who are participants in the national intelligence program.
- To do less, would render to the CFI little more than a "pro forma" role in intelligence resource management-- a situation I consider unacceptable to both the spirit and intention of E.O. 11905.
- In our effort to make things work well, we have, for example, devised and established a CFI programming and budgeting cycle which preserves the integrity of the Defense Department programming and budgeting system.

During six meetings in July, the CFI met with senior managers of the NFIP to review their individual program recommendations for FY 78.

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- In past years, I might note, total NFIP review was conducted over a six-to-eight-month period.
- Thirty-three program issues were identified for CFI deliberations, and each was decided upon by 20 July for preparation of FY 78 budget submissions.
- This month, the CFI will conduct its review of the budget proposals of the individual program managers looking toward submission of the NFIP budget to OMB in November.

The CFI also played a central role in appealing the results of final action by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees for the FY 77 intelligence budget.

- This was the first instance ever of a unified Intelligence Community response.

- Senator McClellan noted the precedent with approval.

During its July review of intelligence programs, the CFI defined a range of additional issues to be studied in detail before Committee decisions were made for FY 78 and the near-term future. Some of the CFI directed studies are now complete; the remainder are in process. The conclusions and recommendations of these studies will bear significantly on CFI final budget decisions and the future of the NFIP as it relates to:

- the impact of a fast-changing international environment and an increasingly complex set of challenges to the United States;
- increased sophistication of technological development by the U.S. and its adversaries; and
- continuing pressures of economic inflation.

While I am not entirely satisfied that the CFI has, as yet, gained full command and control of its responsibilities, progress is being made:

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- the Committee has used well these past several months to iron-out differences, develop and promulgate new directives for resource management throughout the Community, and to test new procedures;
- substantive and procedural issues have been identified and progress made toward their solution; and
- the Committee is demonstrating well that a Community-wide comprehensive budget review process can be made to work.

I am optimistic that the CFI will continue to gain stature and momentum in providing effective guidance to resource managers of the Community and produce meaningful results for the President and the Congress.

#### ACTIVITIES OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Next, I would like to say a few words about my activities under E.O. 11905 in addition to those involved in:

- Chairing the Committee on Foreign Intelligence
- Serving on the Operations Advisory Group

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#### ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT

Lest there be any ambiguity as to the relation between the President and the Director of Central Intelligence, Executive Order 11905 clearly states that the DCI is directly responsible both to the President and to the NSC, and that the DCI shall "act as the President's primary advisor on foreign intelligence."

I meet alone with the President at least once a week, and I think it is important that any DCI have this direct relationship to the President.

- The DCI can thus be assured that intelligence which he considers must be called to the President's attention actually is.
- Within the Intelligence Community itself, knowledge that the DCI has this kind of personal contact with the President strengthens the DCI position as leader of the Community.

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## INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

Most of the responsibilities the Executive Order assigned to me involve Community activities, so I have paid particular attention to strengthening and restructuring my Intelligence Community Staff.

--My Deputy for the Intelligence Community is, as you are aware, a military officer on active duty, and his grade level has been raised from three to four-star rank.

--I am seeking legislation authorizing two Deputy DCIs, since the National Security Act of 1947 provides for only one, who is my deputy for day-to-day management of the CIA.

--The FY 1977 appropriation [redacted] earmarked by the Congress for the old Community Staff is inadequate. I have established a new organization of [redacted] personnel, which will require an additional appropriation [redacted]

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--The restructured Intelligence Community Staff has three major offices.

--An Office of Program and Budget Development that provides direct support to the CFI in execution of its responsibility to control budget preparation and resource allocation in the Community.

--An Office of Policy and Planning which prepares Community planning guidance and policy documents and coordinates preparation of my Annual Report, and

--An Office of Performance, Evaluation and Improvement. This is my mechanism for assessing the effectiveness with which the Community is functioning.

--As a means of emphasizing separateness of the Community Staff from the CIA, I am moving the staff to a location [redacted]

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Overall, I consider a strong and impartial Intelligence Community Staff essential if I am to execute my Community responsibilities.

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## PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

Among the most important charges to the DCI in Executive Order 11905 are that he:

- Act as the President's primary adviser on foreign intelligence.
- Provide the President and other officials in the Executive Branch with foreign intelligence, including National Intelligence Estimates.
- Develop national intelligence requirements and priorities, and
- Supervise production and dissemination of national intelligence.

The basic purpose of our entire intelligence effort is to provide timely, accurate and responsive intelligence to those who need it--including the Congress.

Accordingly, I have devoted considerable attention to the mechanisms by which we develop the intelligence judgments which I must approve.

My basic advisory instrument is the National Foreign Intelligence Board, which I established this spring as successor to the United States Intelligence Board.

- The most senior officers of each element of the Intelligence Community take an active part in the deliberations of this Board.
- The Board is supported by thirteen DCI committees, several of which are specifically charged with substantive intelligence matters. These include:

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- Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee
- Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee
- Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
- Economic Intelligence Committee

--Three other DCI committees are charged with development of guidance for intelligence collection to support the production effort:

- Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation
- SIGINT Committee
- Human Resources Committee

The actual production of national intelligence estimates and other major estimative reports is under the auspices of my National Intelligence Officers.

--There are ten NIOs, one for each of seven major geographic areas of the world, and one each for three key topical programs:

- Strategic forces
- Conventional forces
- Economics and energy

--Within his area of responsibility, each NIO is responsible directly to me for maintaining liaison with the principal users of intelligence and ensuring that their needs are met.

--I charge the NIOs to ensure that:

- All resources of the Community are tapped in the development of national intelligence products, and
- All agencies have an opportunity to present their views, and express their dissents if they disagree with the judgments reached.

In an effort to improve the quality of our intelligence analysis and to explore new viewpoints, we are organizing a panel of advisers from outside the Intelligence Community to enable us to tap specialized expertise in other parts of the Government, in academia and in private industry.

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--We also have under way an experimental project in which outside groups of experts relooking at the same evidence as is available to intelligence analysts. Highly controversial topics have been selected, and separate, or--if you will--competing estimates are being developed.

--We are, in effect, testing whether new approaches can improve the quality of our estimates.

In the area of national current intelligence production, which includes our responses in crisis situations and provision of warning of upcoming situations of key interest to our policy-makers, the production elements involved are rather diverse, and operate flexibly.

--The day-to-day coordination of national current intelligence production is handled for me by the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA, supported by the CIA Operations Center.

--The Community Strategic Warning Staff, located in the Pentagon, is oriented toward specific military warning of attack against the United States or its overseas forces.

--The National Operations and Intelligence Officers Warning Net connects key operations and warning centers by secure telephone to enable immediate responses in crisis situations.

--Use of a National Intelligence Situation Task Force enables rapid development of coordinated reports in a crisis situation.

As you might expect, since I became DCI, I have devoted much of my attention to the intelligence product and to the manner in which it is prepared.

I have been very impressed, I can assure you, with the ability of our analysts and estimators and with their objectivity.

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There are gaps in our information base and, considering the kinds of problems which we must address, there always will be, but we are constantly seeking to improve:

- The manner in which we identify and state requirements for information;
- The application of priorities to our information needs;
- The effectiveness of our collection capabilities; and
- The quality of the analysis which goes into our intelligence products.

The arrangements for collection of information and production of intelligence which now exist under Executive Order 11905 are, in my view, quite satisfactory.

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#### DCI AS SPOKESMAN TO THE CONGRESS

The Executive Order specifically provides that the DCI shall "act as the principal spokesman to the Congress for the Intelligence Community and facilitate the use of foreign intelligence products by Congress."

Since becoming the DCI at the end of January, I have personally appeared before various Congressional committees 41 separate times, which I trust testifies to my spokesman role.

I also have put continuing emphasis on our readiness to provide briefings and documents as required by the Congress in execution of its responsibilities.

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## DCI RELATIONSHIP TO CIA

Before ending this portion of my remarks, I would like to comment briefly on two matters which I am sure will be part of your charter deliberations.

The first of these is whether the Director of Central Intelligence should be separated from the CIA.

I recognize that criticism has been made in the past that the DCI's position as head of the Intelligence Community is incompatible with his position as the operating head of the CIA.

--The charge is that this forces the DCI to be both an impartial arbitrator and an advocate at the same time.

On the basis of my own experience over the past eight months, I do not consider this criticism is valid.

As you know, Executive Order 11905 provides that, to the extent consistent with my statutory responsibilities, I shall delegate the day-to-day operation of the Central Intelligence Agency to my Deputy Director.

I have done this, and Mr. Knoche is fulfilling that role, thereby giving me added time to devote to my Community responsibilities.

On the other hand, I could not execute the responsibilities assigned me for the production of national intelligence without the base which the CIA provides, particularly in current intelligence, in warning and in periods of crisis.

In my view, it is essential that the Director of Central Intelligence also be the operating head of the Central Intelligence Agency if he is to effectively carry out his assigned responsibilities.

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## THE ADEQUACY OF DCI AUTHORITY

A second matter which I expect to be of concern to you in your charter deliberations has to do with the proper role of the Director of Central Intelligence and the definition of his authorities and responsibilities.

I consider that Executive Order 11905 has gone a considerable way toward the solution of these issues.

--The Executive Order makes clear those matters in which the DCI's position and authority are paramount, such as his responsibilities as the intelligence advisor to the President, as intelligence spokesman to the Congress and as the official responsible for the production of national intelligence.

--In my view there is no question as to the current adequacy of the DCI authority for control of the production and dissemination of intelligence of national-level interest.

--The Executive Order also makes it clear, in the area of resource allocation, that U.S. intelligence activities must be reviewed in their totality, but that actual allocation arrangements are a function of the primary role and mission of the assets under consideration.

--This was explicitly covered in the provision of the order that neither the DCI nor the Committee on Foreign Intelligence shall have responsibility for tactical intelligence.

With regard to the allocation, application and central control of Intelligence Community resources, however, the DCI authority is more figurative than fact.

--Although the DCI is the designated leader of the Intelligence Community, his full authority over and responsibility for allocation of CIA resources does not extend to other U.S. foreign intelligence agencies.

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- This poses problems to the DCI's leadership role since, as you might expect, conflicting views can arise within the Intelligence Community as to decisions affecting the resources and programs of individual departments and agencies of the Community.

Executive Order 11905 deals with this problem by assigning budget and resource allocation responsibilities to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, which the DCI chairs and on which the Defense Department is represented by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

- Obviously, there is a potential for difference in approach on resource allocation matters between the responsibilities assigned by Executive Order to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence and those assigned by statute to the departmental secretaries.
- However, the CFI provides an organizational structure in which any issues between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense, for instance, can be resolved.
- The CFI is a mechanism for discussion and adjustment on matters in which I consider reasonable men can reach agreement.
- The present budget program cycle provides an opportunity to assess how well the CFI can perform its assigned responsibilities.

Overall, I consider that Executive Order 11905 represented a major step forward in terms of clarifying the role and authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence.

- It gives him an unambiguous position as regards responsibility for the production of national intelligence.
- Through his chairmanship of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence the Order gives the DCI a means of exercising leadership in resource matters without intruding on the established authority of department heads.

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--In the context of Community actions, the DCI is looked to for leadership rather than authority in resource management.

--The Executive Order provides the basis for this.

In my view, the Executive Order proposes a checks-and-balance environment which should prove advantageous in establishing better command, control and development of a national intelligence program over the longer term.

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#### ACTIVITIES OF ORGANIZATIONS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

As you are aware, Executive Order 11905 briefly sets forth the responsibilities and duties of senior officials of each organization of the Intelligence Community and the responsibilities of the separate organizations.

The reorganization of intelligence elements of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, on which the Committee has been briefed by Mr. Ellsworth and his staff, was a departmental initiative and not something required by the Executive Order.

Since the overall activities of the various organizations of the Community were not changed as a result of the Executive Order, I see no need for further comment.

Instead, I will turn to my final topic, which is the manner in which restrictions set forth in E.O. 11905 have affected operations of intelligence organizations.

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#### IMPACT OF RESTRICTIONS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

About one-fourth of the text of Executive Order 11905 is devoted to Section 5, titled "Restrictions in Intelligence Activities."

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--Included in this section are:

- Restrictions on collection, including restrictions on:
  - Physical surveillance
  - Electronic surveillance
  - Unconsented physical searches
  - Opening of mail
  - Examination of tax returns
  - Infiltration of organizations
  - Collection of information concerning domestic activities of United States persons
- Restrictions on experimentation with drugs on human subjects.
- Restrictions on assistance to law enforcement authorities.
- Restrictions applicable to intelligence personnel detailed elsewhere in the Federal government, and
- Prohibition of assassination.

In large measure the restrictions which the Executive Order made a matter of Presidential directive already had been put into effect within the Intelligence Community, but the specific wording of the Order raised a number of operational problems with which we are seeking to cope.

In our view, the most difficult problems are posed by the restrictions on electronics surveillance.


The Executive Order prohibited:

"electronic surveillance to intercept a communication which is made from or, is intended by the sender to be received in, the United States, or directed against United States persons abroad, except lawful electronic surveillance under procedures approved by the Attorney General."

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
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As you can well understand, considerable attention has been devoted to developing workable arrangements.

The Attorney General issued the guidelines called for by the Executive Order on 7 May, and on 26 May the National Security Agency promulgated its implementation of these guidelines.

This is a complicated problem area, however, and one not easy to solve, so we are still working out adjustments with the Department of Justice.



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With respect to electronic surveillance within the United States, legislation in this area was proposed by the Administration and was considered by the 94th Congress, but was not enacted. This will be a matter of concern and interest for the Administration when the 95th Congress convenes.

Overseas access to U.S. persons by the CIA Clandestine Service in pursuit of its counter-espionage, drug traffic and anti-terrorism responsibilities is being conducted in compliance with the limitations set forth in the Executive Order.

My basic point in referencing the restrictions on intelligence activities that are contained in the Executive Order is not to stress that these restrictions are being complied with--which they are--but rather to point out that it has been necessary in the interest of operational effectiveness to devote considerable effort to the development of guidelines as regards some of the restrictions--particularly in the field of electronic surveillance.

The restrictions are being carefully observed, and the Intelligence Community is continuing to do its job.

The necessary guidelines have been issued, supplementary directives have been issued consistent with the Executive Order, and the Intelligence Community is cooperating without reservation in the implementation of the Order.

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## CONCLUSION

This presentation is somewhat longer than I would have desired, but I have attempted to provide an overview of salient elements of the impact which Executive Order 11905 has had on the Intelligence Community.

Overall, I view the Order as a major step forward in our continuing efforts to assure that the United States Government is provided with the intelligence that it needs, and that this intelligence is obtained in full compliance with the Constitution and laws of the land.

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NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION. 8/28/07

94TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

## S. RES. 400

[Report No. 94-675]

[Report No. 94-770]

### IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 1, 1976

Mr. MANSFIELD (for Mr. RIBICOFF) (for himself, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. PERCY, Mr. BAKER, Mr. BROCK, Mr. CHILES, Mr. GLENN, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. MATHIAS, Mr. METCALF, Mr. MONDALE, Mr. MORGAN, Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. NUNN, Mr. ROTH, Mr. SCHWEIKER, and Mr. WEICKER) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Government Operations

MARCH 1, 1976

Reported by Mr. MANSFIELD (for Mr. RIBICOFF), without amendment

MARCH 1, 1976

Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration for a period extending no later than March 20, 1976

MARCH 13, 1976

Reported by Mr. MANSFIELD (for Mr. CANNON), without amendment

MARCH 13, 1976

Referred simultaneously to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Rules and Administration with instructions that the Committee on the Judiciary make its recommendations to the Committee on Rules and Administration no later than March 29, 1976, and that the Committee on Rules and Administration files the report no later than April 5, 1976

APRIL 1, 1976

Committee on Rules and Administration authorized to report no later than April 30, 1976, by unanimous consent

APRIL 29, 1976

Reported by Mr. CANNON, with an amendment, and an amendment to the title

MAY 19, 1976

Considered, amended, and agreed to

[Strike out all after "Resolved," and insert the part printed in italics]

## RESOLUTION

To establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence,

1       *Resolved*, That it is the purpose of this resolution to  
2   establish a new select committee of the Senate, to be known  
3   as the Select Committee on Intelligence, to oversee and make  
4   continuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs  
5   of the United States Government, and to submit to the Sen-  
6   ate appropriate proposals for legislation and report to the  
7   Senate concerning such intelligence activities and programs.  
8   In carrying out this purpose, the Select Committee on Intel-  
9   ligence shall make every effort to assure that the appropriate  
10  departments and agencies of the United States provide in-  
11  formed and timely intelligence necessary for the executive  
12  and legislative branches to make sound decisions affecting the  
13  security and vital interests of the Nation. It is further the  
14  purpose of this resolution to provide vigilant legislative over-  
15  sight over the intelligence activities of the United States to  
16  assure that such activities are in conformity with the Con-  
17  stitution and laws of the United States.

18       SEC. 2. (a) (1) There is hereby established a select  
19  committee to be known as the Select Committee on Intelli-  
20  gence (hereinafter in this resolution referred to as the "select  
21  committee"). The select committee shall be composed of  
22  fifteen members appointed as follows:

23               (A) two members from the Committee on  
24   Appropriations;

1 (B) two members from the Committee on Armed  
2 Services;

3 (C) two members from the Committee on Foreign  
4 Relations;

5 (D) two members from the Committee on the  
6 Judiciary; and

7 (E) seven members to be appointed from the Senate  
8 at large.

9 (2) Members appointed from each committee named in  
10 clauses (A) through (D) of paragraph (1) shall be evenly  
11 divided between the two major political parties and shall be  
12 appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon  
13 the recommendations of the majority and minority leaders  
14 of the Senate. Four of the members appointed under clause  
15 (E) of paragraph (1) shall be appointed by the President  
16 pro tempore of the Senate upon the recommendation of the  
17 majority leader of the Senate and three shall be appointed  
18 by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the recom-  
19 mendation of the minority leader of the Senate.

20 (3) The majority leader of the Senate and the minority  
21 leader of the Senate shall be ex officio members of the select  
22 committee but shall have no vote in the committee and shall  
23 not be counted for purposes of determining a quorum.

24 (b) No Senator may serve on the select committee for

1 more than eight years of continuous service, exclusive of  
2 service by any Senator on such committee during the Ninety-  
3 fourth Congress. To the greatest extent practicable, one-third  
4 of the Members of the Senate appointed to the select com-  
5 mittee at the beginning of the Ninety-seventh Congress and  
6 each Congress thereafter shall be Members of the Senate  
7 who did not serve on such committee during the preceding  
8 Congress.

9 (c) At the beginning of each Congress, the Members  
10 of the Senate who are members of the majority party of  
11 the Senate shall elect a chairman for the select committee,  
12 and the Members of the Senate who are from the minority  
13 party of the Senate shall elect a vice chairman for such  
14 committee. The vice chairman shall act in the place and  
15 stead of the chairman in the absence of the chairman. Neither  
16 the chairman nor the vice chairman of the select commit-  
17 tee shall at the same time serve as chairman or ranking mi-  
18 nority member of any other committee referred to in para-  
19 graph 6 (f) of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the  
20 Senate.

21 (d) For the purposes of paragraph 6 (a) of rule XXV  
22 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a Senator as  
23 a member of the select committee shall not be taken into  
24 account.

25 SEC. 3. (a) There shall be referred to the select com-



1 mittee all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials,  
2 and other matters relating to the following:

3 (1) The Central Intelligence Agency and the  
4 Director of Central Intelligence.

5 (2) Intelligence activities of all other departments  
6 and agencies of the Government, including, but not  
7 limited to, the intelligence activities of the Defense In-  
8 telligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and  
9 other agencies of the Department of Defense; the De-  
10 partment of State; the Department of Justice; and the  
11 Department of the Treasury.

12 (3) The organization or reorganization of any de-  
13 partment or agency of the Government to the extent  
14 that the organization or reorganization relates to a func-  
15 tion or activity involving intelligence activities.

16 (4) Authorizations for appropriations, both direct  
17 and indirect, for the following:

18 (A) The Central Intelligence Agency and Di-  
19 rector of Central Intelligence.

20 (B) The Defense Intelligence Agency.

21 (C) The National Security Agency.

22 (D) The intelligence activities of other agen-  
23 cies and subdivisions of the Department of Defense.

24 (E) The intelligence activities of the Depart-  
25 ment of State.

1 (F) The intelligence activities of the Federal  
2 Bureau of Investigation, including all activities of  
3 the Intelligence Division.

4 (G) Any department, agency, or subdivision  
5 which is the successor to any agency named in clause  
6 (A), (B), or (C); and the activities of any de-  
7 partment, agency, or subdivision which is the suc-  
8 cessor to any department, agency, bureau, or sub-  
9 division named in clause (D), (E), or (F) to the  
10 extent that the activities of such successor depart-  
11 ment, agency, or subdivision are activities described  
12 in clause (D), (E), or (F).

13 (b) Any proposed legislation reported by the select com-  
14 mittee, except any legislation involving matters specified in  
15 clause (1) or (4) (A) of subsection (a), containing any  
16 matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of any standing  
17 committee shall, at the request of the chairman of such stand-  
18 ing committee, be referred to such standing committee for  
19 its consideration of such matter and be reported to the Sen-  
20 ate by such standing committee within thirty days after the  
21 day on which such proposed legislation is referred to such  
22 standing committee; and any proposed legislation reported  
23 by any committee, other than the select committee, which  
24 contains any matter within the jurisdiction of the select  
25 committee shall, at the request of the chairman of the select

1 committee, be referred to the select committee for its con-  
2 sideration of such matter and be reported to the Senate by  
3 the select committee within thirty days after the day on  
4 which such proposed legislation is referred to such committee.  
5 In any case in which a committee fails to report any pro-  
6 posed legislation referred to it within the time limit prescribed  
7 herein, such committee shall be automatically discharged  
8 from further consideration of such proposed legislation on  
9 the thirtieth day following the day on which such proposed  
10 legislation is referred to such committee unless the Senate  
11 provides otherwise. In computing any thirty-day period  
12 under this paragraph there shall be excluded from such com-  
13 putation any days on which the Senate is not in session.

14 (c) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as pro-  
15 hibiting or otherwise restricting the authority of any other  
16 committee to study and review any intelligence activity to  
17 the extent that such activity directly affects a matter other-  
18 wise within the jurisdiction of such committee.

19 (d) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as  
20 amending, limiting, or otherwise changing the authority of  
21 any standing committee of the Senate to obtain full and  
22 prompt access to the product of the intelligence activities  
23 of any department or agency of the Government rele-  
24 vant to a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such  
25 committee.

1        SEC. 4. (a) The select committee, for the purposes of  
2        accountability to the Senate, shall make regular and periodic  
3        reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the intel-  
4        ligence activities of the various departments and agencies of  
5        the United States. Such committee shall promptly call to the  
6        attention of the Senate or to any other appropriate com-  
7        mittee or committees of the Senate any matters requiring the  
8        attention of the Senate or such other committee or commit-  
9        tees. In making such reports, the select committee shall  
10       proceed in a manner consistent with section 8(c) (2) to  
11       protect national security.

12       (b) The select committee shall obtain an annual report  
13       from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the  
14       Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director  
15       of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Such reports shall  
16       review the intelligence activities of the agency or depart-  
17       ment concerned and the intelligence activities of foreign  
18       countries directed at the United States or its interest. An  
19       unclassified version of each report may be made available  
20       to the public at the discretion of the select committee. Noth-  
21       ing herein shall be construed as requiring the public disclos-  
22       ure in such reports of the names of individuals engaged in  
23       intelligence activities for the United States or the divulging  
24       of intelligence methods employed or the sources of informa-

1 tion on which such reports are based or the amount of funds  
2 authorized to be appropriated for intelligence activities.

3 (c) On or before March 15 of each year, the select  
4 committee shall submit to the Committee on the Budget of  
5 the Senate the views and estimates described in section 301  
6 (c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 regarding  
7 matters within the jurisdiction of the select committee.

8 SEC. 5. (a) For the purposes of this resolution, the select  
9 committee is authorized in its discretion (1) to make investi-  
10 gations into any matter within its jurisdiction, (2) to make  
11 expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (3) to  
12 employ personnel, (4) to hold hearings, (5) to sit and act  
13 at any time or place during the sessions, recesses, and ad-  
14 journed periods of the Senate, (6) to require, by subpoena  
15 or otherwise, the attendance of witnesses and the production  
16 of correspondence, books, papers, and documents, (7) to  
17 take depositions and other testimony, (8) to procure the  
18 service of individual consultants or organizations thereof, in  
19 accordance with the provisions of section 202 (i) of the Leg-  
20 islative Reorganization Act of 1946, and (9) with the prior  
21 consent of the Government department or agency concerned  
22 and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a  
23 reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such  
24 department or agency.

1 (b) The chairman of the select committee or any mem-  
2 ber thereof may administer oaths to witnesses.

3 (c) Subpenas authorized by the select committee may  
4 be issued over the signature of the chairman, the vice chair-  
5 man, or any member of the select committee designated by  
6 the chairman, and may be served by any person designated  
7 by the chairman or any member signing the subpoena.

8 SEC. 6. No employee of the select committee or any  
9 person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services  
10 for or at the request of such committee shall be given access  
11 to any classified information by such committee unless such  
12 employee or person has (1) agreed in writing and under  
13 oath to be bound by the rules of the Senate (including the  
14 jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Standards and Con-  
15 duct and of such committee as to the security of such infor-  
16 mation during and after the period of his employment or  
17 contractual agreement with such committee; and (2) re-  
18 ceived an appropriate security clearance as determined by  
19 such committee in consultation with the Director of Central  
20 Intelligence. The type of security clearance to be required in  
21 the case of any such employee or person shall, within the  
22 determination of such committee in consultation with the  
23 Director of Central Intelligence, be commensurate with the  
24 sensitivity of the classified information to which such em-  
25 ployee or person will be given access by such committee.

1        SEC. 7. The select committee shall formulate and carry  
2 out such rules and procedures as it deems necessary to pre-  
3 vent the disclosure, without the consent of the person or  
4 persons concerned, of information in the possession of such  
5 committee which unduly infringes upon the privacy or which  
6 violates the constitutional rights of such person or persons.  
7 Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent such committee  
8 from publicly disclosing any such information in any case  
9 in which such committee determines the national interest in  
10 the disclosure of such information clearly outweighs any in-  
11 fringement on the privacy of any person or persons.

12        SEC. 8. (a) The select committee may, subject to the  
13 provisions of this section, disclose publicly any information in  
14 the possession of such committee after a determination by  
15 such committee that the public interest would be served by  
16 such disclosure. Whenever committee action is required to  
17 disclose any information under this section, the committee  
18 shall meet to vote on the matter within five days after any  
19 member of the committee requests such a vote. No member  
20 of the select committee shall disclose any information, the  
21 disclosure of which requires a committee vote, prior to a vote  
22 by the committee on the question of the disclosure of such  
23 information or after such vote except in accordance with this  
24 section.

25        (b) (1) In any case in which the select committee votes

1 to disclose publicly any information which has been classi-  
2 fied under established security procedures, which has been  
3 submitted to it by the executive branch, and which the ex-  
4 ecutive branch requests be kept secret, such committee shall  
5 notify the President of such vote.

6 (2) The select committee may disclose publicly such  
7 information after the expiration of a five-day period follow-  
8 ing the day on which notice of such vote is transmitted to the  
9 President, unless, prior to the expiration of such five-day  
10 period, the President, personally in writing, notifies the com-  
11 mittee that he objects to the disclosure of such information,  
12 provides his reasons therefor, and certifies that the threat to  
13 the national interest of the United States posed by such  
14 disclosure is of such gravity that it outweighs any public  
15 interest in the disclosure.

16 (3) If the President, personally in writing, notifies the  
17 select committee of his objections to the disclosure of such  
18 information as provided in paragraph (2), such committee  
19 may, by majority vote, refer the question of the disclosure of  
20 such information to the Senate for consideration. The com-  
21 mittee shall not publicly disclose such information without  
22 leave of the Senate.

23 (4) Whenever the select committee votes to refer the  
24 question of disclosure of any information to the Senate under  
25 paragraph (3), the chairman shall, not later than the first



1 day on which the Senate is in session following the day on  
2 which the vote occurs, report the matter to the Senate for  
3 its consideration.

4 (5) One hour after the Senate convenes on the fourth  
5 day on which the Senate is in session following the day on  
6 which any such matter is reported to the Senate, or at such  
7 earlier time as the majority leader and the minority leader  
8 of the Senate jointly agree upon in accordance with section  
9 133 (f) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the  
10 Senate shall go into closed session and the matter shall be  
11 the pending business. In considering the matter in closed  
12 session the Senate may—

13 (A) approve the public disclosure of all or any  
14 portion of the information in question, in which case the  
15 committee shall publicly disclose the information ordered  
16 to be disclosed,

17 (B) disapprove the public disclosure of all or any  
18 portion of the information in question, in which case the  
19 committee shall not publicly disclose the information  
20 ordered not to be disclosed, or

21 (C) refer all or any portion of the matter back to  
22 the committee, in which case the committee shall make  
23 the final determination with respect to the public dis-  
24 closure of the information in question.

1 Upon conclusion of the consideration of such matter in closed  
2 session, which may not extend beyond the close of the ninth  
3 day on which the Senate is in session following the day on  
4 which such matter was reported to the Senate, or the close  
5 of the fifth day following the day agreed upon jointly by the  
6 majority and minority leaders in accordance with section  
7 133 (f) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946  
8 (whichever the case may be), the Senate shall immediately  
9 vote on the disposition of such matter in open session, with-  
10 out debate, and without divulging the information with re-  
11 spect to which the vote is being taken. The Senate shall  
12 vote to dispose of such matter by one or more of the means  
13 specified in clauses (A), (B), and (C) of the second  
14 sentence of this paragraph. Any vote of the Senate to  
15 disclose any information pursuant to this paragraph shall be  
16 subject to the right of a Member of the Senate to move for  
17 reconsideration of the vote within the time and pursuant  
18 to the procedures specified in rule XIII of the Standing  
19 Rules of the Senate, and the disclosure of such information  
20 shall be made consistent with that right.

21 (c) (1) No information in the possession of the select  
22 committee relating to the lawful intelligence activities of  
23 any department or agency of the United States which has  
24 been classified under established security procedures and  
25 which the select committee, pursuant to subsection (a) or

1 (b) of this section, has determined should not be disclosed  
2 shall be made available to any person by a Member, officer,  
3 or employee of the Senate except in a closed session of the  
4 Senate or as provided in paragraph (2).

5 (2) The select committee may, under such regulations as  
6 the committee shall prescribe to protect the confidentiality of  
7 such information, make any information described in para-  
8 graph (1) available to any other committee or any other  
9 Member of the Senate. Whenever the select committee makes  
10 such information available, the committee shall keep a writ-  
11 ten record showing, in the case of any particular information,  
12 which committee or which Members of the Senate received  
13 such information. No Member of the Senate who, and no  
14 committee which, receives any information under this sub-  
15 section, shall disclose such information except in a closed  
16 session of the Senate.

17 (d) It shall be the duty of the Select Committee on  
18 Standards and Conduct to investigate any unauthorized dis-  
19 closure of intelligence information by a Member, officer or  
20 employee of the Senate in violation of subsection (c) and to  
21 report to the Senate concerning any allegation which it finds  
22 to be substantiated.

23 (e) Upon the request of any person who is subject to  
24 any such investigation, the Select Committee on Standards  
25 and Conduct shall release to such individual at the conclu-

1 sion of its investigation a summary of its investigation to-  
2 gether with its findings. If, at the conclusion of its investi-  
3 gation, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct  
4 determines that there has been a significant breach of con-  
5 fidentiality or unauthorized disclosure by a Member, officer,  
6 or employee of the Senate, it shall report its findings to the  
7 Senate and recommend appropriate action such as censure,  
8 removal from committee membership, or expulsion from  
9 the Senate, in the case of Member, or removal from office  
10 or employment or punishment for contempt, in the case of an  
11 officer or employee.

12 SEC. 9. The select committee is authorized to permit any  
13 personal representative of the President, designated by the  
14 President to serve as a liaison to such committee, to attend  
15 any closed meeting of such committee.

16 SEC. 10. Upon expiration of the Select Committee on  
17 Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Ac-  
18 tivities, established by Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth  
19 Congress, all records, files, documents, and other materials  
20 in the possession, custody, or control of such committee,  
21 under appropriate conditions established by it, shall be  
22 transferred to the select committee.

23 SEC. 11. (a) It is the sense of the Senate that the head  
24 of each department and agency of the United States should  
25 keep the select committee fully and currently informed with

1 respect to intelligence activities, including any significant  
2 anticipated activities, which are the responsibility of or en-  
3 gaged in by such department or agency: *Provided*, That this  
4 does not constitute a condition precedent to the implementa-  
5 tion of any such anticipated intelligence activity.

6 (b) It is the sense of the Senate that the head of any  
7 department or agency of the United States involved in any  
8 intelligence activities should furnish any information or docu-  
9 ment in the possession, custody, or control of the department  
10 or agency, or person paid by such department or agency,  
11 whenever requested by the select committee with respect  
12 to any matter within such committee's jurisdiction.

13 (c) It is the sense of the Senate that each department  
14 and agency of the United States should report immediately  
15 upon discovery to the select committee any and all intelli-  
16 gence activities which constitute violations of the constitu-  
17 tional rights of any person, violations of law, or violations  
18 of Executive orders, Presidential directives, or departmental  
19 or agency rules or regulations; each department and agency  
20 should further report to such committee what actions have  
21 been taken or are expected to be taken by the departments  
22 or agencies with respect to such violations.

23 SEC. 12. Subject to the Standing Rules of the Senate,  
24 no funds shall be appropriated for any fiscal year beginning  
25 after September 30, 1976, with the exception of a continuing

1 bill or resolution, or amendment thereto, or conference re-  
2 port thereon, to, or for use of, any department or agency of  
3 the United States to carry out any of the following activi-  
4 ties, unless such funds shall have been previously authorized  
5 by a bill or joint resolution passed by the Senate during the  
6 same or preceding fiscal year to carry out such activity for  
7 such fiscal year:

8 (1) The activities of the Central Intelligence Agency  
9 and the Director of Central Intelligence.

10 (2) The activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

11 (3) The activities of the National Security Agency.

12 (4) The intelligence activities of other agencies and  
13 subdivisions of the Department of Defense.

14 (5) The intelligence activities of the Department of  
15 State.

16 (6) The intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of  
17 Investigation, including all activities of the Intelligence  
18 Division.

19 SEC. 13. (a) The select committee shall make a study  
20 with respect to the following matters, taking into considera-  
21 tion with respect to each such matter, all relevant aspects  
22 of the effectiveness of planning, gathering, use, security, and  
23 dissemination of intelligence:

24 (1) the quality of the analytical capabilities of  
25 United States foreign intelligence agencies and means for

1 integrating more closely analytical intelligence and  
2 policy formulation;

3 (2) the extent and nature of the authority of the  
4 departments and agencies of the executive branch to  
5 engage in intelligence activities and the desirability of  
6 developing charters for each intelligence agency or  
7 department;

8 (3) the organization of intelligence activities in the  
9 executive branch to maximize the effectiveness of the  
10 conduct, oversight, and accountability of intelligence  
11 activities; to reduce duplication or overlap; and to im-  
12 prove the morale of the personnel of the foreign intelli-  
13 gence agencies;

14 (4) the conduct of covert and clandestine activities  
15 and the procedures by which Congress is informed of  
16 such activities;

17 (5) the desirability of changing any law, Senate  
18 rule or procedure, or any Executive order, rule, or regu-  
19 lation to improve the protection of intelligence secrets  
20 and provide for disclosure of information for which there  
21 is no compelling reason for secrecy;

22 (6) the desirability of establishing a standing com-  
23 mittee of the Senate on intelligence activities;

24 (7) the desirability of establishing a joint commit-  
25 tee of the Senate and the House of Representatives on

1 intelligence activities in lieu of having separate com-  
2 mittees in each House of Congress, or of establishing  
3 procedures under which separate committees on intelli-  
4 gence activities of the two Houses of Congress would  
5 receive joint briefings from the intelligence agencies and  
6 coordinate their policies with respect to the safeguarding  
7 of sensitive intelligence information;

8 (8) the authorization of funds for the intelligence  
9 activities of the Government and whether disclosure of  
10 any of the amounts of such funds is in the public interest;  
11 and

12 (9) the development of a uniform set of definitions  
13 for terms to be used in policies or guidelines which may  
14 be adopted by the executive or legislative branches to  
15 govern, clarify, and strengthen the operation of intel-  
16 ligence activities.

17 (b) The select committee may, in its discretion, omit  
18 from the special study required by this section any matter  
19 it determines has been adequately studied by the Select Com-  
20 mittee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to  
21 Intelligence Activities, established by Senate Resolution 21,  
22 Ninety-fourth Congress.

23 (c) The select committee shall report the results of the  
24 study provided for by this section to the Senate, together  
25 with any recommendations for legislative or other actions it



1 deems appropriate, no later than July 1, 1977, and from  
2 time to time thereafter as it deems appropriate.

3 SEC. 14. (a) As used in this resolution, the term "intel-  
4 ligence activities" includes (1) the collection, analysis, pro-  
5 duction, dissemination, or use of information which relates to  
6 any foreign country, or any government, political group,  
7 party, military force, movement, or other association in such  
8 foreign country, and which relates to the defense, foreign  
9 policy, national security, or related policies of the United  
10 States, and other activity which is in support of such activi-  
11 ties; (2) activities taken to counter similar activities directed  
12 against the United States; (3) covert or clandestine activi-  
13 ties affecting the relations of the United States with any  
14 foreign government, political group, party, military force,  
15 movement or other association; (4) the collection, analysis,  
16 production, dissemination, or use of information about activi-  
17 ties of persons within the United States, its territories and  
18 possessions, or nationals of the United States abroad whose  
19 political and related activities pose, or may be considered  
20 by any department, agency, bureau, office, division, instru-  
21 mentality, or employee of the United States to pose, a threat  
22 to the internal security of the United States, and covert or  
23 clandestine activities directed against such persons. Such  
24 term does not include tactical foreign military intelligence  
25 serving no national policymaking function.

1 (b) As used in this resolution, the term "department  
2 or agency" includes any organization, committee, council,  
3 establishment, or office within the Federal Government.

4 (c) For purposes of this resolution, reference to any  
5 department, agency, bureau, or subdivision shall include a  
6 reference to any successor department, agency, bureau, or  
7 subdivision to the extent that such successor engages in  
8 intelligence activities now conducted by the department,  
9 agency, bureau, or subdivision referred to in this resolution.

10 SEC. 15. For the period from the date this resolution  
11 is agreed to through February 28, 1977, the expenses of  
12 the select committee under this resolution shall not exceed  
13 \$275,000, of which amount not to exceed \$30,000 shall  
14 be available for the procurement of the services of individual  
15 consultants, or organizations thereof, as authorized by sec-  
16 tion 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946.  
17 expenses of the select committee under this resolution shall  
18 be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon  
19 vouchers approved by the chairman of the select committee,  
20 except that vouchers shall not be required for the disburse-  
21 ment of salaries of employees paid at an annual rate.

1        SEC. 16. Nothing in this resolution shall be construed  
2        as constituting acquiescence by the Senate in any practice,  
3        or in the conduct of any activity, not otherwise authorized  
4        by law.

Attest:

FRANCIS R. VALEO,

*Secretary.*

94TH CONGRESS  
2D SESSION

## S. RES. 400

[Report No. 94-675]

[Report No. 94-779]

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### RESOLUTION

To establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence, and for other purposes.

---

By Mr. RINGCOFF, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. PERCY, Mr. BAKER,  
Mr. BROOK, Mr. CHILES, Mr. GLENN, Mr. HUDDLES-  
TON, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. MATHIAS, Mr.  
METCALF, Mr. MONDLE, Mr. MORGAN, Mr. MUSKIE,  
Mr. NUNN, Mr. ROTH, Mr. SCHWEIKER, and Mr.  
WEICKER

---

MARCH 1, 1976

Referred to the Committee on Government Operations

MARCH 1, 1976

Reported without amendment

MARCH 1, 1976

Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration for  
a period extending no later than March 20, 1976

MARCH 18, 1976

Reported without amendment

MARCH 18, 1976

Referred simultaneously to the Committee on the Judiciary  
and the Committee on Rules and Administration with  
instructions that the Committee on the Judiciary make  
its recommendations to the Committee on Rules and Ad-  
ministration no later than March 29, 1976, and that the  
Committee on Rules and Administration file the report  
no later than April 5, 1976

APRIL 1, 1976

Committee on Rules and Administration authorized to report  
no later than April 30, 1976, by unanimous consent

APRIL 29, 1976

Reported with an amendment, and an amendment to the title

MAY 19, 1976

Considered, amended, and agreed to

Approved For Release 2007/11/30 : CIA-RDP84M00713R000100030001-0

Approved For Release 2007/11/30 : CIA-RDP84M00713R000100030001-0

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NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.  
8/28/07

## THE STATE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE

(Material in parentheses is quoted from the Hathaway/Goldwater letter of 11 January, which indicated topics they considered should be addressed in this presentation.)

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2. Today's Perspective . . . . .	3
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("Emphasis here should focus on major substantive issues facing intelligence planning and current management.")

a. The Changing Intelligence Environment . . . . .	11
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("the changes in foreign developments and U.S. decisionmaker needs which are or will impose new demands on intelligence")

b. Collection and Processing . . . . .	14
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("current and projected intelligence capabilities")

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("current and projected intelligence capabilities")  
("gaps and limitations on intelligence support to decisionmakers")

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g. Management and Planning Implications . .	23
("implications...for the organization, personnel, composition, technological investment and performance of U.S. intelligence in the mid- (five year) and long-term (ten to fifteen years)")	
6. Conclusion. . . . .	30

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## THE STATE OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE

(Presentation to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence)

### 1. INTRODUCTION

This briefing will present a general appraisal of the state of U.S. intelligence and the issues with which the Intelligence Community is primarily concerned.

-- The presentation will provide a linkage between the world wrapup that already has been given to the Committee, and the detailed FY 1978 budget hearings that will follow.

My basic message is that despite the resource limitations and the reduced manpower that the Intelligence Community has had to adjust to over the past several years, and despite some adverse developments arising from the recent investigations and consequent publicity given to intelligence activities, the overall state of U.S. intelligence can be described as: "good to excellent."

-- Intelligence should be--and is--judged primarily on the basis of the quality of the intelligence which is provided to those Government officials who set policy and make operational decisions.

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- This intelligence is not as good as we would like it to be, because there always will be shortfalls in some kinds of information, but we are working hard to overcome such limitations.
- Our efforts are still better than might have been expected, however, considering the unprecedented exposure and criticism to which intelligence personnel and intelligence programs were subjected in 1975 and early 1976.

The impact of the recent investigations is still being felt, but progress is being made to restore our damaged overseas liaison relationships, to redevelop sources who withdrew their support for fear of publicity, to rebuild the morale of U.S. intelligence personnel and to strengthen Congressional and public confidence in the way intelligence activities are conducted.

- While the reform movement was needed and constructive, the attitudes it engendered inevitably had a dispiriting effect on many able and dedicated people throughout the Intelligence Community.
- During the past year these attitudes have moved toward a more proper perspective through a demonstrated willingness in the Community to meet the criticisms of the past in a forthright way and

to devise and wholeheartedly implement safeguards that would ensure that future performance would meet the highest standards of propriety and legality.

The time has come, we are convinced, to deal with the present and look to the future--not back to the past.

## 2. TODAY'S PERSPECTIVE

The need of the United States Government for top quality intelligence was never greater than it is today.

- Our Government requires timely, accurate and comprehensive intelligence on a wide range of topics which are literally worldwide in scope.
- This includes both current and expected future developments in military, political, economic, scientific and technical, social and geographic areas of interest.
- Budgetary and operational decisions which will have a critical long-range impact on our national security and the U.S. role in the world are in the forefront of our national concerns, and top quality intelligence inputs are an essential element of the decision process.

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- Preparations for international negotiations on a wide range of subjects also demand the provision of insightful intelligence.
- Verification of compliance with arms control pacts and the data on which to base arrangements to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons are two important examples.
- U.S. national concerns have in recent years given rise to new demands for intelligence needed to curb illicit drug traffic, to anticipate and avert terrorist actions, to forecast grain crops around the world, to keep track of the flow of PETRO dollars, and to contribute to law of the sea negotiations.

We have had the entire spectrum of national needs for intelligence in the forefront of our thinking as we prepared the Fiscal Year 1978 budget proposals the President has submitted for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

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### 3. STRENGTHENING INTELLIGENCE MANAGEMENT

Your Committee is interested, I know, in how effectively intelligence resources are used. Since this is in part a function of management, I should mention two recent major management changes intended to strengthen senior-level control of intelligence activities.

The first resulted from Executive Order 11905. In this Order the President:

- Created the Committee on Foreign Intelligence to review resource needs and prepare the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
- Established the Operations Advisory Group to review sensitive activities.
- Set up the Intelligence Oversight Board to review the legality and propriety of sensitive intelligence operations, and
- Charged the National Security Council to review intelligence activities semiannually and provide necessary guidance.

The second was the reorganization of intelligence management in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Both of these arrangements are under review, as you are aware.

- President Carter has restructured the National Security Council substructure and assigned the duties of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the Operations Advisory Group to the new Policy Review and Special Coordination Committees.
- Secretary of Defense Brown has initiated a review of intelligence organizational and functional relationships and the apportionment of responsibilities within the Defense Department. The second Deputy Secretary, who had been responsible for Defense intelligence matters, is not being replaced.
- We are aware, also, that your Charters and Guideline Subcommittee is drafting proposed legislation on management arrangements within the Intelligence Community.

The Community currently is operating effectively under the guidelines of Executive Order 11905 and the new procedures effected under it.

We are prepared, however, to work closely with your Committee in examining means by which the existing management arrangements can be improved.

In my view, clear definition of the expected role and responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence should be a major focus of any reexamination of the management of the U.S. intelligence effort.

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5. PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

a. THE CHANGING INTELLIGENCE ENVIRONMENT

It is becoming commonplace to cite change as the distinguishing characteristic of our age; not only the amount

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of change, but the continuing acceleration of the pace of that change.

- In this changing world, the intelligence needs of the United States are widening, as is understandable from our position in the world, and at the same time the scene is complicated by more nations, more events, more actors, more interdependence, more intercommunication.

The two things that stand out most clearly as we assess the changing intelligence environment are:

- First, there is a growing list of subjects on which our Government needs intelligence data, and
- Second, there is the prospect that much of this intelligence may become harder to obtain.

Our intelligence efforts have historically been heavily oriented toward the military aspects of world events--and remain so today.

- In many ways the requirements for military intelligence are becoming more diverse and more demanding because of:
  - Uncertainties as to Soviet intentions and objectives
  - The threat of nuclear proliferation
  - Acquisition of sophisticated hardware by more nations, and

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- The continued existence of international tensions in widely separated areas of the world which, whenever they heat up, threaten important U.S. interests.

New threats differing from the traditional military-type are arising to concern us and to require unique kinds of intelligence that overlap the old boundaries between economic, political, military and scientific fields. Terrorism is one such threat.

Challenges which involve major interdisciplinary efforts also are arising. The worldwide traffic in drugs and assessing the impact of conventional arms transfers are among these.

Meanwhile, looming ever larger in our concerns are the growing needs for interrelated political and economic intelligence. There is every indication that the trend toward greater attention to political and economic intelligence will continue sharply upwards in the years ahead.

In this kind of a changing world, those who manage intelligence activities must apply limited resources to critical needs while trying to minimize the risks resulting from shortfalls.

- What is unique about intelligence is that one can never be sure of what is missed when collection and surveillance opportunities are passed up, and the risks of so doing can seldom be rigorously evaluated.

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-- Thus the management problem in intelligence is one of constant reassessment of the priority of information needs and such reallocation of resources as this calls for.

b. COLLECTION AND PROCESSING

Collection difficulties with which we must deal both now and in the future arise from the growing number of targets, from constraints on our access to these targets, and from the fact that some targets are becoming harder and harder to collect against.

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Some of the non-military targets which are becoming of increasing interest are by their very nature more difficult to observe and to evaluate than are many of the traditional military targets.

- It is much easier to determine the number of bombers a country has than to assess that country's political intentions as to where and how it intends to use them.

Changes in the collection environment are requiring:

- Significant increases in research and development on collection and processing systems,
- Major investment in new collection systems,
- The remoting of collection operations, and
- Development of increasingly sophisticated tools for processing data.

While the collection of more data, obtained more quickly by our technical systems, is bringing with it a substitution of technology for manpower in some elements of our collection, storage and retrieval and processing cycle--in other elements also involving high volume of data extensive manpower will still be required in the processing field to limit the volume of data which analysts must address.

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The overall effectiveness of our intelligence effort is importantly dependent upon the effectiveness of collection activities, and we will continue to focus major attention on improving collection competence across the board.

c. PRODUCTION

Although collection must provide the essential base for our analysis, it is the quality of our end-product analyses-- particularly our estimative products--on which the Intelligence Community is rated.

-- How well we have performed has been the subject of many internal and external examinations in recent years.

-- A recently completed survey by my Intelligence Community Staff for the National Security Council indicated, in the main, that the Community is providing its customers timely and relevant products of good quality.

We have some concern about the future, however, for we must adapt successfully to a somewhat different environment and to new sets of needs if intelligence support is to continue to be adequate to the requirements of its users.

-- These challenges apply to the depth and sophistication of the required analysis, as well as to the types of subjects we cover.

- As I already have indicated, new, vital issues concerning internal economics, political and technological developments are competing for recognition on an equal footing with the traditional military related national security issues.

We already are involved with building accurate data bases on more countries, developing analytic expertise on new topics, and responding to an expanding spectrum of users having significantly diverse operational responsibilities and needs.

This, coupled with the growing demand for interdisciplinary and subjective analyses, is putting a severe strain on our limited manpower and resources available for intelligence production.

In response to these pressures we are seeking to do several things:

- To better understand what kinds and amounts of intelligence are most needed by our users.
- To establish and monitor priorities by geographic region, by topic and by type of product to assure we are covering the most important needs within available resources.

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- To adjust our staff structure to facilitate interdisciplinary approaches to analytic problems which call for such.
- To test new and experimental techniques of analysis, and
- To make better use of the capabilities of computerized data bases in support of our analysts.

The major production organizations of the Intelligence Community are engaged in efforts to make their products more timely and more relevant.

At the Community level, I am looking to the National Intelligence Officers for further improvements in our products and to the Intelligence Community Staff for the further development of our techniques for evaluating and enhancing effectiveness of the production process.

d. COVERT ACTION

I will make only brief mention of covert action.

You are aware of the provision for detailed oversight of covert action within the Executive Branch.

- The Operations Advisory Group set up last year was succeeded last month by the new NSC Special Coordination Committee, but the oversight system will remain the same.

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-- Your Committee Chairman is briefed on each  
Presidential finding in this field.

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This situation may well continue in the future, but we are convinced that despite recent public criticism of this aspect of CIA activity, covert action can under some circumstances still make significant contributions to the implementation of U.S. foreign policy.

The CIA should retain its capability for covert action as a means of responding rapidly and flexibly to foreign challenges without officially or overtly engaging the United States Government.

e. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The recent investigations made counterintelligence activities a subject of special concern and scrutiny in both the Executive and Legislative Branches.

We are operating now under very strict guidelines considering the size and extent of the hostile intelligence effort directed against the United States, both overseas and within our own country.

We are still in the process of achieving a posture which will ensure effective protection of the national security while at the same time safeguarding the constitutional and statutory rights of our citizens.

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f. SUPPORT ACTIVITIES

Any activity as large as the National Foreign Intelligence Program necessarily includes a variety of support functions, but I will make reference to only two of them this morning.

The first has to do with automation and information handling.

- To date the complexity and diversity of intelligence information handling problems were considered so great it was difficult to do Community-wide planning that was sufficiently realistic and demonstrable in cost/benefit terms to satisfy the discipline of the budget.
- As a result, the organizations of the Intelligence Community have tended to focus primarily on providing automatic data processing support for their own organizations and missions.

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- There is increasing recognition, however, that to deal with the proliferation of information affecting U.S. foreign policy, military affairs, international economics and other areas of intelligence interest, comprehensive planning must be undertaken to utilize the expanding capabilities of automation and telecommunications.
- Technology in the 1980s will enable computers to perform at a relatively reasonable cost most tasks that human ingenuity is able to conceive, and it probably will cost less to do it with machines than to have people doing work that computers can do.
- An important challenge now facing the Intelligence Community is to readdress the task of planning and implementing comprehensive Community-wide information handling capabilities.
- We must seek to resolve problems relating to:
  - Computer security,
  - Decompartmentation of intelligence materials,
  - Data element standards,
  - Improvements in the ease of querying remote data bases.

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- Telecommunications netting, and
- The character and size of future intelligence requirements for the use of communications satellites.

The second support problem has to do with training.

- Today we have a group of agency and departmental training activities primarily designed to meet the needs of individual organizations.
- To ensure that duplication is minimized we have begun a number of programs in which a single agency provides certain types of training for the entire Intelligence Community.
  - CIA, for instance, is providing such training in the human source collection field and in information handling.
- There will always be a need for some training by individual establishment, but we are seeking to foster the concept of combined training as a service of common concern.

g. MANAGEMENT AND PLANNING IMPLICATIONS

Any assessment of the state of U.S. intelligence necessarily, of course, involves a look at the effectiveness of intelligence management.

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The Intelligence Community is not today--and never has been--managed as a single entity.

It is a Community of organizations with shared objectives and goals, and with access to the same intelligence data. Much weight is put on coordination, and on participation by all elements of the Community in Community mechanisms.

The Director of Central Intelligence provides guidance, but his directive writ applies primarily to the CIA.

Nevertheless, the Community functions and, overall, functions rather well.

I am not convinced that major organizational changes are needed, but we can and must continue to analyze management problems and attempt to solve them.

Better management does not mean increased management layering, but it does call for allocation of clear-cut authority and responsibility.

-- The National Security Act of 1947, for instance, assigned the DCI responsibility for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, but it provided no specific sanctions to enable him to carry out this responsibility.

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- In the absence of supplementary legislation, such as HR 12006, our ability to maintain an effective worldwide foreign intelligence program is jeopardized.
- HR 12006, which was introduced in the second session of the 94th Congress, but not enacted, provided for criminal and civil sanctions against persons who willfully and wrongfully reveal sensitive intelligence information.
- The Intelligence Community is still exploring the best way to implement a system requiring all Executive Branch personnel to execute security agreements as a precondition to granting them access to classified intelligence information.
- As another example of the need for clear-cut authorities, the DCI chairs the committee which prepares and recommends to the President the Annual National Foreign Intelligence Program budget, but he has no specific authority to communicate directly with individual program managers on matters of budget and resource allocations, and has to negotiate this with the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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The most critical management challenge in the Intelligence Community is the effective and efficient management of scarce resources.

- During the past year, relying on Executive Order 11905, we have made considerable progress in centrally reviewing and rationalizing a consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program budget on which you will soon be holding hearings.
- On the basis of this effort, I am convinced there is increasing need to introduce more specific Community guidance into the planning, programming and budgeting process in a meaningful before-the-fact way. The programs then developed can benefit from useful and coherent guidance reflecting a Community perspective.
  - The Intelligence Community Staff is deeply involved in this project, which will involve guidance for short-range, mid-range and long-range periods.

We also recognize the need for a closer cooperative partnership between users and producers of intelligence.

- We are exploiting opportunities to solicit and anticipate the most important needs for intelligence inputs at the highest echelons of the Government and to engender a more responsive user evaluation of the quality and utility of intelligence products.

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- Out of this dialogue are increasingly coming requests for comparative evaluations or net assessments.
- It is my strong feeling that the role of intelligence is to provide inputs to such assessments not to produce them.
- Intelligence can play the "Red" side, but the operational elements of the Government should provide the "Blue" inputs.

One of our most complex problems concerns what is often referred to as the national/tactical intelligence interface.

- This relates on the one hand to what can be conflicting demands of national, department and field consumer needs for intelligence derived from national systems, particularly overhead reconnaissance systems.
- The other side of the coin involves the inputs from tactical systems which can respond to national intelligence needs.

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Overall, we need to do better in evaluating how well the Intelligence Community is doing its job, especially in terms of specific identifiable goals and objectives.

Modification and improvement of intelligence management, however, involves far more than issuing directives or establishing mechanisms.

-- There is a time-consuming process of modifying attitudes and expectations so that Community-level planning guidance is taken into account in a meaningful way in the individual programs and organizational elements.

-- This involves confidence that the central coordinating process is based on a viable plan and that there are real rather than pro forma opportunities for interaction.

I am convinced the events of the recent past have not only strengthened and energized the intelligence oversight and management functions, but have also given organizations of the Community an increased sense of their own interdependence and of the necessity for working cooperatively if we are to get the job done within the budget assets which can be expected to become available.

Achieving a Community perspective is an evolutionary process, but it is one that is underway and will, I believe pay important dividends in the future.

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6. CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion may I emphasize that in the interest of your time I have touched only rather briefly on each of a wide variety of topics to indicate where the Intelligence Community now stands and where we are headed.

Additional and more detailed information is available in DCI documents already provided to the Committee:

- the "1977 Report on the Intelligence Community"
- the "Goals and Objectives for Fiscal Year 1977,"  
and
- the "Perspectives for Intelligence Planning and Programming."

The oversight arrangements set up during the past year by both the Legislative and Executive Branches have, on the whole, worked well.

- We have demonstrated, I can say with some confidence, that intelligence is not a "rogue elephant."

The Intelligence Community has experienced difficult times, but it has still responded to meet the priority intelligence needs of our Government.

There are gaps in our present capabilities that need to be closed, and to do this additional resources are needed.

As I stated early in this presentation, the state of U.S. intelligence is "good to excellent."

I look forward to the time when a Director of Central Intelligence can describe it as "excellent."

The budget request which you will be reviewing is a step in that direction.

20 September 1976

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## THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

(Presentation for DCI use on 28 September in responding to a request from the Subcommittee on Budget Authorization of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.)

\*\*\*\*\*

In their letter of 31 August Senator Hathaway and Senator Goldwater asked that I meet with you to discuss the long-range direction of the Intelligence Community and address three issues.

--First, those aspects of the world scene which pose major challenges to U.S. national security in the Fiscal Year 1979-1983 period, and what this implies for intelligence programs;

--Second, the areas of Intelligence Community management which will be subject to change or will require significant attention and effort in the Fiscal Year 1979-1983 period;

--And, third, what procedures and activities should be established to facilitate an exchange of views and a program for constructive hearings on the Fiscal Year 1978 budget authorization.

What I have to say this morning addresses these issues in turn.

\*\*\*\*\*

Let me emphasize from the start that I consider the purpose of the entire National Foreign Intelligence Program and its related activities is to assure that the United States Government is provided on a timely, accurate and responsive basis with all of the intelligence on current and projected foreign developments which is needed for policymaking, for international negotiations, and for operational decisions relating to the national security and the national welfare.

There probably was a time when intelligence was looked upon solely in terms of information to cope with a military attack.

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If so, that day is long gone.

In today's world, and in the world of tomorrow, intelligence activities must deal with a very wide variety of subject matter--with every foreign development, in fact, and with every change in the international environment, which relates to important U.S. interests.

This is not limited to the physical security of our country from military attack--important as that is--but also embraces our economic health, our social and political stability, and our national efforts to further the evolution of a world in which our nation can continue to be both secure and prosperous.

As to the world scene in which we will be living over the next five to six years and what this implies for the intelligence programs, I consider that the major problem confronting intelligence managers will be one of achieving the proper balance among conflicting demands for the application of limited resources.

We do not consider that the coming period will pose any problems which are absolutely new and different from those with which we now wrestle.

You are well aware that both in the past and today our major intelligence target is the Soviet Union and our highest priority efforts focus on intelligence relating to strategic nuclear developments and strategic warning of military attack.

We do not expect this first priority emphasis to change in the coming years, but it is also clear that other problem areas are going to require increasing attention.

As we assess the near and mid-term future we consider it highly probable that the following statements describe the kind of a world in which we will be living.

--The United States-USSR relationship will be marked by an absence of armed conflict, but there will be a marked ebb and flow in detente relationships.

--The Soviet leaders seem convinced that in the overall "correlation of forces" world events are moving over the long run in favor of the USSR. They will attempt to further this movement through a variety of political, economic, and subversive activities, backed with growing military capabilities.

--The balance between the U.S. and the USSR in the tangible elements of national power is unlikely to change fundamentally and will continue to be marked by offsetting asymmetries.

--In a situation of rough equality in intercontinental nuclear forces between the United States and the USSR, other national assets--including conventional military forces--will gain importance as elements of the "strategic" balance of power.

--While China is likely to experience a period of extended internal in-fighting following the death of Mao, major change in the international role of the PRC is not expected.

--The chances of major change in the Sino-Soviet relationship during the next five years are considered small.

--China will continue gradually to develop its strategic forces and will present an increasingly serious retaliatory threat to the USSR.

--By 1980 the PRC will have the capability of threatening the United States with a demonstration - or desperation - strike by a small number of ICBMs and possibly SLBMs.

--Internal strength and external security will be China's main preoccupation.

--Critical regional confrontations--such as those in the Middle East, in Korea, in Southern Africa and between Greece and Turkey--will not recede enough to eliminate the risk of shooting wars and will require constant intelligence attention.

--International economic problems involving raw materials, food, trade, monetary relationships and energy resource supply could well pose major threats to U.S. interests and will be of such continuing concern to the United States that an expanded intelligence effort focused on economic matters is expected to be necessary.

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--The past few years of globally shared inflation, recession, supply interruptions and material shortages have underscored the high degree of economic interdependence among countries and the pervasive impact of this interdependence on American interests.

--Social change will cause turbulence and possibly create power vacuums in a number of areas both as a result of increasing expectations among the poorer elements of the population and an expanding perception that the economic gaps between the developing countries and the more developed industrial world are growing rather than narrowing.

--Areas particularly susceptible to pressures for social change will be the Persian Gulf, certain other Arab states such as Morocco, India, possibly Indonesia, the Philippines, and in Latin America, Peru, Columbia and possibly even Brazil.

--The spread of nuclear know-how will complicate efforts to control nuclear proliferation and increase the need for comprehensive intelligence in this field.

--Terroristic activities and illicit international drug traffic are far from contained and intelligence collection will be a continuing task.

--What progress may occur in arms limitation agreements will be likely to pose complex intelligence programs if adequate monitoring of compliance is to be assured.

Looking at the world in geographic terms, I think the following comments are pertinent to your committee responsibilities.

--I see no future lessening in the importance of the Soviet Union as our Number One intelligence target.

--High priority will continue to attach to intelligence:

- On Soviet military capabilities,
- On Soviet economic activities,

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--On political dynamics in the USSR, and  
--On Soviet attitudes and intentions  
concerning such matters as:

--Arms limitation agreements,  
--Technology transfer problems, and  
--The projection of Soviet power into  
other areas of the world.

--The People's Republic of China will continue to be  
our Number Two intelligence target.

--Our interests as regards China will continue  
to be somewhat parallel to those which involve the USSR,  
but we must pay particular attention to China's internal  
political dynamics and to Sino-Soviet relationships. 25X1



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My primary purpose in ticking off examples of the kinds of developments in widely scattered areas of the world to which U.S. intelligence resources must be devoted is to emphasize the global nature of the requirements of the United States Government for timely, accurate and responsive intelligence.

There is almost nothing which could happen anywhere in the world but what some intelligence capability will be expected to respond promptly.

What may seem of minor importance today could mushroom into something on which our Government suddenly has a critical need for information.

We try to anticipate such developments, and to plan accordingly--fitting new requirements into the pattern of older, continuing requirements--but this is a process which can never be considered signed in concrete.

Which leads me into the second issue posed by Senator Hathaway and Senator Goldwater--the areas of Intelligence Community management which will be subject to change or require significant attention and effort in the 1979-1983 period.

\*\*\*\*\*

This is a two-part topic so I would first like to say a few words about management areas that may be subject to change, and then speak to the areas which will require significant attention and effort.

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As for the areas subject to change, frankly I hope that before FY-1979 rolls around those changes which your committee views as essential will either have been taken care of by legislation or by action within the Executive Branch.

I have already indicated in discussions with members of the Charters Subcommittee that in my view we have an adequate management arrangement under Executive Order 11905, but I recognize there are those who do not consider an executive order is enough.

I have reported also that there are some changes in existing legislation that I would hope can be handled expeditiously, such as:

- Statutory provision for two Deputy Directors of Central Intelligence;

- Strengthening of the DCI's responsibilities for protection of intelligence sources and methods;

- Specific provision for my Intelligence Community Staff, and

- Some clarification of CIA authorities in the CIA Act of 1949.

The second part of this topic--management areas which will require significant attention and effort--I view as involving management actions rather than management structure.

Assuring that the U.S. foreign intelligence effort is well managed is a continuing responsibility which falls to the Director of Central Intelligence, to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, and the managers of the various intelligence programs.

The role of your committee will be to assure yourselves through various oversight activities that the job is being well done.

Even though the beginning of the FY 1979-1983 period is still two years away, we already are aware of a number of major management problems which will arise in that period and are preparing to deal with them.

Some of these problems are complex in nature, and I can do little more this morning than mention them.

The key factor, however, is that intelligence activities must be conducted in a changing world, so an element of flexibility is all-important in the management of intelligence.

--The demands of our customers change, our capabilities change, our priorities change, and the world changes.

--Management arrangements cannot be changed to keep pace, so an inherent flexibility is essential.

For some years now the Intelligence Community has been operating under very tight fiscal constraints.

Our planning for the future reflects our expectation that those constraints will continue in effect.

The collection of intelligence on target countries which have closed societies depends heavily on technical systems which are quite expensive, so it should not be surprising that most of the costs of the U.S. intelligence program are devoted to the collection of information.

This is an area in which we expect to face a number of serious problems in the coming years.


The vast amount of information which has been published over the past year or so about American intelligence activities has provided a fund of knowledge that can be used to make our job more difficult, both by the countries from which we seek to collect information and by the countries in which we have based our operations.

25X1

We also expect additional efforts by previously permissive governments to deny or restrict our intelligence collection activities based on their soil.

--Planning alternative means of acquiring the same type information or otherwise compensating for base will pose important management problems.

Some of the future management problems relating to intelligence collection are so complex that I would be doing both you and the 25X1 problems a disservice to try to describe them in a sentence or so.



In the analytical and production side of intelligence, I think we will have these two important management questions.

--First, how can we strengthen our capability to cope with the acceleration of events which we believe will be characteristic of the years ahead?

--Improved communications and transportation are sharply reducing the time available to reflect upon, negotiate, and resolve international problems.

--Overloaded institutions may tend to break down, the attention span for individual situations will be shorter, and there will be need for simultaneous perception and management of a multitude of international relationships.

--The role of intelligence managers will be to assure that their organizations can react with the requisite speed, particularly in potential crisis situations.

--To respond to this challenge current intelligence producers will have to:

--improve their capabilities to effectively identify that which is significant from the large volume of raw traffic;

--interpret it quickly and accurately, and

--deliver it expeditiously in the form most useful to consumers.

--The second question is how can the necessary interdisciplinary analysis best be brought to bear quickly on complicated problems?

--It is clear that the large amounts of information available will have to be submitted to more thorough analysis of the interdisciplinary type so that the economic, technological, sociological and cultural factors can be combined with political and military data to provide U.S. decision makers with a unified complete view of the situations which demand their attention--or should demand their attention.

\*\*\*\*\*

I recognize that this is a fragmentary discussion, but your time is short, and I would like to turn to the third issue raised in the 31 August letter and comment briefly on my views about both the policies and procedures needed to ensure full cooperation and confidence between the committee and the Intelligence Community.

--This has to be a mutual effort if it is to achieve the desired objective.

As I have stressed to the committee on other occasions, I believe that our relationships should be based on full recognition of two fundamental policies:

First, there must be a full and open exchange on all matters relating to U.S. foreign intelligence.

--This applies both to substance and to resource requirements.

And, second, we have a mutual responsibility for full protection of information concerning sensitive intelligence sources and methods.

--Protection of sources and methods is essential to the integrity and continued viability of our intelligence effort.

Our ultimate goal--which we must share if it is to be achieved--is the strengthening of our intelligence capability and improving its responsiveness to the needs of the U.S. Government.

To this end, I assure you I will lend full support to the committee in its deliberations.

With respect to hearings on the upcoming FY-1978 budget authorization procedures I visualize the sequence of actions as follows:

--Staff conferences between members of your staff and key officers in the Intelligence Community already has begun.

--This should give your staff a familiarity with likely budget issues, the content of the National Foreign Intelligence Program, and the budget processes within intelligence organizations well before the actual hearings are scheduled.

--Three DCI guidance documents are now in process of preparation. They should be completed in October and will be provided to the committee. They include:

--Key Intelligence Questions for FY-1977. These represent substantive problem areas on which particular attention and resources need to be directed.

--DCI Perspectives for Intelligence for FY-1979-1983. In essence, this will be an elaboration on the kinds of matters I already have discussed with you this morning.

--A new document entitled "Priority National Foreign Intelligence Requirements for Planning and Programming: FY1979-1983". This is a follow-on the "U.S. Foreign Intelligence Priorities" paper which has been issued as planning guidance for each of the past several years by intelligence category or topic, in every foreign country in which the United States has an intelligence interest.

--Shortly after the start of 1977 I will provide the committee with my posture report.

--This will be the first time a document of this nature will have been prepared.

--Its purpose will be comparable with that of the annual posture statement which the Secretary of Defense has issued for the past number of years.

--My posture statement will outline:

--My views of the international environment as it relates to the collection and production of intelligence;

--The kinds of capabilities which this environment requires the Intelligence Community to possess if U.S. interests are to be well served; and,

--Where I think we need to be focusing attention in order to improve our intelligence capabilities.

--I plan on having this posture statement available to the committee prior to the onset of the committee's authorization hearings.

The hearings themselves, I suggest, should begin with an overview on the National Foreign Intelligence Program which I would present, to be followed by briefings by the Deputy Secretary of Defense and each of the program managers of the major intelligence programs.

( ~~SECRET~~ )

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--Additional briefings can be provided, on your request, to satisfy any other particular concerns of the committee.

In my view, a program of this nature, combining our provision of documentation and a series of budget briefings should provide you with the necessary basis for authorization legislation.

In the meantime, I encourage the committee and your staff to keep me and my Intelligence Community Staff advised as to:

--The nature and extent of your forthcoming needs for documentation and briefings as you identify them, and

--Committee perceptions of changes or new trends in the Congressional environment which you consider hold particular implications for the intelligence program. The better you keep us informed the more responsive we can be.

As I have said before, I pledge my full support to your activities, but a system of two-way communication is essential if our support is to be responsive to your needs.

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INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

8 October 1976

Staff Directive No. 8

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF  
ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

The organization of the Intelligence Community Staff has been reviewed and approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Key positions and staff assignments have been made.

Effective this date, the organizational structure of the Staff will be as shown in Attachment 1. The Staff will be managed according to the approved mission and function statements outlined in Attachment 2.

Deputy to the DCI for the  
Intelligence Community


Attachments:  
as stated

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8/28/07

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DECLASSIFICATION: 8/28/07

## Organization of Intelligence Community Staff



Attachment 1

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Attachment 2

INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF  
MANAGEMENT

Summary of Main Functions.....	1
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## INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAFF

Supports the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) in developing and controlling the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). Assists the DCI in the supervision and direction of the Intelligence Community. The Intelligence Community Staff consists of the Office of Policy and Planning, the Office of Performance Evaluation and Improvement, and the Office of Program and Budget Development.

### Main Function

#### A. National Foreign Intelligence Program

- Assist the DCI and CFI in the control of NFIP budget preparation and resource allocation.
- Perform as the CFI Staff during the annual program review and budget cycle for the component programs of the NFIP.
- Prepare Intelligence Community Staff recommendations on NFIP program and budget issues requiring CFI decisions.
- Ensure Intelligence Community compliance with NSC policy directives.
- Prepare supporting materials for DCI and CFI use at NSC semi-annual reviews.

#### B. Collection and Production

- Assist the CFI in establishment of policy priorities for national intelligence collection and production.
- Develop requirements systems for, and assess performance of, national intelligence collection and production.
- Provide staff support for collection committees of the National Foreign Intelligence Board.

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C. Internal Relations

- Determine the adequacy of the Intelligence Community's services of common concern and identify areas requiring policy decisions.
- Ensure appropriate Community-wide availability and use of information handling and communications systems.
- Establish security policies and procedures for protection of intelligence and intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures.

D. External Relations

- Provide guidance to the CFI on national/tactical intelligence relationship.
- Serve as interface with appropriate elements of the Executive Branch and the Congress on programs and resources; assist the DCI in Congressional and other presentations of programs and budgets.
- Ensure proper responsiveness of Intelligence Community collectors and producers to needs of intelligence users.

## OFFICE OF THE COMMUNITY DEPUTY

The Office of Community Deputy (OCD) supports the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC) in execution of his responsibilities to advise and assist the Director of Central Intelligence in supervision and direction of the Intelligence Community, and in directing the activities of the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS). The OCD consists of the D/DCI/IC and his personal staff, the Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community (AD/DCI/IC), the Executive Officer, the Executive Staff, the Committee on Foreign Intelligence/ National Foreign Intelligence Board Secretariat, and the Support Staff.

### Main Functions

#### Deputy for the Community--

- Advise the DCI on Intelligence Community matters.
- Make recommendations on National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) programs, resources and issues to the CFI and maintain data pertaining to the NFIP.
- Evaluate programs and products of the NFIP.
- Coordinate within the Intelligence Community the implementation of intelligence policy and program directives emanating from the President, NSC, CFI, Intelligence Oversight Board and the DCI.

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

- Associate Deputy for the Community

- Executive Officer

- 4



Executive Staff--

- Develop studies and chair inter-agency task groups to address problems as assigned by the DCI and D/DCI/IC.
- Provide legislative liaison with the Congress for the DCI and D/DCI/IC on Intelligence Community matters; prepare Community responses to inquiries and tasking from Congressional Committees.
- Draft revisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) for the NSC Committee on Foreign Intelligence.
- Monitor revisions of Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs).
- Prepare presentations and support the DCI in his appearances before the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.
- Accomplish tasks assigned by the Deputy for the Community in support of staff missions including personal representations when appropriate, and provide direct support to the coordination of Intelligence Community issues.

CFI/NFIB Secretariat--

- Provide secretariat service to the Chairman, Vice Chairman and members of the CFI and NFIB through the Deputy for the Community.
- Prepare and disseminate agenda and basic reference documents and secretariat papers.
- Monitor the development of CFI and NFIB procedures under established directives.

### Support Staff

- Provide administrative and management support for the IC Staff and NFIB elements.
- Plan, prepare, coordinate, and implement policy and programs for the staff in such areas as: personnel, budget, logistics, security, training, and other administrative matters.
- Serve as liaison contact on all administrative matters with counterparts in the various agencies which compose the Intelligence Community.
- Serve as point of contact with the functional offices of the Directorate of Administration/CIA for the accomplishment of administrative and financial services rendered to the IC Staff.

## OFFICE OF POLICY AND PLANNING (OPP)

### Mission

Provides primary support to the DCI, through the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC), on all matters relating to planning for the Intelligence Community. Develops systems to provide planning guidance to intelligence program managers and makes recommendations on policy issues affecting the Community. Coordinates efforts on the IC Staff to articulate DCI policy through the Annual Report of the DCI on the Intelligence Community. OPP provides support to the DCI and the D/DCI/IC on intelligence information handling and on security matters through the Information Handling Division, and the DCI Security and Intelligence Information Handling Committees. OPP provides the secretariat of the Intelligence Research and Development Council (IR&DC) of the NSC Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), and serves as the primary IC Staff agency on matters pertaining to international negotiations affecting intelligence programs. The office consists of a Policy and Plans Division, an Information Handling Division, the permanent staff of the Security Committee, and the IR&DC Secretariat.

### Functions

- To coordinate the development of long-range estimates of substantive and managerial needs of the Intelligence Community.
- To coordinate the development of annual planning guidance to intelligence program managers, including mid-range perspectives and National Foreign Intelligence Requirements and Priorities for Planning and Programming.
- To coordinate the development of short-range (one year) guidance for the DCI to the Intelligence Community, including the identification of National Intelligence Goals and Objectives and the Key Intelligence Questions.

- To identify those major policy and planning issues which require DCI and/or CFI decision; to develop the necessary background information and recommendations and alternatives.
- To coordinate Community efforts to achieve optimum total benefit from the exploitation of national and tactical intelligence assets.
- To coordinate IC Staff efforts to produce the Annual Report to the DCI on the Intelligence Community.
- To monitor the development of the NFIP and to advise the DCI and CFI regarding the policy implications of its composition.
- To coordinate Intelligence Community efforts to develop security policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
- To monitor the performance and adequacy of the Intelligence Community's services of common concern and identify areas requiring policy guidance and decisions.
- To investigate and coordinate relationships among the varied Community information handling and communications systems and explore common solutions to mutual problems.
- To furnish administrative support to the CFI Intelligence Research and Development Council.
- To coordinate IC Staff efforts to provide support to international negotiations related to intelligence programs.

POLICY AND PLANNING DIVISION (OPP/PPD)

Mission

Provides primary support to the DCI, through the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC), on all matters relating to planning for the Intelligence Community. Develops systems to provide planning guidance to intelligence program managers and makes recommendations on policy issues affecting the Community. Coordinates efforts on the IC Staff to articulate DCI policy through the Annual Report of the DCI on the Intelligence Community, and serves as the primary IC Staff agency on matters pertaining to international negotiations affecting intelligence programs.

Functions

- To coordinate the development of long-range estimates of substantive and managerial needs of the Intelligence Community.
- To coordinate the development of annual planning guidance to intelligence program managers, including mid-range Perspectives and National Foreign Intelligence Requirements and Priorities for Planning and Programming.
- To coordinate the development of short-range (one year) guidance for the DCI to the Intelligence Community, including the identification of National Intelligence Goals and Objectives and the Key Intelligence Questions.
- To identify those major policy and planning issues which require DCI and/or CFI decision; to develop the necessary background information and recommendations and alternatives.
- To coordinate Community efforts to achieve optimum total benefit from the exploitation of national and tactical intelligence assets.
- To coordinate IC Staff efforts to produce the Annual Report of the DCI on the Intelligence Community.

- To monitor the performance and adequacy of the Intelligence Community's services of common concern and identify areas requiring policy guidance and decisions.
- To coordinate IC Staff efforts to provide support to international negotiations related to intelligence programs.
- To monitor the development of the NFIP and to advise the DCI and CFI regarding the policy implications of its composition.

## INFORMATION HANDLING DIVISION

### Mission

The Information Handling Division (IHD) maintains the capability to investigate the relationships between varied information handling systems and explore common solutions to mutual problems. The IHD responds to information handling problems involving computer and telecommunications applications. The IHD disseminates information and provides guidance on the use of automated means for rapid production and dissemination of intelligence products. The IHD attempts to ensure that all applicable technology is considered for use in the production of national intelligence. The Division Chief serves as Chairman of the DCI Intelligence Information Handling Committee, and the Division provides staff support to the Committee.

### Functions

- Monitor and evaluate performance of data management systems, data processing, telecommunication and computer technology.
- Monitor the development of procedures and equipment to support the DCI's role in reporting on crisis situations.
- Provide a Community forum for consideration of R&D activities that may assist the production and dissemination of intelligence products.
- Promote increased Community-wide compatibility in planning and operation of computer and telecommunication systems and networks.
- Promote Community-wide standardization of data, files and microforms.
- Promote advice to the Community on computer and telecommunications matters.

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- Review and substantively comment on the dissemination sections of the National Imaging Plans (NIPS).
- Provide the Chairman and the staff support for the DCI Intelligence Information Handling Committee.
- Provide advice and support to other IC Staff components on IC Staff computer and communications planning.

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## SECURITY COMMITTEE

### Mission

The mission of the Security Committee is to establish security policies and procedures by which the Director of Central Intelligence can protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

### Functions

The functions of the Security Committee are:

- To advise and assist the DCI as appropriate in the development and review of security policies, standards, procedures and practices for the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosures.
- To review, formulate and recommend to the DCI personnel, physical and document security policies, standards and practices and dissemination procedures applicable to all government departments and agencies as they relate to the protection of intelligence sources and methods.
- To review, formulate and recommend to the DCI policies, standards and procedures for the dissemination of intelligence materials, for the release of such materials to foreign governments, and for the review of classified intelligence proposed for use in unclassified activities.
- On behalf of the DCI, to call upon departments and agencies to investigate any unauthorized disclosure or compromise of intelligence or of intelligence sources and methods occurring within their departments and agencies; to report the results of these investigations to the DCI.
- To develop, review and use effective means to defend sensitive US installations and personnel against technical surveillance. (This is accomplished through the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee.)

- To develop and recommend to the DCI technical guidance for the establishment, maintenance and improvement of coordinated compartmentation systems. (This is accomplished through the Compartmentation Subcommittee.)
- To review, formulate and recommend to the DCI policies, standards and procedures to protect intelligence data stored or processed by computers. (This is accomplished through the Computer Security Subcommittee.)
- To foster an aggressive and imaginative program of research and development leading to improved security equipment and techniques. (This is accomplished through the Research and Development Subcommittee.)

OFFICE OF PROGRAM AND BUDGET DEVELOPMENT

Provides primary support to the D/DCI/IC, the DCI and the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), for controlling and coordinating the development of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). Develops the consolidated budget to be submitted to the President through OMB. Monitors Community program and budget execution, including major reprogramming activity. Develops issue papers and recommendations for CFI. Provides on-going evaluation and quantification of NFIP performance in terms of resource allocation, application and capability, in relation to present and future national intelligence information needs. OPBD consists of a Data Support Group, a Program and Budget Division and a Program Analysis Division.

Main Functions:

- Develop and produce NFIP resource guidance for promulgation by the Chairman, CFI.
- Control Community-wide development of the NFIP component programs and budget, objectives and resource requirements.
- Perform CFI staff interface with appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community, the Executive Branch, and the Congress on matters of intelligence program and resource management.
- Identify and analyze resource issues within the NFIP; prepare issue or other appropriate staff papers to support the resource decision-making mechanisms.
- Prepare NFIP program recommendations and the consolidated budget; identify NFIP program and budget issues, including resource requirements, and alternatives.
- Assist the DCI in his presentation of Community programs and budgets to the President and the Congress.

#### DATA SUPPORT GROUP (DSG)

Provides data and data processing support to all elements of the Intelligence Community Staff (ICS) relating to national intelligence programs, budget, and resource management. Develops, maintains, and operates the Community's central management information system.

##### Main Functions

- Maintain the ICS data base to include information on the FYDP, KIQA/KEP, CIRIS, DCID 1/2, selected aspects of the national-tactical interface, and data files/registers of the R&D Council.
- Serve as the ICS focal point for ADP support, including software development.
- Provide continuous direct support to the CFI programming and budgeting cycle, and related evaluation activity.
- Initiate and participate in the development of a Community-wide Management Information System based on CIRIS.
- Issue data calls, including data formats and information input instructions; validate inputs; and participate in the development of analytic methodologies employing automated data bases.

#### PROGRAM AND BUDGET DIVISION (PBD)

Assures Community-coordinated development of a comprehensive, cost-efficient NFIP, annually. Coordinates and monitors, CFI programming and budgeting cycle. Formulates guidance, procedures and CFI directives pertaining to the NFIP development process and its substance.

##### Main Functions

- Develop NFIP program and fiscal guidance for promulgation by the Chairman, CFI.
- Monitor NFIP program and budget development and assist in DCI and CFI formal reviews during the programming and budgeting cycle.

- Identify major resources issues for DCI and CFI deliberation--produce appropriate background and position papers with recommendations and/or alternatives.
- Provide the Community forum for assessment and, resolution of resource management problems and issues.
- Ensure appropriate coordination with elements of the Intelligence Community, the Executive Branch, and the Congress.
- Produce a finished program/budget package (NFIP) for DCI and CFI approval.

#### PROGRAM ANALYSIS DIVISION (PAD)

Analyzes and assesses NFIP programs and their output in relation to cost and national intelligence need. Determines value relationships and shortfalls--by individual program and across programs with particular focus on resource requirements, allocations, applications, and effectiveness.

#### Main Functions

- Support the program and budget monitoring activities of the PBD with review and analysis of NFIP issues and problems.
- Provide the focal point for evaluation of the use of intelligence resources in relation to CFI-stated objectives and priorities.
- Initiate and serve as the focal point for the identification of program trade-off issues in support of CFI decisions.
- Produce trend analyses (mid/long term) of the NFIP intelligence resource capabilities, requirements, and functional productivity.

OFFICE OF PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND IMPROVEMENTMISSION

The Office of Performance Evaluation and Improvement (OPEI) supports the DCI, the CFI, and the D/DCI/IC in evaluating and improving the performance of collection and production activities, systems, and programs of the national foreign intelligence community. In coordination with the Office of Program and Budget Development and the Office of Policy and Planning, OPEI provides necessary personnel and expertise to staff the CFI principals and the Chairman and Vice Chairman of NFIB.

FUNCTIONS:

- Analyze and assess the performance of the Intelligence Community in collection and production and make recommendations for the improvement of both.
- Review, evaluate, and improve mechanisms and procedures by which national foreign intelligence is collected and produced.
- Chair and provide staff support for the DCI's three collection committees: the SIGINT Committee, the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation, and the Human Resources Committee.
- Develop, implement, and maintain requirements systems for the collection of national foreign intelligence.
- Review, evaluate, and improve the mechanisms by which collection requirements are established, prioritized, and tasked.
- Assess the responsiveness of intelligence collection and production activities to consumer needs.
- Monitor, assess, and recommend improvements in Intelligence Community activities in the area of warning intelligence and crisis support.

- Provide systems analysis expertise to develop and staff issue papers for the CFI and the NFIB.
- Coordinate and maintain liaison with such individuals, organizations, departments and agencies within and outside the Intelligence Community as appropriate to fulfill OPEI responsibilities.

ORGANIZATION:

In order to carry out its responsibilities, the Office of Performance Evaluation and Improvement staffs and maintains four divisions: SIGINT Division; Imagery Division; Human Resources Division; and Production Assessment and Improvement Division. In addition, OPEI maintains an Integration Staff as a separate element of the office to address issues which encompass the missions and functions of more than one of the divisions.

## INTEGRATION STAFF

### MISSION

The Integration Staff is responsible for studies and evaluations of Intelligence Community activities and programs which require coordination and integration of efforts involving specific cross-source considerations and/or tradeoffs between collection and production.

### FUNCTIONS

- Develop, analyze, and evaluate plans for cross-source and collection/production activities.
- Initiate and conduct analytical studies and assessments of the utility and value of intelligence collection and production activities which cut across lines of Division responsibility.
- Serve as interface on Intelligence Community activities of a cross-source and/or collection/production nature which directly affect DCI and/or CFI actions and decisions; recommend augmentation or redirection as necessary and develop appropriate Terms of Reference.
- Serve as the focus for evaluations of collection, processing, and analytic systems and programs, advanced technology and R&D outside the focus of responsibility of the Divisions.

### ORGANIZATION

The Integration Staff is a small staff of professionals whose activities are conducted with ad hoc support from the four Divisions of the Office. Its Chief also serves as the Office's Deputy Director.



HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION

MISSION

The Human Resources Division provides primary support for the assessment and improvement of the performance of human resources activities. It assists other foreign information gathering and reporting activities of the Government to improve the national foreign information and intelligence effort. The Chief of the Human Resources Division serves as the principal staff advisor to the D/DCI/IC for all human resources matters. He also serves as Chairman of the DCI's Human Resources Committee and in this role reports and is directly responsible to the DCI in coordination with the D/DCI/IC. The Deputy of the Human Resources Division serves as Vice Chairman of the Human Resources Committee.

FUNCTIONS

- Monitor, evaluate, and improve human resources foreign intelligence collection and production activities within the Intelligence Community.
- Evaluate performance and related support for the development and improvement of human resources information gathering and reporting activities of other Government departments and agencies for national needs.
- Provide staff support to the Chairman of the DCI's Human Resources Committee.
- Review, evaluate, and improve the means by which the information needs of intelligence consumers and producers are defined, prioritized, and tasked to collectors.
- Develop or assist in the development of Government plans for foreign information collection and reporting by human resources including training and research and development support.
- Coordinate human resources activities and programs of the Intelligence Community with related activities of other Government departments and agencies.

ORGANIZATION

The Human Resources Division is organizationally divided as follows: staff/secretariat support to the Human Resources Committee and direct management support to the Community in human resources activities.

## IMAGERY DIVISION

### MISSION

The Imagery Division provides primary support for the assessment and improvement of the performance of national foreign intelligence imagery activities, projects, and systems. The Chief of the Imagery Division serves as the principal staff advisor to the D/DCI/IC for all imagery matters. He also serves as Chairman of the DCI's Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX), and in this role reports and is directly responsible to the DCI in coordination with the D/DCI/IC. The Deputy Chief of the Division serves as the Vice Chairman of COMIREX.

### FUNCTIONS

- Analyze and assess the performance of national-level imagery activities, projects, and systems.
- Review, evaluate, and improve the mechanisms by which imagery collection and exploitation requirements are established, prioritized, and tasked.
- Provide staff support to the Chairman of the DCI's Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX).
- Develop, implement, and maintain requirements systems for imagery collection and exploitation.
- Assess the responsiveness of imagery activities, projects, and systems to consumer needs.
- Support, through the Office of Program and Budget Development and the Office of Policy and Planning, DCI and CFI activities relating to and affecting the imagery program.

### ORGANIZATION

The Imagery Division consists of an Imagery Assessment Branch and five COMIREX Staff Support Units: an Executive Secretariat, an Imagery Collection Requirements Subcommittee (ICRS), an Exploitation Requirements Subcommittee (EXSUBCOM), an ADP Coordinating Unit, and a Special Support Unit.

## SIGINT DIVISION

### MISSION

The SIGINT Division provides primary support for the assessment and improvement of the performance of national foreign intelligence SIGINT activities, projects, and systems. The Chief of the SIGINT Division serves as the principal staff advisor to the D/DCI/IC for all SIGINT matters. He also serves as Chairman of the DCI's SIGINT Committee and in this role reports and is directly responsible to the DCI in coordination with the D/DCI/IC. The Deputy of the SIGINT Division serves as the Vice Chairman of the SIGINT Committee.

### FUNCTIONS

- Analyze and assess the performance and make recommendations for the improvement of Intelligence Community SIGINT activities, projects, and systems.
- Review, evaluate, and improve the mechanisms by which SIGINT collection requirements are established, prioritized, and tasked.
- Provide staff support to the Chairman of the DCI's SIGINT Committee.
- Develop, implement, and maintain requirements systems for SIGINT collection.
- Assess the responsiveness of SIGINT activities, projects, and systems to consumer needs.
- Support, through the Office of Program and Budget Development and the Office of Policy and Planning, DCI and CFI activities relating to or affecting the SIGINT program.

### ORGANIZATION

The SIGINT Division consists of a SIGINT Assessment Branch and three SIGINT Committee Staff Support Units: an Executive Secretariat, a SIGINT Requirements Validation and Evaluation Subcommittee (SIRVES), and SIGINT Overhead Reconnaissance Subcommittee (SORS).

## PRODUCTION ASSESSMENT AND IMPROVEMENT DIVISION

### MISSION

The Production Assessment and Improvement Division provides support for the assessment and improvement of national foreign intelligence production in the context of the needs of the producers and consumers of intelligence. It also supports the work of the Intelligence Community Staff related to intelligence warning and crisis procedures.

### FUNCTIONS


- Initiate, direct, and/or conduct ad hoc assessments, reviews, and post mortem studies of Intelligence Community performance.
- Review and evaluate the quality, timeliness, usefulness, and adequacy of national foreign intelligence products.
- Monitor and assess the activities of the Intelligence Community in the area of warning intelligence and crisis support; develop, propose, and help to implement means to improve performance in this area.
- Develop, propose, encourage, and help to implement means to improve intelligence production including the use of new analytical methodologies and new means of product presentation.
- Develop and maintain data and procedures for evaluating substantive intelligence performance.
- Support the DCI, NFIB, and the CFI in evaluating consumer-producer relationships.
- Maintain liaison with appropriate individuals and committees concerned with collection and production, with intelligence consumers inside and outside the Intelligence Community, and with appropriate contractors.

### ORGANIZATION

The Production Assessment and Improvement Division consists of two branches: a Performance Evaluation Branch and a Crisis Intelligence and Product Improvement Branch.

Approved For Release 2007/11/30 : CIA-RDP84M00713R000100030001-0

Approved For Release 2007/11/30 : CIA-RDP84M00713R000100030001-0



*Ofm-8*

26 January 1977

NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.  
8/28/07

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT : Contingency Delegations of Authorities

1. The following delegations will apply during the term of my service as Acting Director of Central Intelligence, in the event I am temporarily absent from Washington, D. C., or temporarily absent from duty for any other reason:

a. The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community will continue to exercise the authorities delegated to him by the Director's memorandum of 22 July 1976, Subject: "Delegation of Authority for the Performance of Your Duties," Executive Registry No. 76-8364/1.

b. The Deputy Director for Administration will exercise the authorities delegated to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence by the Director's memorandum of 22 July 1976.

2. I plan to be out of the city on 29 and 30 January, and the above will govern until my return, as in all similar cases in the future, without separate issuances over my signature to cover each case. On any major issues, I will count on the D/DCI/IC and the DDA to consult with me by phone, as appropriate.

*E. H. Knoche*

E. H. Knoche  
Acting Director

Distribution:

D/DCI/IC

DDS&T

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DDA

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D/DCI/NI

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
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IG

Comptroller

Asst/DCI

NO/DCI



5 AUG 1976

NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.  
8/28/07

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

FROM : George Bush  
Director

SUBJECT : Delegation of Authority for the Performance of  
Your Duties

REFERENCE : My memo, subject as above, dated 22 July 1976

Paragraph 5b(8) of reference is amended to read as follows:

(f) Overview the Director of Central  
Intelligence committees, except the Inspectors  
General Committee, on behalf of the Director.

/s/ George Bush

George Bush

Distribution:

Orig. - Addressee (DDCI)

~~1~~ - D/DCI/IC

1 - DCI

1 - ER via Exec Secy

1 - OCC

1 - AD/DCI/IC

22 JUL 1976

NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION. 8/28/07

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

FROM : George Bush  
Director

SUBJECT : Delegation of Authority for the Performance of Your  
Duties

1. By this memorandum I am delegating authority to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence and to the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, pursuant to paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 3(d) of Executive Order 11905 which is necessary for the performance of the duties of those positions. To the extent that any existing delegations may be inconsistent with this memorandum, they are hereby superseded.

2. Authority as Acting Director

Section 102(a) of the National Security Act established the CIA with a "Director of Central Intelligence who shall be the head thereof." The Act also established the position of "Deputy Director of Central Intelligence" and provides that the DDCI shall "act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director during his absence or disability." This memorandum cannot and does not intend any negation of or exceptions to those statutory provisions. Therefore in my "absence or disability" the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence "shall act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director."

3. Delegation to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

There is hereby delegated to the DDCI:

a. all authorities vested in the Director of Central Intelligence by statute, law and regulation as head of the Central Intelligence Agency, including the authority to certify the expenditure of funds as provided by section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act, as amended, consistent with the decision of the Comptroller General addressed to my predecessor on 2 January 1962 (41 Comp. Gen. 429); and



b. those authorities vested by E.O. 11905 in:

(1) the Director of Central Intelligence which pertain to the Central Intelligence Agency; and

(2) the Central Intelligence Agency.

4. Delegation to the Deputy to the Director for the Intelligence Community (hereinafter Deputy for the Community)

There is hereby delegated to the Deputy for the Community:

a. all authorities vested in the Director of Central Intelligence by the National Security Act, except those delegated by paragraph 3.a. of this memorandum;

b. all authorities vested in the Director of Central Intelligence by Executive Order 11905, except those delegated by paragraph 3.b. of this memorandum; and

c. to the extent that information, advice, and recommendations concerning the Intelligence Community or the overall national intelligence effort may be due the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the authority to take the actions required of the Director of Central Intelligence by Executive Order 11460.

5. In order to assist me in the performance of my responsibilities, you are authorized and directed to perform the following duties under my supervision and guidance:

a. Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

(1) manage the Central Intelligence Agency;

(2) in my absence, attend meetings of the Operations Advisory Group;

(3) as the Central Intelligence Agency member, attend meetings of the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB);

(4) manage the CIA Program, an element of the National Foreign Intelligence Program;

(5) supervise the production of national intelligence by CIA;

(6) perform the functions assigned to the CIA under Executive Order 11905;

(7) as prescribed by National Security Council Intelligence Directives or otherwise:

(a) plan, review and evaluate all CIA activities and allocate CIA intelligence resources among its subordinate components;

(b) provide CIA representation on Intelligence Community advisory boards and committees;

(c) assist in developing priorities for collection and production of national intelligence and for undertaking, as directed, other foreign intelligence activities, e.g., covert action;

(d) formulate policies with respect to arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters; and

(e) support the Deputy for the Community in the development of standards and practices relating to the protection of intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures; and

\* (8) such other duties pertaining to the Central Intelligence Agency as may be prescribed.

b. Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community

(1) at my request, represent the Director of Central Intelligence at meetings of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence;

(2) be Vice-Chairman of the NFIB;

(3) be head of and direct the Intelligence Community Staff;

vised 5 August 1976 to read: (8) Overview the Director of Central Intelligence committees, except the Inspectors General Committee, on behalf of the Director.

(4) make recommendations on NFIP programs, resources and issues to the CFI and maintain data pertaining to the NFIP;

(5) coordinate within the Intelligence Community the implementation of intelligence policy and program directives emanating from the President, NSC, CFI, Intelligence Oversight Board and the Director of Central Intelligence;

(6) evaluate programs and products of the NFIP;

(7) advise the DCI on Intelligence Community matters;

(8) supervise the activities and provide staff support for the SIGINT, COMIREX and Human Resources DCI Committees, and coordinate the activities of all other DCI Committees except the DCI Committee of Inspectors General.

(9) as prescribed by National Security Council Intelligence Directives or otherwise:

(a) ensure the development and submission of a budget for the NFIP to the CFI;

(b) assist in the development of national intelligence requirements and priorities;

(c) establish procedures to ensure the propriety of requests to the Intelligence Community;

(d) ensure the development of standards and practices to protect intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures;

(e) establish a rigorous program to downgrade and declassify foreign intelligence information, consistent with E.O. 11652;

(f) assist the DCI in advising the President and others on Intelligence Community matters;

(g) ensure the establishment of common security standards for handling foreign intelligence and for granting access thereto;

(h) establish uniform criteria for transmission of critical intelligence;

(i) consult with users and producers of intelligence to ensure timeliness, relevancy and quality of the intelligence product; and

(10) such other duties pertaining to the Intelligence Community as may be prescribed.

6. In my absence attendance at meetings of the National Security Council and the PFIAB will be determined on the basis of the subject matter of such meetings and in consultation with me. On other matters which do not clearly pertain exclusively to the Agency or exclusively to the Community, you should consult with each other, or with me, to determine where the action lies.

/s/ George Bush

George Bush.

OGC 76-380

9 July 1976

NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION.  
8/28/07

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Anthony A. Lapham  
General Counsel

SUBJECT : Delegation of Authority to Deputy Director of Central  
Intelligence and Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence  
Community

STAT 1. I am forwarding for your consideration and recommended signature a memorandum by which you delegate authority to the two Deputy Directors, [redacted] and Mr. Knoche. A delegation to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is required by Executive Order 11905. While the Executive Order does not specifically direct delegation of authority to the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, as a practical matter, and as a matter of law, a delegation is necessary if he is to discharge functions.

2. Paragraph 2 of the memorandum of delegation is not a delegation but simply records the fact that in certain circumstances the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, by statute, is the Acting Director and is to "act for, and exercise the powers of, the Director" in his "absence or disability."

3. Paragraphs 3 and 4 delegate all of your authorities to one or the other of the two Deputies; all your Agency authorities go to the DDCI, all your Community- or Government-wide authorities go to the Deputy for the Community.


4. The fact that you delegate all your authorities of course does not mean that you divest yourself of them or of your responsibilities. It simply authorizes one or the other of your two Deputies to exercise all the powers which you have the authority to delegate.

5. Paragraph 5 is by way of specifying in non-legal terms the types of activities and function each would perform, pursuant to the delegations in paragraphs 3 and 4. Paragraph 5 does not purport to be an all-inclusive list.

In practice, I am sure that understandings will develop between you and each Deputy and between the two of them as to the areas in which each will act without consultation with you or with each other and, conversely, those areas in which they are not to act or are to act only upon consultation with you.

6. The memorandum of delegation reflects a certain fuzziness or contradiction inherent in the National Security Act and Executive Order 11905. In particular, the Act provides that in the "absence" of the Director the DDCI shall exercise the powers of the Director. The memorandum provides that the Deputy for the Community is to represent the Director at CFI meetings and one or the other, as appropriate to the subject, will attend meetings of the National Security Council and PFIAB. To some degree these provisions of the memorandum would seem to conflict with the statute. I believe, however, that the term "absence" in the National Security Act should be construed to mean those occasions when the Director is absent because he is on vacation or ill and is not available to discharge the duties of his office. In those instances when it is necessary that he be absent from a meeting of the National Security Council, PFIAB or another organization, undoubtedly the official who would be present in his stead would be whatever official the Council, PFIAB, etc. or the Director desired. Quite probably in many cases it would be in order for both Deputies to attend.


7. Recommend your signature.

  
Anthony A. Lapham

STAT

Attachment


CONCUR:

  
E. H. Knoche

20 JUL 1976

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Date

  
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

19 JUL 1976  
Date

Approved For Release 2007/11/30 : CIA-RDP84M00713R000100030001-0

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Approved For Release 2007/11/30 : CIA-RDP84M00713R000100030001-0

12 August 1976

NSC REVIEWED DOCUMENT AND HAS NO OBJECTION TO  
DECLASSIFICATION. 8/28/07

## THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE

### Introduction

This paper is designed to give Governor Carter an outline of our intelligence system and how it works. Virtually all of the material presented here is now in the public domain. Nevertheless, its treatment in a comprehensive and authoritative fashion makes this a sensitive document. Its dissemination should be tightly controlled.

Section I is devoted to a brief description of the intelligence process. Section II specifies the authorities under which intelligence operates. Section III describes the various intelligence agencies and their responsibilities. Section IV deals with the DCI and the central organizations through which he administers the intelligence system, including the budgetary process. Section V deals with covert action and Section VI with oversight mechanisms.

### I. The Intelligence Collection and Production Process

Essentially the intelligence process can be likened to an industrial one. Raw material -- fragments of information of various types and degrees of detail and validity -- is collected and fed into a factory -- an analytic or production organization. The factory distills its raw input into a variety of products, finished intelligence, designed for the use of a variety of consumers. Intelligence managers seek to determine the needs of their consumers, to translate these into requirements for collection, to direct collection in response to these requirements, and to shape the finished intelligence product so as best to meet consumer needs. Because the universe of information is infinite and consumers are insatiable, while resources and budgets are



finite indeed, they must also establish priorities for what is to be collected and what finished intelligence is to be produced. These priorities then drive budgetary allocations, either to reallocate resources among existing organizations and systems, to create new programs and capabilities, or to eliminate unproductive ones.

A. Sources of Raw Intelligence. There are three major categories: technical, human, and overt.

1. Technical collection in turn breaks down into two major categories, signals intelligence or SIGINT and imagery [redacted]

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2. Human source collection involves essentially the actions of human beings in eliciting information, [redacted]

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[redacted] CIA's Directorate of Operations is responsible for clandestine foreign intelligence collection. It is also responsible for overt collection, [redacted]

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3. Overt collection involves the culling from open sources -- foreign broadcasts, US and foreign press, and scholarly books and journals -- of information useful to the intelligence analyst.

B. Processing. A substantial slice of intelligence resources is devoted to processing, the synthesis of data into a form usable by the intelligence analyst. This includes photo-interpretation, cryptanalysis and decryption of intercepted enciphered communications, reduction of telemetry to meaningful numbers, and the general use of computers to store, search, select, and organize large bodies of information.

C. The Analyst. Any intelligence organization has a body of analysts, each assigned to a particular geographic or functional specialty, broad or narrow. There may, for instance, be one analyst assigned to half a dozen small African countries, or one Soviet foreign policy specialist assigned to Soviet policy toward Africa. The systems for collection, processing, and dissemination of raw intelligence are designed to bring to the individual analyst's desk all the information from all sources pertinent to his responsibilities. If he is a current analyst, his job is to read incoming information as it arrives, to evaluate it, and to distill from it a kind of running assessment of the state of affairs within his field. If he is a research analyst, his job is to define his project, to issue the necessary requirements for new collection, to review and select from existing bodies of data, to evaluate each piece of information, and to produce from the results a paper responsive to the task given him.

D. The Production Manager. Analysts are formally grouped into functional or geographic branches and divisions, but equally important is the ad hoc task grouping, whereby analysts

in all the specialties involved in responding to a particular question are informally organized to produce contributions to the response. A question with regard to Cubans in Angola, for instance, will involve not only the Angolan analyst from the African division, but the Cuban analyst from the Latin American division, air transport and sea transport specialists from the economic division, and foreign policy analysts from the Soviet division. Someone must be placed in charge of such an effort, to coordinate the activities of the participants, to ensure that collection requirements are placed, to review for quality the contributions of participating analysts, and to combine those contributions into a coherent, concise, literate product.

E. Types of Finished Intelligence. The single characteristic of finished intelligence is that it has been evaluated and, if necessary, correlated with other information. It is possible for a raw report to be totally valid and need neither comment nor additional context. In this case the act of the analyst in determining that it stands by itself converts it from raw to finished intelligence. Thus finished intelligence can range from the phone call from an operations center alerting the senior officer to an event, to the most elaborate research products scheduled over a period of years. Current intelligence can start with the phone call mentioned above and stretches through a variety of daily and weekly reporting mechanisms to the memorandum in response to a policymaker's question: how many Cubans are there in Southern Africa today? What is Syrian policy in Lebanon? Estimative intelligence projects forward; it deals with the unknown (but knowable) and with the unknowable: what are the present Soviet capabilities for war against China? What is the likely outcome of an Arab-Israeli war in 1985? Intelligence research comprises an outpouring of monographs that underpin both current and estimative work: what are the characteristics of the SS-X-20 IRBM system? Where are the Arabs investing their oil profits? A subcategory of intelligence

research output is basic intelligence, primarily the structured compilation of geographic, demographic, social, and political data on countries abroad; this grouping includes a wide variety of maps and factual handbooks as well.

## II. Authorities

A. The basic authority for US intelligence is the National Security Act of 1947. It was intended primarily to create the National Security Council and Department of Defense, and to separate the Air Force from the Army. With the lessons of Pearl Harbor in mind, however, Congress also created under the NSC the Central Intelligence Agency, under a Director of Central Intelligence, and charged it:

"(1) to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government departments and agencies as relate to national security;

"(2) to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security;

"(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government using where appropriate existing agencies and facilities: Provided, That the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal-security functions: Provided further, That the departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence: And provided further, That the Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure;

"(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally;

"(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

These provisions have stood essentially without amendment since 1947, but the Senate Select Committee chaired by Senator Inouye is now to review them.

B. The CIA Act of 1949 provided for a statutory Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. It also vested in the DCI a number of operating authorities essential to the conduct of secret intelligence activities, including a secret budget.

C. Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford in February 1976, for the first time spelled out in some detail the responsibilities of the DCI deriving from the Act of 1947 and provided him, under the President, with the executive authorities necessary to carry out these responsibilities. (See Section IV below.) It defines the functions and responsibilities of the various intelligence agencies (Section III). It establishes certain control mechanisms (Sections V and VI). Finally, it sets forth guidelines for the conduct of intelligence operations within Constitutional limits.

D. National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCID's) supplement E.O. 11905 with further definitions of the relationships among and responsibilities of the intelligence agencies. Some of these are classified.

E. Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCID's) are issued by the DCI to implement certain NSCID's or to carry out responsibilities assigned directly to him by E.O. 11905.

III. Intelligence Organizations and Responsibilities

A. The Central Intelligence Agency. CIA has broader responsibilities than any other agency. It is managed, under the DCI, by the (statutory) Deputy DCI. There are four functional Directorates.

1. The Directorate of Operations has primary national responsibility for the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence, [redacted]

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[redacted] It conducts counter-intelligence abroad and coordinates these activities with the FBI, which is solely responsible for domestic counter-intelligence. The Operations Directorate is also responsible for covert action. (See Section V below.)

2. The Directorate of Science and Technology is responsible for research and development of technical collection systems. Its program is unique; it is dedicated to exploiting new technology solely for intelligence collection purposes. This Directorate collects technical intelligence, largely SIGINT, in collaboration with the Directorate of Operations. It processes imagery through its management of the National Photographic Interpretation Center. It produces scientific and technical intelligence, especially concerning the characteristics of foreign strategic weapons systems.

3. The Directorate of Intelligence is responsible primarily for intelligence production. It produces political, military, economic, biographic, geographic, and sociological intelligence and synthesizes these with the work

of S&T Directorate. In addition, through the Foreign Broadcast Information Service it collects intelligence from foreign open radio and television broadcasts (Radio Moscow, for instance). Its processing activities include the translation of these broadcasts and of foreign documents.

4. The Directorate of Administration is responsible for a variety of support activities. It provides: communications; computer facilities; logistic, medical, financial, and personnel services; conducts training; and maintains security.

5. CIA's collection activities are carefully coordinated with those of other intelligence agencies to minimize duplication and ensure coverage of all major targets. (All SIGINT collection, for instance, is conducted within an annual national plan.) CIA's production capability is comprehensive but varies considerably in depth of coverage. On certain topics such as economics CIA maintains unique research capabilities as a service of common concern. On others of great national importance, such as Soviet strategic weapons systems, it maintains research programs in deliberate competition with those of the military services. (Experience has proved the worth of this competition; there is no monopoly on wisdom.) Finally, on topics of lesser importance CIA maintains the minimal capability necessary to provide the DCI a check on the work of other agencies.

B. Defense Intelligence Management. The Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Ellsworth, maintains overall cognizance of Department of Defense intelligence on behalf of the Secretary. He has an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)/Director of Defense Intelligence. The latter has two deputies: the Director, DIA, and a deputy for management and resource matters. Where national intelligence matters are concerned, the various agencies of Defense take their guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence.

C. The National Security Agency. NSA is responsible for collection, processing, decryption, and dissemination of SIGINT for the federal government. Its output provides raw material to the production organizations and also supports military commanders in the field.

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[REDACTED]

The Director, NSA, is subordinate to the Secretary of Defense but takes operational guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. NSA is also responsible for cryptographic security.

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[REDACTED]

E. The Defense Intelligence Agency. DIA is responsible for coordination of the intelligence activities of the military services. In the collection field, it manages the military attache system. It produces military and related intelligence in support of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the major military commands. The Director, DIA, is responsible both to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS.

F. The Bureau of Intelligence And Research, Department of State. INR is the intelligence arm of State. It is quite small, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] It has two major functions, production of political and some economic intelligence

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to meet State's departmental needs, and coordination of State's relations with other intelligence activities. This includes State participation in national intelligence production (See IV D below), relations with CIA's Directorate of Operations, and transmission of intelligence requirements to our Embassies abroad. INR has no collection or processing responsibilities.

G. The Service Intelligence Agencies. The Army, Navy, and Air Force maintain important intelligence research centers. These are mainly directed at technical questions of direct concern to the service involved, but they also provide important and unique national intelligence capabilities. For instance, the Air Force's Foreign Technology Division at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio is the best single source for analysis of Soviet aircraft and missiles. Navy provides highly specialized collection and analysis in undersea warfare.

H. The Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI does have a role in foreign intelligence. Obviously it works closely with the CIA Directorate of Operations in foreign counterintelligence matters and provides intelligence from its penetrations of foreign organizations within the US.

I. Treasury. Treasury is primarily a consumer of intelligence. It makes some contributions  but it has no production function.

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J. Energy Resource and Development Administration. ERDA's role in intelligence is inherited from the Atomic Energy Commission. It, like Treasury, is primarily a consumer but it does make a contribution in intelligence

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#### IV. The DCI

The organizations listed above constitute the "Intelligence Community." The Director of Central Intelligence is the:

- Primary intelligence adviser to the President
- Leader (for lack of a better term) of the Intelligence Community
- Director of CIA

Of these, the most clearly defined is the last. In practice, his ability to head the Community depends both on his access to the President as adviser and on the institutional base of CIA. When he has and is known to have such access, the Community will respond to his lead. On the other hand, his interests as Community leader are often different from those as Director of CIA. E.O. 11905 was designed in part to ease some of these problems.

A. The DCI and the President. The Act of 1947 is ambiguous with regard to the position of the DCI. He is "under" the NSC, but the NSC has no corporate existence. It advises the President; hence it has been (reasonably) assumed that the DCI answers to the President. The modalities of the arrangement have depended in considerable degree on personality. In recent years the practice has been for the DCI to deal with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on routine matters (usually several times a day). The present DCI, however, meets alone with the President at least once a week. He also attends NSC meetings, not as a policy advocate, but as an adviser on intelligence matters. He is also a member of the NSC Sub-Committees and an active participant in discussions other than the recommendation of policy.

B. Executive Order 11905. The structure of American intelligence had been subject to two major criticisms with regard to the position of the DCI.

First, his position as head of the Intelligence Community was said to be incompatible with his position as Director of CIA; he was forced to be impartial arbitrator and advocate at the same time. Second, and counter to the first, his authority was said to be not commensurate with his responsibilities; he did not have the power to enforce his decisions, however impartial, over agencies other than CIA. (About 80 percent of US intelligence resources are in the Department of Defense, less than 20 in CIA.)

E.O. 11905 was intended to give increased powers to the DCI and at the same time go some distance toward meeting these criticisms.\* It provided that the DCI have two deputies, one to assist in his supervision and direction of the CIA and one to assist in his supervision and direction of the Community. (The statutory Deputy DCI, Mr. Knoche, is responsible for the Agency; legislation is being sought to make the Deputy for the Community, [redacted] statutory as well.) Under this arrangement the DCI is the arbitrator, his Agency Deputy the advocate for Agency programs.

E.O. 11905 made a clear distinction between those portions of the DCI's job in which, as intelligence adviser to the President, he must be paramount, and those in which, as manager of the Community, he must balance the needs of the National Security Council for intelligence support in peacetime and crisis against those of the Department of Defense for support in war and in building war-fighting capabilities. For the first, largely having to do with substantive intelligence assessments, E.O. 11905 gave the DCI virtually a free hand. For the second, largely concerned with resource and budget issues, it for the first time established an organizational structure in which issues between the DCI and the Secretary of Defense could

\* The responsibilities assigned to the DCI by E.O. 11905 are quoted at Annex.

be resolved. Realistically, it recognized this was not an area in which the DCI could be dominant. The issues are institutional, the needs of each institution valid. The Order provided a mechanism for compromise.

C. The Committee on Foreign Intelligence. This mechanism was the Committee on Foreign Intelligence or CFI. [redacted]

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[redacted] extended that arrangement to the entire National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP). The DCI chairs the CFI, with the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Mr. Ellsworth) and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Mr. Hyland) as members. The Committee is not advisory to the DCI; it normally operates by consensus, but decisions can be appealed to the NSC and ultimately to the President. Its responsibilities are as follows:

"(i) Control budget preparation and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

"(A) The DCI shall, prior to submission to the Office of Management and Budget, review, and amend as he deems appropriate, the budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

"(B) The CFI shall also adopt rules governing the reprogramming of funds within this budget. Such rules may require that reprogrammings of certain types or amounts be given prior approval by the CFI.

"(ii) Establish policy priorities for the collection and production of national intelligence.

"(iii) Establish policy for the management of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

"(iv) Provide guidance on the relationship between tactical and national intelligence; how-

ever, neither the DCI nor the CFI shall have responsibility for tactical intelligence.

"(v) Provide continuing guidance to the Intelligence Community in order to ensure compliance with policy directions of the NSC."

1. The DCI's Intelligence Community Staff provides staff support for the CFI. It is headed by the DCI's Deputy for the Intelligence Community who is Executive Secretary of the CFI. The IC Staff's responsibilities extend beyond the CFI, however, to the National Foreign Intelligence Board (See IV D below) and the DCI Committees (IV E below). For the CFI its most important function is to develop, administer, and defend the National Foreign Intelligence Program. The IC Staff is not a part of CIA. Its personnel are contributed by all the intelligence agencies. It is presently located in the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley, Va., but will soon be moved to its own quarters

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2. The National Foreign Intelligence Program is the budget for all US intelligence activities except the tactical intelligence operations of the military services. It has the following major components:

-- The Combined Cryptologic Program (CCP); NSA and related SIGINT activities of CIA and the military services.

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-- The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), all other Department of Defense spending for intelligence other than tactical, including DIA and Army, Navy, and Air Force Intelligence.

In addition, the NFIP includes the extremely small funds spent for State/INR and the intelligence staffs of Treasury and ERDA.

3. The intelligence budgetary cycle is generally similar to that of the Federal Budget as a whole. The NFIP is classified, but it is subject to the same reviews as the general budget, for the Executive by the Office of Management and Budget and for the Congress by those Committees and staffs it designates. These organizations have full access to the details of the NFIP and any of its component programs. It is only in the open, published federal budget that certain portions are hidden within other appropriations.

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As the CFI was only organized last spring, its procedures are still not fully worked out. It is necessary to integrate consideration of the NFIP as a coherent single program with the complex budgetary procedures of OMB and the Department of Defense. It appears, however, that the CFI will review the CCP, GDIP, CIAP, etc. individually during the spring and summer, and that this will be followed by a cross-program review designed to produce an integrated NFIP. The NFIP will then be submitted to OMB for its review in the fall. Any issues that emerge between OMB and the CFI can then be appealed to the President before his annual budget message is submitted to Congress. At this writing the CFI is preparing guidance for the individual program managers' use in preparing their proposals for Fiscal Year 1979. It has just completed its cross-program review of the NFIP for FY 78, and is negotiating with Congress on certain aspects of the budget for FY 77 as Congressional consideration of the Defense Appropriations Bill reaches its final stages.

4. The Congressional role in the intelligence budget is in a state of flux. The responsibilities of the Budget Committees have not been defined, nor is it clear how Senator Inouye's Committee will operate in this regard. In the past the Intelligence Subcommittees of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees have been briefed in fairly general terms, while the Subcommittees on Defense of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees have been briefed in greater detail. The latter have access to any detail they request, and the House in particular has been vigorous in its budgetary review. In the future, it seems clear that the Senate Select Committee will review the entire NFIP in some depth prior to its consideration by the Appropriations Committee. It will also have jurisdiction over the CIAP, while Armed Services will retain jurisdiction over the military programs. Arrangements are being made for Government Accounting Office teams to be assigned to the Select Committee for audits of CIA activities.

D. The DCI as Intelligence Advisor to the President.

As noted above, E.O. 11905 gave the DCI a free hand in the field of substantive intelligence assessment; in technical jargon the production of "national intelligence." (National intelligence is simply that intelligence needed for the formulation of national policy; it usually involves the work of more than one intelligence agency and often requires the concurrence or dissent of all of them). Actually, the Order confirmed the leading position the DCI has taken in this field since the early 1950's.

1. The instrument through which the DCI acts in national intelligence is the National Foreign Intelligence Board, formerly the United States Intelligence Board. The NFIB is a committee consisting of the senior officers of the Intelligence Community. It is chaired by the DCI and is advisory to him.

The membership of NFIB is as follows; Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, Vice-Chairman; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, CIA Member; Director of DIA, Director of NSA, Director of INR, Senior Representatives of Treasury, ERDA, and the FBI. The military intelligence chiefs are technically "observers" rather than members, but they act -- and dissent -- as if they were members.

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The primary function of NFIB is to consider national intelligence (see D3 below). It does, however, support the DCI in a number of other ways in coordinating the activities of the Intelligence Community.

2. Staff support for the NFIB comes in varying degrees from the IC Staff and the DCI Committees, but in substantive matters largely from the National Intelligence Officers. The NIOs, under the Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence, are a substantive staff to the DCI. Like the IC Staff, they are an Intelligence Community rather than a CIA organization. They are responsible to the DCI for the production of national intelligence within their assigned fields, and are empowered by him to draw on the full resources of the Community to meet policy needs. They provide a link among consumers, producers, collectors, and experts outside government. There are at present ten NIOs: for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for Western Europe, for the Middle East, for South and Southeast Asia and Africa, for China, for Japan and East Asia, for Latin America, for strategic programs, for conventional forces, and for economics.

3. The production of National Intelligence, under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officers, is the ultimate purpose of the national intelligence system. It consists of a wide range of studies, assessments, and estimates identified



by the appropriate NIO (or requested of him by a senior policy officer), as necessary to the formulation of policy. The NIO is responsible for ensuring that, in normal circumstances, all the resources of the Community are tapped in response, and that all agencies have an opportunity to present their views. The products range from the Interagency Memorandum prepared by one agency and discussed with other agencies at the working level (What arms is South Africa supplying to Rhodesia?) to the formal National Intelligence Estimate prepared jointly by several agencies and extensively coordinated, finally by NFIB itself (Soviet Offensive and Defensive Strategic Programs).

The views expressed in National Intelligence Estimates, or other interagency assessments, are those of the DCI. He is obligated, however, to respect the right of dissent. Should any NFIB principal differ with the DCI's findings, he may have his own views published as an integral and conspicuous part of the Estimate. This process ensures that all relevant resources of the Federal Government are tapped and that all informed opinion is expressed in the intelligence assessments presented by the DCI to the President and the NSC.

4. There are times when current intelligence reporting and assessment is as important to national policy as estimative intelligence. It is not possible, however, to keep current reporting current and at the same time subject it to the time-consuming procedures of formal coordination. The production of current intelligence for the national consumer is therefore delegated by the DCI to the Office of Current Intelligence in CIA. OCI is nevertheless committed to seek the opinions and contributions of other agencies when time permits, and to print dissenting opinions.

E. The DCI Committees. The former United States Intelligence Board had a series of functional sub-committees. These have been retained

after the issuance of E.O. 11905 as subordinate to the DCI, supporting the NFIB and the DCI as circumstances require. Each is designed to coordinate Community activities in its given field. Its Chairman is nominated by the DCI and its membership includes representatives of all interested agencies both within the Community and elsewhere in government. There are four "production" committees, Weapons Systems, Scientific and Technical, Economic, and Atomic Energy; three "collection" committees, SIGINT, Imagery Requirements and Exploitation, and Human Resources; and miscellaneous committees for Security, Information Handling, [redacted] and Critical Collection Problems.

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## V. Covert Action

A. The nature of covert action. In general, covert action is action to influence events abroad taken by the US government either confidentially or in ways that do not reveal its sponsorship. In practice such action can range from large para-military programs (e.g., Laos) through more modest activities designed to influence foreign political opinion to simple "message-carrying."

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The Central Intelligence Agency is responsible under the NSC and the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) for covert action. In the 1950s more than [redacted] of its budget was spent on these activities; in recent years the figure has been less than [redacted]. In addition to covert action programs specifically approved by the OAG, CIA maintains a supporting infra-structure necessary for covert action.

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The OAG was established by E.O. 11905 to replace the NSC subcommittee known under various Administrations as 54/12, 303, and 40 (taken from the numbers of the Presidential directives). In comparison with its predecessors, the OAG is more structured and has more formal procedures. It is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI are members; the Attorney-General and Director, Office of Management and Budget, are observers. The OAG makes written recommendations to the President, with each member required to concur or dissent. Only after Presidential decision is any action taken.

C. Congress and Covert Action. In the past the intelligence subcommittees of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees of both houses were briefed, usually after the fact, on major covert action programs. In addition, informal consultation took place with Committee Chairmen on the occasion of major expenditures and the Committees were formally notified of withdrawals from the Agency's contingency reserve fund with respect to covert action programs and other unforeseen contingencies. This fund was established to provide a means of augmenting CIA appropriations when necessary without requiring recourse to a supplemental appropriation. It would have been necessary

to volunteer the purpose for which any supplemental appropriation was necessary, and this would have threatened the security of the program. Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, however, requires that the President certify each covert action program to be "important to the national security" and to so notify the Foreign Affairs, Armed Services, and Appropriations Committees of both houses of each such finding in a timely fashion. The responsibility for such reporting has been delegated to the DCI by the President. The Executive has complied with this requirement.

## VI. Oversight

A. The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. PFIAB is a board of distinguished citizens appointed by the President to oversee intelligence operations with a view to making them more effective and efficient. PFIAB has been instrumental, for instance, in encouraging the development of collection systems using advanced technology. The full board meets for two days six times a year, and a number of its members participate also on subcommittees and on inspection trips. Its present chairman is Leo Cherne. It has a small permanent staff.

B. The Intelligence Oversight Board. In response to the findings of the Rockefeller Commission on improprieties in intelligence operations, E.O. 11905 established an Intelligence Oversight Board appointed by the President. It is chaired by Ambassador Robert Murphy and also has a small professional staff. Its membership interlocks with that of PFIAB, but it is a separate body reporting to the President through the Attorney-General and the PFIAB. It receives reports from the Inspectors-General and General Counsels of the various intelligence agencies and may conduct investigations of improprieties when it deems warranted. In addition, individual intelligence officers may report improprieties to it without the permission or knowledge of their superiors.

Congressional Oversight. In the past, Congressional oversight over CIA has been exercised by the Armed Services Committees of the Senate and House. (As the sponsoring committees of the National Security Act of 1947, they assumed jurisdiction over agencies created by it.) This remains the arrangement in the House, with responsibility vested in a sub-Committee chaired by Representative Nedzi. This spring, however, the Senate transferred exclusive jurisdiction over CIA to Senator Inouye's Select Committee on Intelligence, and gave it "sequential" jurisdiction (with Armed Services and other oversight committees) over the intelligence activities of Defense and other agencies. To the extent they have requested it, these oversight bodies have been given full access, except for the true names of agents and cooperating foreign intelligence sources, to the entire range of CIA activities.

As noted above, similar access has been given to subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees. The Foreign Affairs Committees and other Congressional committees are, on request, briefed on substantive intelligence assessments within the areas of their jurisdiction, but not on intelligence operations except as required by Section 662.

Annex

"Director of Central Intelligence

(1) The Director of Central Intelligence, pursuant to the National Security Act of 1947, shall be responsible directly to the National Security Council and the President. He shall:

(i) Chair the CFI.

(ii) Act as executive head of the CIA and Intelligence Community staff.

(iii) Ensure the development and submission of a budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program to the CFI.

(iv) Act as the President's primary adviser on foreign intelligence and provide him and other officials in the Executive branch with foreign intelligence, including National Intelligence Estimates; develop national intelligence requirements and priorities; and supervise production and dissemination of national intelligence.

(v) Ensure appropriate implementation of special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives.

(vi) Establish procedures to ensure the propriety of requests, and responses thereto, from the White House Staff or other Executive departments and agencies to the Intelligence Community.

(vii) Ensure that appropriate programs are developed which properly protect intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures. His responsibility within the United States shall be limited to:

(xi) Act as the principal spokesman to the Congress for the Intelligence Community and facilitate the use of foreign intelligence products by Congress.

(xii) Promote the development and maintenance by the Central Intelligence Agency of services of common concern to the Intelligence Community organizations, including multi-discipline analysis, national level intelligence products, and a national level current intelligence publication.

(xiii) Establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection, and designation of relative priorities for the transmission of critical intelligence, and provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing guidance as to the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such intelligence.

(xiv) Establish such committees of collectors, producers and users of intelligence to assist in his conduct of his responsibilities as he deems appropriate.

(xv) Consult with users and producers of intelligence, including the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and the Council of Economic Advisors, to ensure the timeliness, relevancy and quality of the intelligence product."





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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

# **The Logic of the DCI Committee Structure**

*Prepared by the Intelligence Community Staff  
for the Director of Central Intelligence*

**Secret**

NFIB D 27.1/59  
3 January 1977

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THE LOGIC OF THE  
DCI COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

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# THE LOGIC OF THE DCI COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

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## THE LOGIC OF THE DCI COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

### PURPOSE

Modern managers of large organizations are increasingly aware of the value of advisory committees. Indeed, most of the great corporations in America today employ some form of committee structure integrated into a corporate staff as a method of enhancing the ability of management to control the organization.

Most managers are mindful as well of the general disadvantages of any committee system, especially the potential for time and effort inefficiencies and the potential for compromise leading to soft judgments and weak recommendations. A cursory look at the 13 DCI Committees and their more than 50 subcommittees might prompt questions regarding their efficiency. This is particularly so in the historical context, given the *ad hoc* evolution of the committee structure over a period of many years. The purpose of this paper is to show that these considerations to the contrary, the DCI Committee structure today is a logical mechanism which provides effective professional support to the DCI and the Intelligence Community over the wide range of specialized intelligence subjects which they must consider.

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## RECENT HISTORY

Prior to February 1976, the DCI Committees were considered to be working groups subordinate to the United States Intelligence Board (USIB), the advisory body to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) comprised of the senior members of those agencies and Departmental elements which make up the Intelligence Community. While the USIB was formally terminated with the issuance of the President's Executive Order (E.O. 11905) on U.S. Foreign Intelligence Activities on 19 February 1976, it was reconstituted shortly thereafter as the National Foreign Intelligence Board (NFIB); still an advisory body to the DCI on substantive intelligence matters; still under the chairmanship of the DCI. The Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community (D/DCI/IC), however, was established as the NFIB vice chairman and a full voting member. This important change formalized the relationship of the NFIB to the Intelligence Community Staff, which is directed by the D/DCI/IC and supports the DCI in his Community role.

Coincident with these changes, the concept of the former USIB Committees changed as well. In recognition of the fact that the committees are permanent advisory groups whose chairmen are "on-call" to the DCI, they were renamed DCI Committees (instead of "NFIB Committees") in order to underscore their true supporting role. The chairmen and staffs of five of the DCI Committees are currently integrated into the Intelligence Community Staff, and overview of all DCI Committees is exercised by the D/DCI/IC on behalf of the DCI. The D/DCI/IC meets routinely with all DCI Committee chairmen. Hence, the DCI Committees, although still supportive of NFIB tasking, maintain a true Intelligence Community flavor by being directly responsible to the DCI and his Community Staff.

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## BACKGROUND

**Current Committee Structure:** The one informal (SALT Monitoring) and twelve formal DCI Committees are organized in several areas of specific concern dealing with collection, production, and support or other specialized handling. The memberships are generally composed of trained personnel with experience in the field represented by each committee. Members are drawn from all components of the Community and oversight of the committees is exercised by the DCI and/or the D/DCI/IC. The current DCI Committees are:

### Collection

a. *The Human Resources Committee* (HRC) advises and assists the DCI in the discharge of his responsibilities for the efficient allocation and effective use of Community resources for the collection of positive foreign intelligence information through human sources. Current emphasis is on increasing the overt information gathering contribution of all departments and agencies involved in foreign affairs, including those not formally part of the Intelligence Community.

b. *Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation* (COMIREX) provides staff support to, and acts for, the DCI in development and implementation of national-level guidance for overhead imagery collection and exploitation. This means that COMIREX is the DCI's instrument to develop Community requirements to which national collection systems and the National Photographic Interpretation Center are responsive.

c. *The Signals Intelligence Committee* (SIGINT) advises and assists in matters involving SIGINT including guidance for the overhead SIGINT programs, policies and procedures for the conduct of SIGINT arrangements with foreign governments, policies and procedures for the protection of SIGINT, and the preparation of SIGINT requirements and priorities.

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### Production

e. *Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee* (JAEIC) recommends national collection requirements, fosters interagency exchanges of information, and contributes to national intelligence. The JAEIC is also responsible for monitoring implementation of the provisions of Safeguard (d) of the Limited Test Ban Treaty on behalf of the DCI. The likelihood of further nuclear proliferation—the spread of nuclear weapon capabilities to additional foreign countries—is receiving current emphasis.

f. *The Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee* (WSSIC) is responsible for

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coordinating requirements and Intelligence Community production for foreign weapon and space systems. (Formerly the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, limited to foreign missile and space intelligence.)

g. *Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee* (STIC) is to provide early warning of foreign S&T advances, whether indigenous or imported, which could affect significantly the national security or political or economic welfare of the U.S. Examples of technologies on which reports have been made or are being prepared currently include

h. *The Economic Intelligence Committee* (EIC) develops coordinated guidance for the collection of foreign economic intelligence for all relevant users in Washington, D.C.

#### Other Support

i. *The Intelligence Information Handling Committee* (IHC) is responsible for promoting and coordinating planning and procedures for the timely handling of intelligence information in all forms within the Intelligence Community; and for promoting the continuous improvement, integration, and effective use of Community information handling and telecommunications assets and resources.

j. *The Security Committee* provides recommendations regarding security policies and procedures for the protection of foreign intelligence sources and methods. Current emphasis is on studies related to compartmentation and computer security questions.

k. *The Committee on Exchanges* (COMEX) ensures coordination of Intelligence Community interests in U.S. Government official exchanges and bilateral cooperative agreements, and in commercial visits and other related activities. Its concern is the provision of

intelligence advice and support to the Department of State and other elements of the U.S. Government concerned with US-USSR, EE and PRC exchanges and commercial contracts.

l. *The Critical Collection Problems Committee* (CCPC) is a permanent study group responsive to requests submitted to it by the DCI. Recent activities include an update of a study on intelligence activities against narcotics and dangerous drugs, a review of intelligence activities against North Korea, and a broad study on worldwide terrorism.

m. *SALT Monitoring Group* is not a formal DCI Committee, but was created by the NFIB and is responsible to the DCI for guidance to, and supervision of, all intelligence monitoring activities required under the strategic arms limitations agreements with the USSR.

**Recent Changes in Committee Structure:**  
The objectives and performance of DCI Committees undergo periodic review as the dynamics of change impact Community requirements. Reflecting this, a substantial number of changes have taken place in the Committee structure in recent years, as shown below:

a. *Committee on Exchanges* (COMEX), re-established 9 May 1975 following extensive consideration by the NFIB of two major studies on this subject, continues an Intelligence Community function organized in 1956 at the outset of the East-West Exchange Program.

b. *The Critical Collection Problems Committee* (CCPC)—the continued existence of the CCPC was reviewed in early 1976 since some of its functions had been taken over by the National Intelligence Officers and Intelligence Community Staff. Since that time CCPC has demonstrated its unique value by providing studies in special collection areas.

c. *Economic Intelligence Committee* (EIC)—Since it was created in 1954, it has been a catalyst in the current expanded effort throughout much of the Government in the



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field of economic intelligence, reflecting changing emphasis on economic problems.

d. *The Human Resources Committee (HRC)* is a relatively new committee which was established on a trial basis in January 1973 and as a permanent committee in June 1974. Its duties and responsibilities have been greatly expanded since that time. It also has assumed some of the functions of the *Interagency Clandestine Collection Priorities Committee (IPC)* which was disestablished in 1974.

e. *The Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee (STIC)*, established in 1976, is a successor committee to the *Scientific Intelligence Committee*. It concentrates exclusively on S&T intelligence and is no longer involved in current weapons intelligence.

f. *Security Committee* was given new responsibilities, a much broader charter, and a full-time chairman when a new DCI Directive was approved in 1974. It also absorbed the functions of the old *Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee*.

g. *The Signals Intelligence Committee (SIGINT)*—following a major review of the SIGINT Committee by a special *ad hoc* group the committee was provided with a new DCI Directive, broader responsibilities and additional staff support. In 1975 the subcommittee structure of the SIGINT Committee also changed with the establishment of the *SIGINT*

*Requirements Validation and Evaluation Subcommittee (SIRVES)*. At the same time, the *Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee* and *SIGINT Evaluation Subcommittee* were disestablished.

h. *Weapon and Space Systems Intelligence Committee (WSSIC)* is a new committee established in January 1976. It has absorbed the weapons systems intelligence responsibilities of the old *Scientific Intelligence Committee* and is now responsible for coordinating all requirements and Intelligence Community production for foreign weapon and space systems. The mission and functions of the *Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC)* are subsumed within the WSSIC structure.

i. *National Intelligence Survey Committee* was disbanded 30 June 1974.

j. *Watch Committee* was disestablished 3 March 1975 and new and broader responsibilities in strategic warning were assumed by the Special Assistant to the DCI for Strategic Warning and his staff located in the Pentagon.

k. The importance of the DCI Committees was emphasized in 1976 when they were determined to be directly responsible to the DCI instead of subordinate to the NFIB, as was the case under the old USIB concept prior to February 1976.

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## STRENGTHS OF THE COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

It is evident that the current DCI Committee structure is the product of an evolutionary process but that the structure itself has become institutionalized. This is not to say, however, that the structure is unwieldy, outmoded, inefficient or in any other way undesirable. The following comments demonstrate the strengths of the structure:

a. The DCI Committee structure responds to the stated needs of the DCI. The individual committees deal with problems which are of continuing concern to the DCI and the Intelligence Community. Standing committees and a substructure of subcommittees are more effective than *ad hoc* task group handling of problems which are continuing in nature.

b. The committee structure is dynamic. Committees are established, disbanded, or have their charters amended as the situation and Intelligence Community's needs warrant.

c. The committee structure is relatively objective in that it provides a forum for representation of all elements of the Intelligence Community, with no one organization in a position to dominate. Principal membership of each committee is derived from all member agencies represented at the NFIB but, unlike the NFIB, the military services have full membership rather than observer status.

d. The committee structure is not overly costly in manpower. Relatively few personnel are involved full-time with committee work,\*

and in those few cases the committee is handling ongoing day-to-day problems which require constant attention. Most committee chairmen are the heads of line organizations with duty and experience relating directly to the committee subject matter. In most committees the line organizations are available as a source of part-time support to committee activities.

Committee chairmen generally are selected for the expertise which they bring to bear on committee subject matters and function primarily in line jobs related to committee affairs. By the nature of their work they have available to them an appreciation of all-source contributions germane to their respective committees. In some cases it is difficult to separate a chairman's committee work from his regular line duties. More often than not this serves the committee's advantage since the chairman is not totally dependent upon other committee members for information on the subject at hand. The structure provides for all Intelligence Community member agencies to be represented equally on all formal DCI committees. Although there have been exceptions, military personnel are not often named as committee chairmen because the frequency of their reassignment tends to disrupt continuity of committee leadership. Most committee matters are a part-time function for most committee members. Each committee secretariat supplies needed continuity of operations and staff coordination. Each chairman supplies professional knowledge and staff support when

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needed. Full-time committee membership with full-time supporting staffs would create diseconomies of function and manpower.

e. The DCI Committee structure makes a constructive contribution to the entire Community in addition to its support of the NFIB and the DCI, as follows:

(1) The structure provides forums at which the various elements of the Community can present their views in the development of Community positions.

(2) The committees and their working groups become educational focal points for face-to-face exchange of Community views and information. They provide a unique outlet for discussion of parochial ideas or observations.

(3) The structure provides an alternate method of surfacing substantive ideas which merit DCI attention and which otherwise are subject to bureaucratic barriers.

(4) The structure provides for visibility of major issues which can alert the DCI in advance of such issues surfacing at policy levels of other agencies or departments.

f. The IC Staff exists to support the DCI in his Community leadership role. The IC Staff role vis-a-vis the DCI Committee structure assists management by:

(1) Preparing and/or coordinating annual Letters of Instruction from the DCI to committee chairmen. The IC Staff not only sets tasks for committees, but receives annual reports from each committee which are evaluative in nature and which form the basis for new Letters of Instruction.

(2) Periodic meetings of all committee chairmen with the DCI and the D/DCI/IC.

(3) Receiving monthly activity reports from each committee to the D/DCI/IC.

(4) Preparing and initially coordinating pertinent Director of Central Intelligence Directives before submission to the DCI.

(5) Including the chairman and support staffs of five of the DCI Committees (SIGINT, COMIREX, Human Resources, Information Handling, and Security) as members of the IC Staff. Chairmen of the first three also serve as heads of divisions within the staff.

g. The DCI Committee structure provides:

(1) A flexible system for professional support to the DCI. In addition to the wide range of specialized subjects which committees can cover, the committees can be tasked to support the Committee on Foreign Intelligence as appropriate. Each committee chairman is available to the DCI to perform staff studies or other assignments which require a coordinated Community approach.

(2) A unique coordinating mechanism. Given the present structure of the Community, composed as it is of a group of nearly autonomous departments and agencies, there is no other Community-wide system for interagency coordination and information exchange below the level of the NFIB principals. Committees have served to encourage such coordination and exchange. DCID 1/3 directs committee coordination in matters of overlapping concern, and the separate committee DCID's iterate that direction. Additionally, annual Letters of Instruction to each committee may direct coordination with other specifically named committees. Beyond these measures, considerable informal coordination takes place among committees and the IC Staff monitors coordination by acting as focal point for preparation of LOI's and, indeed, by tasking the DCI committees to perform studies and meet other requirements.

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(3) Functional continuity. Because such standing committees provide a more effective means of handling a wide variety of problems than would a series of *ad hoc* committees convened to deal with each new problem, substance continuity is built into the structure.

(4) A useful institutional history. As such, a backdrop exists against which new action items can be viewed from a perspective of

precedent and for efficacy of previous treatment.

(5) An effective safeguard system for the DCI. The NIO structure effectively complements the DCI committees. The geographic orientation of the former and the topical/functional orientation of the latter combine to form a net in which to catch issues of omission. This tends to force DCI attention to such matters, enabling them to be treated on an *ad hoc* basis.

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## CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

This paper is not intended to measure the relative value of each DCI committee, but to present the entire committee mechanism in a positive light, to show that there is logic to this supporting system. Many commonly desirable organizational characteristics are incorporated in the DCI Committee structure and several which are uniquely desirable. No serious weaknesses exist which defy explanation. It is likely that no other organizational system could replace the committee structure without objectionable trade-offs in manpower, objectivity and effectiveness. The structure supports the DCI and the Intelli-

gence Community as it is supposed to do while providing a mechanism through which issues can surface from below. The system works.

The weight of logic indicates that the DCI Committee structure should be retained so long as the Intelligence Community exists in its present form. The process of change is apparently an inherent part of the committee structure. It is important, therefore, that management of the committee system include provisions for continuing review of the several committees and that such review enjoy a high management priority.

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